Digest of Decisions

Growth Management Hearings Board



Digest

Washington State Growth Management Hearings Board

In 1990, the Legislature enacted the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, to create a state-wide method for comprehensive land use planning that would prevent uncoordinated and unplanned growth. The Legislature subsequently established three independent Growth Management Hearings Boards – Eastern Washington, Western Washington, Central Puget Sound - and authorized these boards to "hear and determine" allegations that a city, county, or state agency has not complied with the goals and requirements of the GMA, and related provisions of the Shoreline Management Act (SMA), RCW 90.58, and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), RCW 43.21C.

During the 2010 Legislative session, with Senate Bill 6214, the Legislature restructured the Growth Management Hearings Boards, establishing a single seven-member board to hear cases on a regional basis; this new structure became effective on July 1, 2010. **Therefore, this Digest of Decisions represents a synopsis by keyword of the substantive decisions issued by the Growth Management Hearings Board from July 1, 2010 onward**. The Digest includes decisions of all three regions (Eastern, Western and Central Puget Sound). Historical synopses of Board decisions from Eastern, Western and Central Puget Sound issued prior to July 1, 2010 are contained in those Boards' respective individual Digests of Decisions on the GMHB website.

The Digest provides synopses of cases and their key holdings, with quick links to each substantive decision and to the key holdings text. A glossary of acronyms is provided at the end. The case synopses and key-holdings excerpts are provided for the convenience of practitioners and should not be relied on out of context. Further, **users of this Digest are reminded that decisions of the Board may be appealed to court and thus some of the excerpted cases may have been impacted by subsequent court and/or Board rulings. It is the responsibility of the user to research the case thoroughly prior to relying on holdings of a decision.**

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Region 1: Eastern Washington

Benton • Chelan • Columbia • Douglas • Ferry • Franklin • Garfield • Grant • Kittitas • Pend Oreille • Spokane • Stevens • Walla Walla • Yakima

Region 1: Eastern Washington Table of Cases[1]

1997 Cases

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County v. Ferry County,* Case No. 97-1-0018c** [2]
  The Board concluded that Ferry County was not in compliance with the requirements of the Growth Management Act relating to: (1) including the Best Available Science in designating and protecting Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas under RCW 36.70A.170, RCW 36.70A.060(2), and RCW 36.70A.172, and (2) including the Best Available Science in protecting Wetlands under RCW 36.70A.060(2) and RCW 36.70A.172. At the compliance hearing, the County conceded it had taken no legislative action to achieve compliance. *Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance [Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas] (January 23, 2013)*

  Key Holdings: Critical Areas

  The Board found Ferry County in continuing non-compliance with the GMA requirement to include the Best Available Science in designating and protecting Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas for Bull Trout and Common Loon under RCW 36.70A.170, RCW 36.70A.060(2), and RCW 36.70A.172. Compliance was found regarding designation and protection of habitat for Grizzly Bear, Pygmy Whitefish, Bald Eagle, Fisher, Peregrine Falcon, Canada Lynx, and Gray Wolf. *Order Finding Continuing Non-Compliance [Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas] (February 5, 2014)*

  Key Holdings: Critical Areas (Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas)

2001 Cases

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County, et al. v. Ferry County,* Case No. 01-1-0019**
  Ferry County was found out of compliance with the requirements relating to the designation of Agricultural Lands of Long-Term Commercial Significance under RCW 36.70A.170, RCW 36.70A.030, RCW 36.70A.060(1)(b), and RCW 36.70A.020. *Eighth Compliance Order (December 16, 2011)*; *Ninth Compliance Order [Agricultural Resource Lands] (February 8, 2013)*

  Key Holdings: Agricultural Lands, Invalidity

  The County then amended its Comprehensive Plan and Future Land Use Map to designate 479,373 acres of land as Agricultural Lands of Long-Term Commercial Significance and to change its development regulations. The Board found the County in compliance with the requirements relating to the designation of ALLTCS. *Order Finding Compliance (February 14, 2014)*

  Key Holdings: External Consistency

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[1] For pre-2010 rulings on Eastern cases, please refer to the Eastern Digest prior to July 1, 2010.

[2] This case was previously coordinated with Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County, Case No. 06-1-0003. On January 23, 2013, the Board consolidated the two cases under Case No. 97-1-0018c.

2005 Cases

- ***Futurewise v. Stevens County,* Case No. 05-1-0006**
  The Board's 2006 FDO concluded Stevens County had failed to designate all of the identified habitats of Endangered, Threatened, and Sensitive (ETS) species as fish and wildlife conservation areas and failed to consider Best Available Science in designating all of the identified habitats of ETS species as fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas in establishing protections for the functions and values of critical habitat areas. The Board's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [146 Wn.App. 493 (2008)]. Following several compliance extensions, interim regulations to protect ETS species and associated Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas were made permanent. The Board found Stevens County in compliance. *Order Finding Compliance (December 14, 2011)*

2006 Cases

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 06-1-0003**
  See Case No. 97-1-0018c.

2007 Cases

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, et al. v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 07-1-0004c**
  The Board's Final Decision and Order (August 20, 2007) was largely affirmed by the Supreme Court, (172 Wn.2d 144, (2011)). The Board determined the County's actions achieved compliance on several issues relating to the rural element of the County's plan but found continuing non-compliance with respect to measures to protect rural character as required by RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c). *Compliance Order [Post-Court Remand] (May 31, 2013).*

- ***Larson Beach Neighbors and Jeanie Wagenman v. Stevens County*, Case No. 07-1-0013**
  The Board's Final Decision and Order (October 6, 2008) found the County had not complied with GMA requirements to protect critical areas. The Board's subsequent order finding continuing non-compliance (April 2009) was upheld by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. *Third Order on Compliance – Finding Continuing Noncompliance (February 22, 2013).*

2008 Cases

- ***Wes Hazen, et al. v. Yakima County, et al.,* Case No. 08-1-0008c**
  Five groups of petitioners challenged Yakima County's adoption of critical areas regulations, protection for agricultural resource lands, and designation of LAMIRDs in rural areas. The cases were consolidated as Case No. 08-1-0008c and a Final Decision and Order was entered April 10, 2010 [see prior Digest]. On remand the County took action to comply. A challenge to the compliance action filed by Hazen, et al. as Case No. 09-1-0014 was coordinated for subsequent proceedings. *Partial Coordinated Compliance Order (April 27, 2011)*; *Partial Compliance Order (May 20, 2011)*; *Coordinated Order Finding [Partial] Compliance (January 13, 2012)*. The Court in *Yakima County v. EWGMHB,* 168 Wn.App. 680 (2012) affirmed the Board's stream buffer width determination but reversed as to ephemeral streams. *Order on Remand [Type 5 Ephemeral Streams] (December 3, 2012)*.

Key Holdings: Compliance, Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas (CARAs), LAMIRDs

2009 Cases

- ***John Brodeur, Futurewise, Vince Panesko and Department of Commerce v. Benton County,* Case No. 09-1-0010c**
  Petitioners challenged Benton County's redesignation of rural lands and proposed expansion of the West Richland UGA. The Board found the County's increase in rural densities, failure to analyze capital facilities needs and UGA expansion were noncompliant. *Final Decision and Order, Rural Lands (November 24, 2009)*. *Final Decision and Order, West Richland UGA (December 2, 2009)*. The County's non-compliant actions were rescinded and the case was closed. *Order Finding Compliance – Rural Lands (July 16, 2010)*; *Order Finding Compliance [West Richland UGA] (April 26, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Urban Growth Area – Sizing

- ***Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County,* Case No. 09-1-0013**
  Petitioners challenged Walla Walla County's compliance efforts relating to designation and protection of Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas and the requirement to include Best Available Science. The Board found the County out of compliance regarding the GMA's requirements to designate and protect areas with a critical recharging effect on aquifers used for potable water. *Compliance Order (April 5, 2012)*. The County enacted regulations based on Best Available Science and the Board found compliance. *Order Finding Compliance (June 3, 2013)*.

  Key Holdings: Critical Areas (Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas)

- ***Wes Hazen, Upper Wenas Preservation Association and Futurewise v. Yakima County,* Case No. 09-1-0014, coordinated with 08-1-0008c**
  See Case No. 08-1-0008c.

2010 Cases

- ***John Brodeur, Futurewise and Vince Panesko v. Benton County (Richland UGA),* Case No. 10-1-0001c [3]**
  The parties stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (August 17, 2010).*

- ***John Brodeur, Futurewise and Vince Panesko v. Benton County (Benton City UGA),* Case No. 10-1-0002c [4]**
  The parties stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (August 17, 2010).*

[3] Case No. 10-1-0001c is the consolidation of the issues related to Resolution 09-727 in Case No. 09-1-0015c and Case No. 10-1-0001.
[4] Case No. 10-1-0002c is the consolidation of the issues related to Resolution 09-728 in Case No. 09-1-0015c and Case No. 10-1-0002.

- ***Community Addressing Urban Sprawl Excess (CAUSE) v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0003**
  Due to withdrawal of petitioner, Board vacated FDO while matter was pending before superior court. *Order Lifting Invalidity and Vacating Final Decision and Order (March 8, 2011).*

- ***Futurewise v. Douglas County,* Case No. 10-1-0004**
  Petitioners challenged the County's resolution summarizing and confirming its multi-year phased comprehensive plan update actions. The petition alleged provisions of two previously-enacted amendments failed to comply with the GMA. The Board dismissed the petition as untimely, ruling a challenge to the disputed enactments was time-barred. *Final Decision and Order (August 31, 2010).*

  Key Holdings: Amendment, Timeliness

- ***City of Wenatchee v. Chelan County,* Case No. 10-1-0005**
  Parties stipulated to dismissal as result of a mediated settlement. *Order of Dismissal (July 26, 2010).*

- ***Futurewise v. Spokane County,* Case No. 10-1-0006**
  The Board determined two challenged LAMIRDs complied with GMA requirements for limited areas of more intensive rural development. *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010).*

  Key Holdings: Timeliness, Standing, Equitable Doctrines

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0007**
  The Tribes challenged Yakima County's failure to properly designate critical areas. The Board determined the County's designation of hydrologically-related critical areas with which endangered species have a primary association complies with the GMA. *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010).*

  Key Holding: Critical Areas – Fish and Wildlife Habitat

- ***Judy Crowder, et al. v. Spokane County,* Case No. 10-1-0008**
  Petitioners challenged the County's rural cluster development provisions. The Board found the Comprehensive Plan and regulatory provisions complied with the GMA by providing permanent protection for open space in cluster development. *Final Decision and Order (August 24, 2010).*

  Key Holding: Innovative Techniques

- ***The City of Chelan v. Chelan County,* Case No. 10-1-0009**
  The parties settled the matter and stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (August 18, 2010).*

- ***Michael Fenske, et al. v. Spokane County,* Case No. 10-1-0010**
  Petitioners challenged the County's Comprehensive Plan map amendment allowing high-density residential development on a parcel with limited access. The Board denied a motion to dismiss for defective service, finding substantial compliance. *Order On Motion to Dismiss (May 27, 2010)*. The Board invalidated the map amendment because capital facilities planning was not in place to support the high-density designation. *Final Decision and Order (September 3, 2010)* Affirmed as to service, reversed as to capital facilities planning, *Spokane County v. EWGMHB*, 173 Wn.App. 310 (January 31, 2013).

  Key Holdings: Service, Capital Facilities

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011**
  The Yakama Nation challenged Ecology's approval of Yakima County's Shoreline Master Program**.** The Board upheld the SMP with respect to application of the "optimum implementation" standard required for shorelines of statewide significance. Designation of the floodplain, conditional allowance of surface mining in the shoreline, and vegetative buffer widths were also upheld. The SMP was remanded for completion of the cumulative impacts analysis for surface mining. *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011)*. Ecology and the County complied, and the case was closed. *Order Finding Compliance (February 8, 2012.)*

  Key Holdings: Burden of Proof, Equitable Doctrines, Exhibits, Shoreline Management Act – Standard of Review, Shoreline Management Act, Shorelines of Statewide Significance, Participation Standing

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012**
  Pilcher challenged the City of Spokane's Shoreline Master Program as approved by Department of Ecology. The Board permitted an amended Petition naming Ecology as an additional respondent and denied motions to dismiss the Petition for failure to timely name and serve Ecology. *Order Denying Motions to Dismiss (December 8, 2010)* (Board member Roehl dissenting). The Board determined the challenged amendments to the City's SMP complied with the applicable SMA provisions and Shoreline Master Program guidelines. *Final Decision and Order (March 22, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Petition for Review, Service, Shoreline Management Act – Standard of Review, Shoreline Management Act, Supplemental Evidence

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 10-1-0013**
  Responding to Petitioners' "failure to act" challenge, the Board determined Kittitas County had failed to adopt transportation concurrency regulations as required by RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b). *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011)*. The County adopted the necessary concurrency ordinance and the Board found compliance. *Order Finding Compliance (February 9, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Failure to Act, Timeliness, Invalidity, Concurrency

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 10-1-0014**
  Petitioners alleged the County failed to review and revise its critical areas ordinances. The Board determined the petition was not filed within 60 days after publication of the County's seven-year GMA update and was therefore time-barred. *Final Decision and Order (June 3, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Updates, Failure to Act, Timeliness

2011 Cases

- ***Kittitas County Conservation and Futurewise v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001**
  Petitioners challenged Kittitas County's expansion of the Thorp LAMIRD. The Board concluded the County's action failed to comply with the applicable LAMIRD requirements and created internal plan inconsistencies. In addition, the Board found Kittitas County failed to comply with the procedural requirements of SEPA. The Board first issued a partial Final Decision and Order addressing only those aspects relating to SEPA and subsequently issued an FDO on the remaining issues. The Board issued a determination of Invalidity. *Corrected Final Decision and Order (Partial) (June 13, 2011); Final Decision and Order (Partial) (July 12, 2011).* Affirmed, 2013 Wash.App. LEXIS 1873 (August 13, 2013).

  Key Holdings: Internal Consistency, Invalidity, Jurisdiction, LAMIRDs, SEPA

- ***Leon S. Savaria v. Yakima County,* Case No. 11-1-0002**
  On County's dispositive motion, Board dismissed challenge to County's denial of petitioner's application to de-designate agricultural land. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (May 4, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Agricultural Lands (Innovative Zoning), Definitions

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 11-1-0003**
  Ferry County filed a motion for summary judgment requesting dismissal of all issues. The GMHB Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that dispositive motions are permitted on a limited record "to determine the board's jurisdiction, the standing of a petitioner, or the timeliness of the petition." The Board deemed the motion to be a dispositive motion analogous to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the Superior Court Civil Rules, granting the motion in part only. *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011).* After a hearing on the merits, the Board remanded to the County to comply with GMA requirements for designation of mineral and agricultural resource lands. *Final Decision and Order (December 17, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction, Standing, Petition for Review, Equitable Doctrines - Collateral Estoppel

  The County then amended its Comprehensive Plan and Future Land Use Map to designate approximately 1.4 million acres of land as Mineral Resource Lands of Long-Term Commercial Significance, excluding urban areas. The Board found the County in compliance with GMA

requirements relating to the designation and conservation of its resource lands under RCW 36.70A.020, RCW 36.70A.030, RCW 36.70A.060, RCW 36.70A.070, and RCW 36.70A.170. *Order Finding Compliance (February 20, 2014).*

2012 Cases

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 12-1-0001**
  The parties settled the matter and stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (March 7, 2013)*

- ***Five Mile Prairie Neighborhood Association and Futurewise v. Spokane County,* Case No. 12-1-0002**
  Petitioners challenged two amendments to the County's comprehensive plan and zoning code. In addressing the question of jurisdiction, the Board determined the concurrent plan and regulation amendment was within the Board's jurisdiction. It also found the change in designation for a housing development was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan and with the criteria for a zone reclassification in the County Zoning Code. *Final Decision and Order (August 23, 2012)*. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, unpublished opinion; *Spokane County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd*., 2015 Wash. App. LEXIS 755 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015); review denied.

  Key Holding: Jurisdiction

- ***Douglas County Coalition for Responsible Government, Douglas Action Committee, and Futurewise v. Douglas County,* Case No. 12-1-0003**
  The parties settled the matter and stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (January 9, 2013).*

2013 Cases

- ***Joshua Corning and Building North Central Washington v. Douglas County*, Case No. 13-1-0001**
  Petitioners challenged an ordinance restricting the number of land segregations allowed by the County in designated agricultural lands. The decision on a motion for summary judgment based on a failure to timely notify the Department of Commerce was deferred to the Hearing on the Merits. The Board ruled the County's subsequent filing with Commerce complied with statutory notification requirements. One Board member dissented, noting that a Statement of Actions Taken should have been required, showing evidence of County consideration of state agency comments. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2013).*

  Key Holding: Notice

- ***Futurewise v. Spokane County and the Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 13-1-0002**
  See Case No. 13-1-0003c.

- ***Spokane Riverkeeper, The Lands Council, and Trout Unlimited v. Spokane County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 13-1-0003c**[5]
  Petitioners appealed a decision by the Washington State Department of Ecology to give "Final Ecology Approval of Spokane County Shoreline Master Program Comprehensive Update." The Board upheld the decision on critical areas-wetlands, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation trails, channel migration zones, and public access but reversed the decision as to on-site sewage systems and remanded. *Final Decision and Order (December 23, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Shorelines, Shoreline Management Act – Standard of Review

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, Futurewise, Five Mile Prairie Neighborhood Association, Southgate Neighborhood Council, The Glenrose Association, Paul Kropp, Larry Kunz, and Dan Handerson v. Spokane County,* Case No. 13-1-0004**
  See Case No. 13-1-0006c.

- ***Edward Coyne & West Richland Citizens for Smart Growth v. City of West Richland and Charles Grigg,* Case No. 13-1-0005**
  Petitioners challenged a comprehensive plan amendment and area-wide rezone resulting in the change of a property's land use from low density residential to commercial. Challenges focused primarily on public participation, a lack of findings, and internal Comprehensive Plan inconsistency. The Board found the City was in compliance with GMA requirements. *Final Decision and Order (March 5, 2014).* The Board decision was upheld by the Benton County Superior Ct., No. 14-2-00880-2; Matter pending Ct. of Appeals, Div. III, 336531.

  Key Holdings: Findings, Internal Consistency, Public Participation

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, et al. v. Spokane County,* Case No. 13-1-0006c**[6]
  Petitioners challenged a County resolution expanding County UGAs. The Board granted a Dispositive Motion regarding public participation and remanded the resolution back to the County for compliance. The Board determined the County changed its population growth target in the resolution without adequate public review and comment. *Order Granting Dispositive Motion Re: Public Participation (November 26, 2013)*. Board upheld on direct review, 188 Wn. App 467 (June 18, 2015).

  Key Holdings: Public Participation, Population Projections

- ***Spokane County, City of Spokane, and Spokane Airport Board v. City of Airway Heights,* Case No. 13-1-0007**
  Spokane County, the City of Spokane, and the Spokane Airport Board challenged the City of Airway Heights' adoption of a conditional use process for multi-family residential development in the vicinity of Fairchild Air Force Base and Spokane International Airport, alleging the

[5] Case No. 13-1-0003c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 13-1-0002 and 13-1-0003.
[6] Case No. 13-1-0006c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 13-1-0004 and 13-1-0006.

regulations failed to protect military installations and airports from incompatible development. The Board found violations of RCW 36.70A.530, RCW 36.70A.510, RCW 36.70.547, and RCW 36.70A.200 and imposed invalidity. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014).*

Compliance with the Board's FDO was placed in "abeyance" due to an appeal. *Order of Abeyance (March 20, 2015).*

Reversed by Spokane County Superior Ct., No. 14-2-02535-6. Ct. of Appeals affirmed Board in part (and order of invalidity reinstated), reversed in part; 193 Wn. App. 282 (4/12/16); Reconsideration denied by City of Airway Heights v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 2016 Wash. App. LEXIS 1259 (Wash. Ct. App., May 31, 2016).

Key Holdings: Airports, EPFs

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Klickitat County,* Case No. 13-1-0008**
  Petitioner challenged Klickitat County's update of its critical area ordinance. The Board dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction as Klickitat County is a partial-planning county, one which is neither required to nor had chosen to plan under RCW 36.70A.040. *Order of Dismissal (November 22, 2013).*

  Key Holding: Jurisdiction

- ***The Lands Council and Spokane Riverkeeper v. Spokane County,* Case No. 13-1-0009**
  The Petitioners challenged the County's adoption of a revised definition of "Qualified Biologist", alleging the new definition allowed individuals with education and professional experience in subjects other than biology to be considered a "Qualified Biologist". The parties were granted a settlement extension which led to resolution of the matter. The case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (April 22, 2014).*

2014 Cases

- ***Eric Davis v. Stevens County,* Case No. 14-1-0001**
  The Petitioner challenged the County's revisions of the logical outer boundaries of the Loon Lake LAMIRD, raising some of the same issues presented in Case No. 06-1-0009c. Several settlement extensions were granted and the matter was eventually dismissed, following resolution of the 2006 case. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (April 8, 2015).*

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0002**
  The petitioner challenged the County's comprehensive plan amendments related to the capital facilities plan's level of service (LOS) standards regarding police and parks as well as provisions related to the provision of urban services to rural/natural resource lands. The Board found violations of RCW 36.70A.070(3), RCW 36.70A.110(4), a failure to be guided by GMA planning goals RCW 36.70A.020(1) and (12), and imposed invalidity. *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014)*. A motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying for Reconsideration*

(November 17, 2014). This dispute was mediated, and the parties are now collaborating on comprehensive plan amendments to achieve compliance with the GMA.

Key Holdings: Capital Facilities, Urban Services

- ***Futurewise v. Benton County,* Case No. 14-1-0003**
  Petitioner challenged Benton County's expansion of Kennewick's urban growth area into 1,263 acres of agricultural lands for industrial purposes. Although the state legislature recognized UGA amendments for industrial purposes by adopting RCW 36.70A.1301, the Board found the County's action was not based on the County's" planned population growth" and violated the Act's requirement to protect agricultural lands and prevent developmental sprawl. *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014)*. The Board granted a *Certificate of Appealability (December 17, 2014)*. The County rescinded its action, the Board found compliance, and the appeal was dismissed. *Order Finding Compliance (May 20, 2015)*.

  Key Holdings: UGAs, De-designation of Agricultural Lands

- ***Roger D. Whitten v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0004**
  See Case No. 14-1-0006c.

- ***Chris Schettle v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0005**
  See Case No. 14-1-0006c.

- ***Roger D. Whitten, Chris Schettle, and Derrick Hansen v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0006c[7]**
  Petitioners challenged the County's allowance of weddings and social events in agricultural zones. The Board found that the regulations included the key provisions and protective criteria of recent legislative amendments regarding agricultural accessory uses, and that the County supplemented them with additional public services standards. The key questions were whether the amended regulations were inconsistent with the size, scale and intensity of agricultural use, failed to protect agriculture, and failed to conserve agricultural lands of long term commercial significance, in violation of RCW 36.70A.177 and WAC 365-196-815? No GMA violations were found and the case was closed. *Final Decision and Order (January 7, 2015)*.

  Key Holdings: Agricultural Accessory Uses

2015 Cases

- ***CPM Development Corporation v. City of Spokane Valley,* Case No. 15-1-0001**
  The Petitioner challenged the City's adoption of a one-year moratorium prohibiting mining and mineral product manufacturing. The City repealed the challenged ordinance and the matter

[7] Case No. 14-1-0006c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 14-1-0004, 14-1-0005, and 14-1-0006.

was dismissed on stipulation. See Case No. 15-1-0002 which challenges a subsequent, similar moratorium. *Order of Dismissal (September 1, 2015)*.

- ***CPM Development Corporation v. City of Spokane Valley, Case No. 15-1-0002***
  See Case No. 15-1-0003c.

- ***CPM Development Corporation v. City of Spokane Valley, Case No. 15-1-0003c*** [8]
  Petitioner challenged the adoption, pursuant to RCW 36.70A.390, of a one-year moratorium prohibiting mining and mineral product manufacturing.

- ***CPM Development Corporation v. City of Spokane Valley,* Case No. 15-1-0004**
  Challenge of the City's adopted comprehensive plan and development regulations on April 25, 2006, for failure to act to adopt policies and regulations related to mineral resource land designation and protection.

2016 Cases

- ***Shrine Park Association, Inc. and Cascade Enterprises Limited Partnership v. City of Spokane,* Case No. 16-1-0001**
  Challenge of the City of Spokane's action to amend the City of Spokane Comprehensive Plan under Ordinance No. C35310. This matter is pending.

- ***Central Washington Growers Association, et al. v. Chelan County,* Case No. 16-1-0002**
  Challenge of Chelan County Resolution 2016-14. This matter is pending.

- ***Confederated Tribs and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Kittitas County and Ecology,* Case No. 16-1-0003**
  Challenge of the Kittitas Ordinance No. 2016-006. This matter is pending.

- ***Vaughns 57th Avenue, LLC v. City of Spokane,* Case No. 16-1-0004**
  Challenge of the City of Spokane's amendments to Ordinance No. C35360, Ordinance No. C35359, and Ordinance C35370. This matter is pending.

- ***Laurie Ness and Patrick Paulson v. City of Richland,* Case No. 16-1-0005**
  Challenge of City of Richland Resolution 78-16. This matter is pending.

[8] Case No. 15-1-0003c is the consolidation of case Nos. 15-1-0002 and 15-1-0003.

Region 1: Eastern Washington Digest of Decisions by Key Holdings

Agricultural Accessory Uses

- ***Roger D. Whitten, Chris Schettle, and Derrick Hansen v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0006c:** [To meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of RCW 36.70A.177(2) and (3), the petitioner must show the proposed] "accessory uses" fail to satisfy the following elements:
  (1) "support, promote, or sustain agricultural operations and production;"
  (2) "are located, designed, and operated so as to not interfere with . . . overall agricultural use of the property and neighboring properties;"
  (3) "consistent with the size, scale, and intensity of the existing agricultural use;"
  (4) "shall not be located outside the general area already developed for buildings and residential uses;"
  (5) "shall not otherwise convert more than one acre of agricultural land to nonagricultural uses." *Final Decision and Order (January 7, 2015),* p. 7.
  . . . rather than allowing for permanent changes in the use of land in the Small Tract Agriculture area, the allowed action is temporary, may only continue for a period of up to six months, may not involve the erection of a substantial structure, and is revocable. *Final Decision and Order (January 7, 2015), p. 12.*

Agricultural Lands

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County, et al. v. Ferry County,* Case No. 01-1-0019:** Ferry County's designation criteria for Agricultural Lands of Long-Term Commercial Significance do not comply with the requirements in RCW 36.70A.170 and RCW 36.70A.030 because the criteria do not refer to and do not consider statutory Factor 1 (not already characterized by urban growth) or Factor 2 (primarily devoted to commercial production of 13 enumerated agricultural products). *Eighth Compliance Order (December 16, 2011), pg. 16.*

Airports

- ***Spokane County, City of Spokane, and Spokane Airport Board v. City of Airway Heights,* Case No. 13-1-0007*:*** To ensure that lands near military installations are protected from incompatible development, amendments to comprehensive plans and development regulations should not allow development that is incompatible with the military installation's ability to carry out its mission requirements or to undertake new missions. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014), pg. 7 and pg. 17.*

  By focusing on noise contours determined at the time of project application, the Ordinances fail to make allowances for future mission changes or the use of different aircraft at FAFB. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014), pg. 13.*

  In particular, significant weight should be given to the comments about noise and aircraft safety hazards which were submitted by Fairchild Air Force Base, Spokane International Airport, and the Federal Aviation Administration [as well as 2008 findings of the Spokane County Hearing Examiner, as upheld by the Court of Appeals]. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014), pg. 17.*

RCW 36.70.547 requires that each county, city, or town where a general aviation airport is located "shall, through its comprehensive plan and development regulations, discourage the siting of incompatible uses adjacent to such general aviation airport." *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014), pg. 22.*

Innovative Zoning

- ***Leon S. Savaria v. Yakima County,* GMHB Case No. 11-1-0002:** Board holding RCW 36.70A.177 uses the word "may," thus which innovative zoning techniques to be used is within the County's discretion. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (May 4, 2011), pg. 3.*

Amendment

- ***Futurewise v. Douglas County*, Case No. 10-1-0004**: A "Failure to Revise" challenge (1) must be filed within 60 days after publication of the county's seven year update and (2) must concern aspects of a comprehensive plan that are directly affected by new or recently amended GMA provisions. Petitioner, as the party with the burden of proof, must show that both of these elements are satisfied in order to proceed to the merits of a Failure to Revise challenge. *Final Decision and Order (August 31, 2010), at 7.*

Burden of Proof

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** [Issues not stated in the petition may not be raised for the first time in the opening brief] *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 16.*

Capital Facilities

- ***Michael Fenske, et al. v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0010:** [The Board's ruling that capital facilities planning must be completed at map amendment stage was reversed by the Court of Appeals based on the County's concurrency ordinance.] *Final Decision and Order (September 3, 2010)*

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0002:** This Board has held that "[a]ll facilities included in the [capital facilities element] CFE must have a minimum standard (LOS) clearly labeled as such (i.e., not "guidelines" or "criteria"). . . ." The Board has also held that establishing an LOS is an objective way to measure the adequacy of a facility or service, but the GMA does not dictate what is inadequate; the setting of an LOS standard is a policy decision left to the discretion of local elected officials. *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014), p. 7.*

  [In addressing LOS for both police and parks, the Board stated the adopted LOS do] not establish a minimum capacity, i. e., how many officers are required to adequately serve and protect the citizens of Spokane County? [They also do] not require that capacity "must be provided per unit of demand or appropriate measure of need." The new LOS is not equated to a

unit of demand or measure of need. . . . *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014), pgs. 7-8.*

The GMA requires a reassessment of the land use element if the needed parks cannot be constructed, not a choice to not acquire the parks. *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014), p. 8.*

. . . the new LOS standards . . . do not indicate they are a "baseline standard" "below which the jurisdiction will not allow service to fall." In fact, the LOS standards are so general you cannot ascertain the baseline (citing WAC 365-196-415(5)(b)(iii)). *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014), p. 9.*

More significantly, the new law enforcement and parks LOS standards are not compliant with the GMA's goals and requirements to show the capacities of existing Capital Facilities and the future needs and capacities of expanded or new Capital Facilities. *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014), p. 10.*

Critical Areas

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County, Case No. 97-1-0018, coordinated with Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 06-1-0003:** There was no substantial evidence in the record to support a County finding that Best Available Science was included in designating the following types of Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas: (1) areas where Endangered, Threatened, and Sensitive Species have a Primary Association, and (2) Habitats and Species of Local Importance. On remand, Ferry County should provide a reasoned justification for departing from Best Available Science in designating Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas. *Compliance Order (December 1, 2011), page 16.*

Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas (CARAs)

- ***Hazen, et al. v. Yakima County*, Coordinated Case Nos. 08-1-0008c and 09-1-0014:** WAC 365-190-080(4) states that counties and cities should designate critical areas by using maps and performance standards, and counties and cities should clearly state that maps showing known critical areas are only for information or illustrative purposes … [during its compliance efforts, Yakima County's CARA map, which was based on older, superseded science, was not reviewed or revised to reflect updated best available science, thus] …Without a mapping update to include Best Available Science, the pre-existing CARA designation map does not comply with the GMA. *Coordinated Compliance Order/Issuance of Stay (April 27, 2011) at 10.*

- ***Citizens for Good Governance v. Walla Walla County,* Case No. 09-1-0013:** The Board remanded to the County to achieve compliance on three issues: (1) Include the Best Available Science regarding horizontal permeability underlying the airport; and determine whether or not the aquifer contamination risk at the airport satisfies the GMA's standard of being a vulnerable aquifer -- as indicated by the combined effect of land uses and hydrogeologic conditions that contribute directly or indirectly to or facilitate contamination of groundwater; (2) Determine

whether or not the Shallow Gravel Aquifer is vulnerable to contamination conveyed through Zone 2 recharge areas; and if vulnerability is found, classify/designate Zone 2 recharge areas according to whether or not the Shallow Gravel Aquifer is vulnerable to contamination from identified Zone 2 recharge areas; (3) Either amend its regulations as to aquifer contamination threats from pre-existing non-conforming uses to reflect the inclusion of Best Available Science, or provide a reasoned justification for departing from the Best Available Science as to aquifer contamination threats from pre-existing non-conforming uses within CARAs. *Compliance Order (April 5, 2012), page 27.*

The Board found and concluded that Walla Walla County had included the Best Available Science in designating and protecting Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas and had achieved compliance with the Growth Management Act as to the GMA's requirements to designate and protect critical areas. *Order Finding Compliance [Re: Critical Aquifer Recharge Areas] (June 3, 2013).*

Essential Public Facilities (EPFs)

- ***Spokane County, City of Spokane, and Spokane Airport Board v. City of Airway Heights,* Case No. 13-1-0007:** RCW 36.70A.200(5) prohibits the adoption of plans or development regulations that "preclude the siting of essential public facilities," including, by implication, their operations or expansion. Here Airway Heights amended its development regulations to allow residential uses conditionally in the commercially-zoned area despite directions from SIA (Spokane International Airport) and WSDOT that residential development in the area would jeopardize SIA's planned parallel runway. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2014), pg.2*6.

Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County v. Ferry County,* Case No. 97-1-0018c:** [In addressing bull trout critical habitat, the Board stated: [T]he absence of federally-designated critical habitat is not a determinative fact for purposes of a county's GMA designation of areas where ETS species have a "primary association." *Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance [Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas] (January 23, 2013) at p. 11.*

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0007:** [The] Yakima County map, together with the various performance standards, definitions, and policy statements in Yakima County Code Chapter 16C.06, constitutes Yakima County's designation of fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas for aquatic species located outside of SMA jurisdiction, as contemplated by the GMA and reflecting a consideration of the applicable Department of Commerce Guidelines. Petitioner offered no evidence that this multi-layered approach to habitat designation fails to satisfy the requirement in RCW 36.70A.170(1). *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010), at 9.*

Compliance

- ***Hazen, et al. v. Yakima County*, Coordinated Case Nos. 08-1-0008c and 09-1-0014:** [T]he compliance date established in the Board's FDO is the *deadline* by which the legislative action is

to be taken. That is, an ordinance putting in place remedial policies or regulations must be formally adopted by the County by this deadline. Compliance is not achieved by taking steps; compliance is determined only after the jurisdiction has taken action through its governing body by adopting ordinances or resolutions which implement the GMA. *Coordinated Compliance Order/Issuance of Stay (April 27, 2011)*, at 6.

- ***Hazen, et al. v. Yakima County*, Case No. 08-1-0008c:** [Petitioner's arguments are beyond the scope of the issue statements in the PFR] Accordingly, the Board cannot consider those specific arguments since to do so would be to issue an advisory opinion on issues not presented to the Board in the Statement of Issues, contrary to RCW 36.70A.290(1). Petitioner must file a new PFR to challenge new issues falling outside the scope of the original PFR. *Partial Compliance Order (May 20, 2011)*, at 6.

Concurrency

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 10-1-0013:** RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b) requires that local jurisdictions must adopt and enforce ordinances which prohibit development approval if the development causes the level of service on a locally owned transportation facility to decline below the standards adopted in the transportation element of the comprehensive plan … [T]he County was unable to cite any provisions that would prohibit development approval, aside from subdivision approval, if the development causes the level of service to decline below the County's adopted standards. In the absence of such fundamental provisions, it cannot be said the County has adopted a transportation concurrency ordinance. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011) at 7-8.*

  Adopted LOS standards alone do not satisfy the requirement in RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b) [transportation concurrency]. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011) at 8.*

Definitions

- ***Leon S. Savaria v. Yakima County,* Case No. 11-1-0002:** RCW 36.70A.030 provides statutory definitions of various terms used in the GMA and as such, does not prescribe GMA requirements. Thus, an alleged violation of RCW 36.70A.030 cannot by itself constitute GMA non-compliance, without coupling the definition with another section of the GMA containing a requirement. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (May 4, 2011), pg. 2.*

De-Designation of Agricultural Lands

- ***Futurewise v. Benton County*, GMHB Case No. 14-1-0003:** The Board considers the County's de-designation of agricultural lands for this small section of land, in isolation from a much larger county or area-wide study to be inappropriate and, by de-designating lands that qualify as agricultural lands of long term commercial significance, the County violated WAC 365-190-050 and GMA sections RCW 36.70A.030, .050, and .170, *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p. 35.

In the present case, which also appears speculative, the Board finds Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating the Kennewick UGA expansion land continues to meet the criteria for agricultural designation, and the desired economic opportunity does not trump GMA resource conservation criteria. *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p. 35.

Equitable Doctrines

- ***Futurewise v. Spokane County,* Case No. 10-1-0006**: [County sought dismissal based on a Superior Court holding in another case, asserting the Board was barred from hearing the matter.] The GMA does not expressly authorize this Board to make legal rulings regarding res judicata/collateral estoppel effects allegedly emanating from a superior court decision in a different, unrelated case … Spokane County cites no legal authority that res judicata/collateral estoppel can be asserted against a tribunal as opposed to being asserted against a litigant. And there is nothing in the Growth Management Act to support this novel theory advanced by the County. *Order on Motion to Dismiss (July 6, 2010) at 2-3.*

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** [The Board addresses and applies *Collateral Estoppel* and *Res Judicata* but determines neither bars the matter] *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 8-11.*

Collateral Estoppel

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 11-1-0003:** Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, requires (1) identical issues, (2) a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) application of the doctrine must not work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue to be precluded must have been actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior case. Petitioners cannot present any legal briefing or arguments at the Hearing on the Merits on issues that were previously litigated and determined in prior case. *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011)*, pg. 8.

Evidence (Supplemental Evidence and Exhibits)

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** It is a party's obligation to submit for the Board's consideration those portions of the Record upon which it intends to rely. [WAC 242-03-520] A physical copy of an exhibit is always required to be submitted except in extraordinary circumstances and, then, only upon approval by the Presiding Officer. [Provision of CD is not sufficient.] *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 6.*

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012:** [Noting that review is limited to the jurisdiction's record and that supplementation is allowed only in limited situations, the Board stated] In examining proposed supplemental evidence, we look to both the relevance of the proposed evidence and its

reliability. The party offering the evidence must be able to show that the evidence will help illuminate the issues before the board. Second, the evidence must be of a nature that the board can rely on to be objective and trustworthy. Even if relevant to an issue before the board, evidence may not be admitted if it is mere opinion or argument. As a general proposition the Board rejects proffered supplemental evidence compiled after the decision of the local government has been made. *Order on Motion to Supplement (December 30, 2010), at 2.*

External Consistency

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County, et al. v. Ferry County,* Case No. 01-1-0019:** In order to satisfy their burden of proof to show an inconsistency violation under RCW 36.70A.130(1)(d), Petitioner must show that specific language in a Development Regulation is incompatible with or will thwart specific language in Comprehensive Plan Policy. *Order Finding Compliance (February 14, 2014).*

Failure to Act

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 10-1-0013:** [Petitioners asserted a "Failure to Act" claim as to the County's Transportation Concurrency Regulations.] The GMA establishes a mandatory duty to "adopt and enforce" a transportation concurrency ordinance; therefore, based on the language of RCW 36.70A.040(4), Kittitas County had until December 27, 1994 to adopt a comprehensive plan and development regulations, including those related to transportation concurrency … The Board has jurisdiction under RCW 36.70A.290(a) to hear failure to act appeals to determine whether the County is in compliance with the GMA as it relates to the adoption of development regulations. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011) at 9.*

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 10-1-0014:** [Petitioners asserted a "Failure to Act" claim since the County allegedly failed to take action to "Review and Revise" its critical areas ordinance to include BAS by the deadline in RCW 36.70A.130(4).] In light of the holding in *Thurston County v. WWGMHB* regarding "Review and Revise" update challenges, a "Failure to Act" claim cannot be made under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. *Final Decision and Order (June 3, 2011) at 7.*

Findings

- ***Edward Coyne & West Richland Citizens for Smart Growth v. City of West Richland and Charles Grigg,* Case No. 13-1-0005:** This Board has previously recognized appellate court case law holding that meaningful appellate review requires entry of adequate and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. *Final Decision and Order (March 5, 2014), pg. 11.*

Innovative Techniques

- ***Crowder, et al. v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0008:** [I]f a county chooses to allow Rural Cluster Development, the county must do so in a manner that is consistent with rural character and provides appropriate rural densities that are not characterized by urban growth. The rural

cluster can create smaller individual lots than would normally be allowed in a Rural Area, but only so long as there is a significant area of compensating open space that is "permanently" protected or protected "in perpetuity"… i.e., the open space protection has no expiration date [and] … cannot be revoked so long as the area is governed by the Rural Element. *Final Decision and Order (August 24, 2010) at 7-8.*

Internal Consistency

- ***KCC, et al. v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001:** The GMA provides the Comprehensive Plan (CP) "shall be an internally consistent document and all elements shall be consistent with the future land use map", that development regulations must be "consistent with and implement the CP, and any "amendment of or revision to DRs shall be consistent with and implement the CP. The amendments were found to be inconsistent with the CP as they failed to satisfy the [CP] criteria for geographic expansion . . .did not satisfy the statutory LAMIRD criteria in RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d), and because they created internal plan inconsistencies and inconsistent development regulations contrary to RCW 36.70A.130(1)(d). *FDO (Partial) (July 12, 2011), pg. 16.*

- ***Edward Coyne & West Richland Citizens for Smart Growth v. City of West Richland and Charles Grigg,* Case No. 13-1-0005:** In order to satisfy their burden of proof to show an inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan, Petitioners must point to specific language in the challenged Ordinance that is incompatible with or thwarts specific language in the existing Comprehensive Plan. The alleged lack of ordinance findings or the alleged impacts on the neighborhood do not constitute an inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan. Under the GMA, using City funds to advance a project is not an inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan because Petitioners have not pointed to any provision of the Comprehensive Plan incompatible with such a use of funds. *Final Decision and Order (March 5, 2014), pg. 14.*

Invalidity

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 10-1-0013:** (Holding that by the very nature of a failure to act challenge there is no comprehensive plan or development regulation for the Board to invalidate). *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011) at 9.*

- ***KCC, et al. v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001:** The Board concluded the County's action would substantially interfere with fulfillment of GMA Planning Goals 2 (Reduce Sprawl), 5 (Economic Development), 10 (Environment), and 11 (Citizen participation and coordination) contained in RCW 36.70A.020. Moreover, there was compelling evidence in the record indicating a high risk for project vesting in this case, which would render GMA and SEPA planning procedures as ineffectual and moot. The Board issued a Determination of Invalidity as to portions of the Ordinance. *Corrected FDO (Partial) (June 13, 2011), pg. 12; FDO (Partial) (July 12, 2011), pg. 17.*

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County, et al. v. Ferry County,* Case No. 01-1-0019:** The Board's invalidity authority is limited by statute to potential invalidation of comprehensive plans and development regulations. There is no statutory authority to apply invalidity directly to land. Accordingly, the Board declined to issue a determination of invalidity as to land. *Eighth Compliance Order (December 16, 2011), pg. 18.*

Jurisdiction

- ***KCC, et al v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001*:*** [In addressing a challenge to the Board's SEPA jurisdiction] the Board found under *Spokane County v. EWGMHB, 160 Wn. App. 274 (2011),* the Court of Appeals considered the situation where a County acts *concurrently* to amend its CP and to rezone property. In *Spokane County,* the court held such a concurrent action was a "legislative" action as distinct from a "quasi-judicial" action, and the Board has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over "legislative" actions such as amending a CP. Applying *Spokane County* to the facts in the present case, the Board has subject matter jurisdiction since it was a legislative action to *concurrently* amend the Kittitas County CP land use map (Rural to Commercial) and to rezone property (Ag 20 to Commercial Highway). *Corrected FDO (Partial) (June 13, 2011), pg. 5; FDO (Partial) (July 12, 2011), pg. 5* .

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 11-1-0003:** To invoke the Board's jurisdiction to review compliance with the GMA, a party with standing must comply with the statute's procedural requirements: (1) file a petition for review within 60 days after publication; (2) allege noncompliance with requirements of the GMA; and (3) include a detailed statement of issues presented for resolution by the Board. *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011),* pg. 1-2.

  Rules adopted by the Board to regulate proceedings are not jurisdictional, and jurisdiction does not depend on rule compliance. Dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the Board's rules of procedure under WAC 242-03-720(2) would be warranted when that failure essentially renders the action frivolous under RCW 36.70A.290(3). *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011),* pg. 4.

- ***Five Mile Prairie Neighborhood Association and Futurewise v. Spokane County,* Case No. 12-1-0002:** If Petitioner's issue challenges a rezone not authorized by an existing comprehensive plan or subarea plan (i.e., NOT a "Project Permit") and the rezone falls within the statutory definition of a "development regulation" (e.g., the rezone is a "zoning ordinance"), then the Growth Management Hearings Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the challenged rezone complies with the GMA. *Final Decision and Order (August 23, 2012), pg. 7.*

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Klickitat County*, Case No. 13-1-0008:** [I]t is clear from the Moore case [143 Wn.2d 96] that the Growth Management Hearings Board lacks statutory authority to hear and decide [cases involving partial-planning counties]. *Order of Dismissal (November 22, 2013)* at 2.

Limited Areas of More Intensive Rural Development (LAMIRDs)

- ***Hazen, et al. v. Yakima County,* Case No. 08-1-0008c**: [Finding that a pre-1990 water and sewer system constituted part of the "built environment" for a LAMIRD as referenced in RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(iv) and that the LOB followed the service boundary for these facilities.] *Partial Compliance Order (May 20, 2011)*

- ***KCC, et al v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001:** The County's expansion Ordinance contained no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law as to whether this Type III LAMIRD Expansion was "isolated," or "small in scale," or "consistent with rural character" as set forth in RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(iii). There was evidence in the record to support a finding/conclusion that Ordinance 2010-014 would not be isolated and would not be small scale. *FDO (Partial) (July 12, 2011), pg. 10.*

Notice

- ***Joshua Corning and Building Northwest Washington v. Douglas County*, Case No. 13-1-0001:** The Board believes that a . . . late filing of an amendment of the County's development regulations with the Department of Commerce reasonably corrects the violation of [RCW 36.70A.106]. The notice requirement to Commerce, with its coordination with other state agencies, is the focus of this requirement, not a part of a broader public involvement process. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2013) at 8.*

Petition for Review (PFR)

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012:** [WA State Department of Ecology was added as a respondent party via an Amended Petition for Review]. PFR amendments cannot be used to add new issues or enlarge the scope of review or satisfy a jurisdictional requirement once the 60 day appeal period has elapsed. But filing an amended petition is an appropriate way to add an additional party to the case so long as all jurisdictional requirements have been met within the 60 day appeal period. *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (December 8, 2010), at 11* (Board member Roehl dissenting).

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 11-1-0003:** While it may always be possible to provide even greater detail in an issue statement, there must be a balance struck between specificity and conciseness. Issue statements must give reasonable notice of the scope of the review in a single sentence but cannot present actual legal arguments as that is done through much more detailed briefing and oral argument. Even if issue statements were lacking technical details, our Supreme Court has held that public policy favors the adjudication of controversies on their merits rather than their dismissal on technical procedural grounds. *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011)*, pg. 4.

Population Projections

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, et al. v. Spokane County*, Case No. 13-1-0006c:** The population projection is the key starting point for determining the amount of land that is

needed and appropriate for future growth, not vice versa. The GMA requires the size of a UGA must be "based upon" the OFM 20-year urban population growth projection and a County's UGA designation cannot exceed the amount of land necessary to accommodate the urban growth projected by OFM, plus a reasonable land market supply factor. *Order Granting Dispositive Motion Re: Public Participation (November 26, 2013)* at 7.

A significant change in the population projection could have major ramifications for a whole host of planning functions, including planning for increased housing, commercial facilities, transportation, potable water, wastewater treatment, and other public infrastructure to serve the significantly increased population. *Order Granting Dispositive Motion Re: Public Participation (November 26, 2013)* at 12.

Public Participation/Citizen Participation (Goal 11)

- ***Edward Coyne & West Richland Citizens for Smart Growth v. City of West Richland and Charles Grigg,* Case No. 13-1-0005:** In order to satisfy their burden of proof to show noncompliance with the GMA's public participation requirements, Petitioners had to allege a failure by the City to adopt the public participation program and notice procedures called for by RCW 36.70A.035, 36.70A.130, and 36.70A.140. *Final Decision and Order (March 5, 2014), pg. 16.*

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County, et al. v. Spokane County*, Case No. 13-1-0006c:** [The County did not comply with the public participation requirements of the GMA regarding its population growth target.] [R]ather than updating its projected population targets through a clear cut public update process, as it initially had done, the County changed its population projection and allocations for its UGA at the conclusion, that is, within challenged Resolution itself. *Order Granting Dispositive Motion Re: Public Participation (November 26, 2013)* at 9.

Service

- ***Michael Fenske, et al. v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0010:** [Although the County Auditor was not served as required by WAC 242-02-230, Petitioners substantially complied with the PFR service requirements.] *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (May 27, 2010); Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (June 28, 2010).*

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012:** [The City of Spokane and WA State Department of Ecology both sought dismissal because Petitioner failed not only to name but to serve the Department of Ecology within the statutory time period] [The GMA] is silent as to naming Ecology and serving the PFR on Ecology [in a challenge to a shoreline master program]. Although Ecology has an integral and pervasive role as the final approval authority over all local master programs and amendments thereto across Washington State, and Ecology should appropriately be viewed as a necessary party to this case, the statutes [GMA and SMA] do not explicitly require naming Ecology and serving the PFR upon Ecology within the 60-day appeal period. *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (December 8, 2010), at 9* (Board member Roehl dissenting).

Shorelines (Goal 14)

- ***Spokane Riverkeeper, The Lands Council, and Trout Unlimited v. Spokane County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 13-1-0003c:** Spokane County chose not to enlarge its Shoreline Master Program jurisdiction to include for buffers for GMA-designated Critical Areas that occur within shorelines of the state and chose not to include the entire one-hundred-year-floodplain. Therefore, Critical Areas that occur within shorelines of the state, together with their required buffers, are regulated pursuant to GMA-adopted Critical Areas Ordinances. *Final Decision and Order (December 23, 2013) at pp. 13-14.*

  Ecology's decision to approve Spokane County's Shoreline Master Program Update, without requiring standards relating to vertical separation between on-site sewage drainfields and the groundwater table or equivalent design criteria or performance standards, in order to prevent water quality impacts that would result in a net loss of shoreline ecological functions, failed to comply with the policies of the Shoreline Management Act and the Shoreline Master Program Guidelines. *Final Decision and Order (December 23, 2013) at pp. 48-50.*

Shoreline Management Act

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** It is clear from both the statute [RCW 90.58.030(2)(d)] and the guidelines [WAC 173-22-040(3)] that inclusion of larger portions of the floodplain in the SMP is discretionary on the part of local government .... Further, Petitioner has not adduced evidence in support of its argument that the exclusion of large areas of flood plain from the SMP violates the "no net loss" standard. Without any legal authority requiring inclusion of larger areas of floodplain in the SMP, and in the absence of scientific evidence dictating such inclusion in the SMP, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proof.... *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 14.*

  The burden is on the Yakama Nation to demonstrate the newly adopted SMP provisions [for floodplain mining within the Yakima River basin as a conditional use] fail to adequately protect the shorelines. By merely referring to past impacts without coming forward with current scientific evidence to demonstrate inadequate shoreline protections, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proof. *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 21-22.*

  [In finding Yakima County failed to prepare a comprehensive Cumulative Impact Analysis that evaluated, considered, and addressed reasonably foreseeable impacts, the Board stated] WAC 173-26-186(8) clearly contemplates that the SMP consider impacts from past actions … [and] WAC 173-26-186(8)(d) provides that analysis of cumulative impacts should consider "current circumstances affecting the shorelines" together with "reasonably foreseeable future development" … the term "cumulative impact" has been defined in case law as "the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions." *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 22-24.*

[Petitioner alleged 100-foot "one-size-fits-all" buffers were inadequate to protect shorelines. In response the Board, relying on WAC 173-26-201(3)(d) and 173-2-6-221(5) and science in the Record, found for Ecology and the County.] *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 27-31.*

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012:** [Channel Migration Zones (CMZ) – Petitioner asserted Ecology justified a 200 foot buffer solely on the presence of the CMZ and presented competing science.] The Department of Ecology made Findings of Fact that the proposed buffer is based on good science, and "[a] detailed review of the channel migration zone by Ecology's expert in fluvial geomorphology confirmed the channel migration zone and supports the originally proposed [200 foot] buffer." [The Board found compliance.] *Final Decision and Order (March 22, 2011) at 13-15.*

Shoreline Management Act – Standard of Review

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** In appeals concerning a Shoreline of Statewide Significance, the Legislature has: (1) narrowed the scope of GMHB review by excluding Growth Management Act (GMA) internal consistency and State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) as potential bases for compliance review, and (2) prescribed a high evidentiary standard – "clear and convincing evidence." … In contrast, for appeals concerning Shorelines, the GMHB has been delegated broader review authority that includes GMA internal consistency and SEPA compliance. *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011), at 4.*

- ***John R. Pilcher and JRP Land, LLC v. City of Spokane and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 10-1-0012:** [In regards to Shorelines of Statewide Significance] RCW 90.58.190(2)(c) limits the scope of GMHB review by providing that the Board shall uphold the decision by the Department of Ecology unless the Board, by clear and convincing evidence, determines that Ecology's decision is inconsistent with the policy of RCW 90.58.020 and the applicable guidelines. *Final Decision and Order (March 22, 2011), at 7.*

  [Based on RCW 90.58.190(2)(c), the Board found several issues and/or parts of issues presented by the petitioners outside of the scope of review granted by the SMA when the action is related to Shorelines of Statewide Significance; Board is precluded by statute from considering noncompliance based on GMA internal consistency when issue concerns a Shoreline of Statewide Significance]. *Final Decision and Order (March 22, 2011) at 5, 15-16.*

- ***Spokane Riverkeeper, The Lands Council, and Trout Unlimited v. Spokane County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 13-1-0003c:** Where petitioners challenge particular SMP provisions that apply uniformly to shorelines of the state, without differentiating between Shorelines and Shorelines of Statewide Significance, the Board's scope of review will be based upon provisions of RCW 90.58.190(2)(c) – i.e., the Board shall uphold the decision by Ecology unless the Board, by clear and convincing evidence, determines that Ecology's decision

is inconsistent with the policy of RCW 90.58.020 and the applicable guidelines. *Final Decision and Order (December 23, 2013) at p. 4.*

Shorelines of Statewide Significance

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** [Citing provisions of WAC 173-26-251 – Optimum Implementation] The Shoreline Management Act calls for a higher level of effort in implementing its objectives on Shorelines of Statewide Significance … Development standards must be established that ensure the long-term protection of ecological resources of Statewide importance, such as anadromous fish habitat, forage fish spawning and rearing areas, and unique environments, and shall consider incremental and cumulative impacts of permitted development and include provisions to ensure no net loss of shoreline ecosystems and ecosystem-wide processes. *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 33.*

Standing

- ***Futurewise v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0006**: [A] PFR is not required to contain such evidence [regarding petitioner's standing] but rather once standing is challenged a petitioner is permitted to come forward with evidence to demonstrate they satisfy one of the standing requirements of the GMA. *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010), at 7-8.*

  [Generally comments received after an announced deadline cannot be utilized to demonstrate standing but standing was allowed based on the GMA's intent for public participation and conflicting evidence] *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010), at 8.*

- ***Concerned Friends of Ferry County and David L. Robinson v. Ferry County,* Case No. 11-1-0003:** Comment letters provided reasonable notice to the County that there were concerns about the designation and conservation of all three types of resource lands in Ferry County. Therefore, Petitioners' participation before the County was reasonably related to issues presented to the Board, and Petitioners had standing. *Order on Motion for Summary Judgment (December 23, 2011)*, pg. 6.

Participation Standing

- ***Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Yakima County*, Case No. 10-1-0011:** [P]articipation standing is based on the "subject matter" of a party's participation and it is to that issues must be reasonably related. The issues Yakima County seeks dismissed are clearly related to two fundamental aspects of the SMA – the designation of the shoreline jurisdiction and the heightened protection afforded shorelines of state-wide significance – and fall within the scope of the Yakama Nation's generalized concerns as to the protection of shorelines in Yakima County, especially in the context of surface mining. Therefore, it cannot be said the County or Ecology were "blind-sided" by the Yakama Nation's appeal or by the fact the SMA requires SMPs to be consistent with and implement the goals, policies, and requirements of the SMA; as this applies to each and every SMP adoption or amendment. *Final Decision and Order (April 4, 2011) at 7-8.*

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)

- ***KCC, et al v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 11-1-0001:** In order to adopt a pre-existing SEPA document, an agency must follow three essential steps as set forth in RCW 43.21C.034 and WAC 197-11-630: (1) determine prior action and the new action have similar elements that provide a basis for comparing their environmental consequences such as timing, types of impacts, alternatives, or geography; (2) take official action to adopt the pre-existing SEPA document using the adoption form substantially as in WAC 197-11-465; and (3) provide a copy of the adopted SEPA document to accompany the current proposal submitted to the decision-maker. In this case, there was no evidence in the record Kittitas County complied with any of the three legally-prescribed steps to adopt a pre-existing SEPA document. There was also no evidence in the record Kittitas County made a Threshold Determination, and the DNS Threshold Determination contains no actual information on environmental effects. *Corrected FDO (Partial) (June 13, 2011), pg. 10.*

Timeliness

- ***Futurewise v. Douglas County*, Case No. 10-1-0004**: A PFR must be filed within 60 days after publishing notice of adoption of the amendment, not within 60 days after publishing notice of a resolution that confirms or refers back in time to the actual amendment adoption. *Final Decision and Order (August 31, 2010), at 6.*

- ***Futurewise v. Spokane County*, Case No. 10-1-0006**: The question of whether a challenge has been timely filed is jurisdictional. [Challenge to LAMIRD previously designated was time-barred.] *Final Decision and Order (August 17, 2010), at 12.*

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County*, Case No. 10-1-0013:** Because the question posed in this appeal is whether the County failed to act to comply with the RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b) requirements to adopt a concurrency ordinance, the appeal is timely. The Board has jurisdiction under RCW 36.70A.290(a) to hear failure to act appeals to determine whether the County is in compliance with the GMA as it relates to the adoption of development regulations. *Final Decision and Order (June 6, 2011) at 6.*

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 10-1-0014:** [Board dismissed "review and revise" challenge as untimely, based on the holding in *Thurston County v. WWGMHB* .] *Final Decision and Order (June 3, 2011) at 8.*

Updates

- ***Kittitas County Conservation, Ridge and Futurewise v. Kittitas County,* Case No. 10-1-0014:** In GMA parlance, the term "Update" refers to the requirement for local jurisdictions to "review and revise, if needed," their Comprehensive Plan and Development Regulations according to RCW 36.70A.130(1) and the deadlines established by the GMA. The update process provides the vehicle for bringing plans into compliance with recently enacted GMA requirements and for recognizing changes in land usage and population. *Final Decision and Order (June 3, 2011) at 5.*

Urban Growth Areas (UGAs)

UGA Size

- ***Brodeur/Futurewise, et al. v. Benton County, et al.*, Case No. 09-1-0010c:** [RCW 36.70A.110 and 36.70A.115] were amended in 2009 to clarify that GMA planning should be expanded beyond land capacity for housing and employment growth to include land capacity for certain additional specified categories of facilities such as commercial and industrial facilities; however, the 2009 legislative amendments did not change the GMA's requirement that the size of a UGA must be based upon an OFM 20-year population projection. *Order Finding Continuing Non-Compliance (September 24, 2010), at 4-5.*

  While the Board is mindful of the City's desire to pursue economic development opportunities … and the County's discretion to make local choices about accommodating urban growth, those considerations do not trump the specific requirements of the GMA for UGA sizing, including RCW 36.70A.110(2) and RCW 36.70A.115. Furthermore, if the County approves a UGA enlargement based only upon economic development opportunities, without regard to the amount of land actually needed to accommodate OFM-projected urban growth, then such growth will be uncontained and the fundamental GMA goal to reduce sprawl will be frustrated. *Order Finding Continuing Non-Compliance (September 24, 2010)*, at 6.

- ***Futurewise v. Benton County*, GMHB Case No. 14-1-0003:** [RCW 36.70A.1301 allows] more frequent revisions to the UGA for certain cities east of the crest of the Cascade Mountain Range that meet very specific requirements . . . [The Board found that the statute did not amend] the language in other parts of the Growth Management Act . . . such as "planned population growth", *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014)*, p. 9.

  With regard to part (2)(b) of [RCW 36.70A.]1301, this addition to the County's UGA is not based on land needed to serve its planned population growth but on a change in the amount of land the City wants to have designated for industrial purposes, *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p.9.

  According to the [Washington Supreme Court] OFM population projections create a cap on UGA expansion.24 RCW 36.70A.110(2) and .115 specify that UGA expansions to provide for employment growth and institutional or commercial uses are to be based on serving the planned population growth. *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p. 12.

  In approving this UGA application, the County did not comply with part (2)(d) of [RCW 36.70A.]1301 by not basing its action on a valid development proposal. The Board notes that the Development Proposal and phased master plan submitted by the City to the County both appear very limited, are not based on end user agreements, and are incomplete, *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p.16.

  The Board finds and concludes there is no evidence in the record to support the size of the UGA expansion area. It is unclear whether 1,263 acres is too much land, too little land, or just the

right amount of land to match the OFM 20-year urban growth projection. The County's action violated RCW 36.70A.110 and RCW 36.70A.115 and was not consistent with the County's planning policies, by not basing its UGA expansion on planned population growth, *Final Decision and Order (October 15, 2014),* p. 26-27.

Urban Services

- ***Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. Spokane County,* Case No. 14-1-0002:** [Citing *Thurston County v. Cooper Point Association*, 108 Wn. App. 429 (2001), the Board stated urban governmental services may only be extended/expanded beyond a UGA if the following criteria are met]:
  (1) Cities are the most appropriate providers of urban governmental services;
  (2) It is generally not appropriate to extend or expand urban governmental services into rural areas;
  (3) Limited occasions to extend or expand are allowed that are:
  (4) Shown to be necessary to protect:
  (a) basic public health and safety and
  (b) the environment, but;
  (5) Only when the urban governmental services are financially supportable at rural densities; and
  (6) Only when extension or expansion does not allow urban development. *Final Decision and Order (September 23, 2014),* p. 15.

Region 2: Western Washington

Clallam • Clark • Island • Jefferson • Lewis • Mason • Pacific • San Juan • Skagit • Thurston • Whatcom

Region 2: Western Washington Table of Cases

1998 Cases

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network (WEAN) and Island County Citizens' Growth Management Coalition v. Island County,* Case No. 98-2-0023c**
  Case No. 06-2-0012c was a challenge to the County's compliance action taken in Case No. 98-2-0023c. The Board's decisions in both matters were appealed. The 1998 case's appeal was addressed at 122 Wn. App. 156, 93 P.3d 885 (2004), a decision affirming the Board's decisions.

  The compliance legislation considered in Case No. 06-2-0012c included a clause providing it would become effective only upon conclusion of any challenges in the County's favor. The County did not prevail and the Board found Case No. 06-2-0012c moot and it was dismissed. *Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance (Case 98-2-0023c)/Order of Dismissal (Case 06-2-0012c), (July 17, 2014)*.

  Following the appeals, only a single issue of the many raised in the 1998 case remained unresolved. The parties stipulated the County remained out of compliance regarding the breadth of critical area regulation exemptions applicable to rural lands. The Board's finding of compliance was appealed and the Thurston County Superior Court held the actions of the County in exempting existing agricultural uses that adopt management plans was clearly erroneous. The County then adopted an interim ordinance limiting the scope of the critical area regulation exemption. While the Board agreed that the substance of the compliance legislation would result in compliance, the fact that it was an interim ordinance led to a finding of continuing non-compliance. *Order Finding Continuing Non-Compliance, (May 1, 2015)*. The County then permanently adopted the regulations and compliance was found and the case closed. *Order Finding Compliance, (December 23, 2015)*.

2000 and 2001 Cases

- ***Protect the Peninsula's Future and Washington Environmental Council v. Clallam County,* Case Nos. 00-2-0008 and 01-2-0020**
  Challenges of critical areas ordinances resulted in findings of noncompliance and invalidity determinations. (*Final Decision and Order, December 19, 2000*; *Compliance Order/Final Decision and Order, (October 26, 2001*). Appeals and the legislature's adoption of SSB 5248 (which suspended jurisdictions' powers to amend or adopt critical areas ordinances as they applied to agricultural activities) delayed further Board action. In 2011 the legislature adopted the Voluntary Stewardship Program and the matter then returned to the Board for further consideration. The primary question for the Board was whether Clallam County's development regulations met the GMA requirement to protect critical areas in areas used for agricultural activities.

  Under the VSP, a county with similar agricultural activities, geography, and geology to one of four named counties (including Clallam) may, under certain circumstances, adopt the development regulations of one of those counties to satisfy the GMA requirement to protect such critical areas. In granting the motion to dismiss, the Board observed one of its roles in

interpreting the GMA is to give effect to legislative intent and avoid unlikely or absurd results. The Board granted the County's motion to dismiss based on the fact the legislature included Clallam's regulations as one of four acceptable, "safe harbor" regulatory protection sets. To find otherwise would have resulted in an absurd result. (*Order on Motion to Dismiss, (December 13, 2012*)

PPF appealed and the Court of Appeals (No. 45459-9-II) reversed, remanding the matter to the Board. The matter is now on settlement extensions.

2005 Cases

- ***Futurewise v. Whatcom County and Gold Star Resorts, Inc., Intervenor*, Case No. 05-2-0013, coordinated with *Governors Point Development Company, et al v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c**
  See Case No. 11-2-0010c.

2006 Cases

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County,* Case No. 06-2-0012c**
  This case was a challenge to the County's compliance action taken in Case No. 98-2-0023c . The Board's decisions in both matters were appealed. The 1998 case's appeal was addressed at 122 Wn. App. 156, 93 P.3d 885 (2004), a decision affirming the Board's decisions.

  Only a single issue of the many raised in the 1998 case remained unresolved and the parties stipulated the County was out of compliance regarding the breadth of critical area regulation exemptions applicable to rural lands. That issue was remanded. The compliance legislation considered in Case No. 06-2-0012c included a clause providing it would become effective only upon conclusion of any challenges in the County's favor. The County did not prevail, the Board found Case No. 06-2-0012c moot, and it was dismissed. *Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance (Case 98-2-0023c)/Order of Dismissal (Case 06-2-0012c) (July 17, 2014)*.

2007 Cases

- ***Advocates for Responsible Development and John Diehl v. Mason County*, Case No. 07-2-0006:**
  Petitioners challenged three Mason County ordinances, the third of which changed the designation of a parcel of property from Long Term Commercial Forest to In Holding. In regards that issue, the Board found the change in the Future Land Use Map constituted a comprehensive plan amendment, thus subjecting it to the Board's jurisdiction and an internal plan inconsistency was found to have resulted. *Final Decision and Order, (August 20, 2007)* Intervenor Shaw Family's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration, (September 10, 2007)*.

  The County was subsequently determined to be in compliance. *Order Finding Compliance, (April 25, 2008).* The Mason County Superior Court affirmed the Board in Cause No. 07-2-00884-9. Shaw Family appealed alleging the County's decision constituted a site-specific rezone and thus the Board lacked jurisdiction (Diehl also appealed). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's

determination on jurisdiction. 157 Wn. App. 364, 236 P.3d 975. Review was denied, 171 Wn.2d 1008 (2011).

- ***Dry Creek Coalition and Futurewise v. Clallam County,* Case No. 07-2-0018c**
  [The Court of Appeals remanded and directed the Board to ascertain whether or not the State provided sufficient funding for a 2002 GMA amendment requiring inclusion of parks and recreation in jurisdictions' capital facilities elements. Provision of that funding was a condition precedent to the County's compliance with the statutory amendment.] The Board concluded the County had included parks and recreation in its CFP prior to the 2002 amendment of RCW 36.70A.070(2) and, furthermore, there was no evidence in the record that state funds were appropriated and distributed to the County during the applicable time period for the specific purpose of adding parks and recreation facilities to the County's CFP element. *Determination on Remand, (December 15, 2011)*. The Case was dismissed by Order dated June 1, 2012 pursuant to the Board's Determination on Remand and lapse of the appeal period.

- ***Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 07-2-0027**
  The Petitioners originally challenged Clark County's de-designation of 19 areas of designated agricultural natural resource lands, consisting of 4,351 acres, and the addition of that acreage to urban growth areas. The de-designation decision occurred less than three years after the most recent designation of those areas. The Board found de-designation of 11 of the areas failed to comply with the GMA as they were not characterized by urban growth. *FDO, (May 14, 2008)* and *(AFDO, (June 3, 2008)..*

  The Clark County Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals remanded three of the 11 areas found non-compliant and affirmed as to the others. 161 Wn. App. 204(2011) The Washington Supreme Court granted review in part, addressing only an issue involving the Court of Appeals' consideration of the validity of cities' decisions to annex lands while a challenge was pending before the Board and vacated that portion of the Court of Appeals decision. 177 Wn.2d 136(2013).

  The matter was remanded to the Board to reconsider its decision regarding one area as it had failed to document full consideration of the WAC factors under the third prong of the Lewis County test: whether land has long term commercial significance. The Board was also directed to reconsider two other areas in regards to whether or not they were characterized by urban growth.

  The Board concluded the Court of Appeals had decided the question of whether the two areas were characterized by urban growth and reversed its earlier decision. The Board concluded the other area had long-term commercial significance for agricultural production following review of all WAC factors, and continued a previous determination of invalidity. *Final Decision and Order on Remand, (March 11, 2014)* The County achieved compliance by re-designating the

area as ALLTCS and the case was closed. *Order Finding Compliance [Area WB], (September 4, 2014)*.

Key Holdings: Agricultural Lands, Deference

2008 Cases

- ***Olympia Stewardship Foundation and Citizens Protecting Critical Areas, et al. v. Jefferson County*, Case No. 08-2-0029c**
  Jefferson County elected to include CMZs as critical areas within the category of Geologically Hazardous Areas due to their erosive character and the need to protect structures from future damage. The regulations required property owners to retain all vegetation located in "high-risk" channel migration zones for five County rivers. The regulation defined "high-risk CMZs" as those portions of the rivers' channels that are "likely to migrate" within a specific period of time. CPCA's issues were either abandoned or dismissed. OSF's issues related to buffers, CMZs, and property owners' rights.

  The Board concluded its jurisdiction was limited to review of those provisions of the regulations applicable outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the Shoreline Management Act. It upheld the County's designation of CMZs as critical areas. The regulations were remanded due the adopted time period for designation of high risk CMZs and a blanket vegetation removal prohibition. *FDO, (November 19, 2008).* Thereafter, the County came into compliance. *Order on Compliance, (July 20, 2009).*

  OSF appealed and the Board's decision was affirmed. 166 Wn. App. 172 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). Review was denied by *Olympic Stewardship Found. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd*., 174 Wn.2d 1007 (Wash., June 6, 2012).

2009 Cases

- ***Irondale Community Action Neighbors v. Jefferson County*, Case No. 09-2-0012**
  Petitioners challenged comprehensive plan and development regulations asserting they resulted in oversized UGAs. The Board held it had the authority to apply the equitable doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and applied res judicata in dismissing the Petition for Review in its entirety. *Order on Motions to Strike, (November 5, 2009).*

  The Board's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, *Irondale Cmty. Action Neighbors v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd*., 163 Wn. App. 513. Review was denied, *Irondale Cmty. Action Neighbors v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.,* 173 Wn.2d 1014, 272 P.3d 246.

- ***Dennis Hadaller v. Lewis County*, Case No. 09-2-0017**
  The Petitioner challenged Lewis County's designation of ALLTCS, including his acreage, in an earlier case (No. 08-2-0004c). In that matter, the Board ruled Hadaller failed to meet his burden of proof to establish the designation was erroneous. In the 2009 case, Hadaller asserted the County erred by retaining the agricultural designation on his lands, arguing the new record

supported de-designation. The Board dismissed as the challenge was untimely. The designation decision had been made in 2007 and the County was under no obligation to revisit it. *Order on Lewis County's Motion to Dismiss, (January 27, 2010).*

The Thurston County Superior Court affirmed the Board's dismissal and the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the Superior Court. *Hadaller v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd*., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 1096.

2010 Cases

- ***Caitac, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 10-2-0009c**[9]
  Starting in 2010, the Board granted intervention to private land owners and local governments. In 2010 through 2011, due to settlement agreements, the Board issued orders dismissing several parties. By 2012, the parties were limited to Yew Street Associates, Hillside Associates, Westpac Management, Ind., Frank and Sandra Muljat and J&M, LLC. Since then the Board has issued numerous 90 day extension orders at the request of the parties.

- ***Eugene Butler and Richard Battin v. Lewis County,* Case No. 10-2-0010**
  Petitioners challenged the County's actions which were designed, in part, to potentially allow for the location of a large, regional auction facility. Petitioners argued the type, size and scale of the proposed facility would not be compatible with the rural character of Lewis County, constituted urban growth and should have been considered using the Major Industrial Development process. The Board concluded "unique, regional commercial/industrial uses", including an auction facility, could be compatible with Lewis County's rural character, did not constitute urban growth and use of the MID process was optional. *FDO, (July 22, 2010).*

  Key Holdings: LAMIRDs, Major Industrial Developments, Rural Character

- ***Skagit D06, LLC v. City of Mount Vernon,* Case No. 10-2-0011**
  In a challenge to the City of Mount Vernon's adoption of Ordinances amending the City's Comprehensive Plan and Development Regulations to require annexation before the City extends sewer service and adopting several annexation policies, the Board found these amendments neither created a moratorium on development, nor otherwise violated the GMA. The Board decision was affirmed by unpublished opinion in Skagit D06, LLC v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 2245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).

  Key Holdings: Moratoria, Housing Element (Goal 4), Economic Development (Goal 5), Property Rights Element (Goal 6), Urban Services (Extension outside UGA)

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case No. 10-2-0012**
  The primary issue was whether San Juan County's development regulation to designate, site, and permit Essential Public Facilities (EPFs) was contrary to the Growth Management Act. San

[9] Case No. 10-2-0009c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-2-0001, 10-2-0002, 10-2-0003, 10-2-0004, 10-2-0005, 10-2-0006, 10-2-0007, 10-2-0008 and 10-2-0009

Juan County argued its three-step process for updating the comprehensive plan, shoreline master program, and development regulations for essential public facilities ensured that all three were in compliance with GMA. The Board concluded the County's regulations did not protect critical areas or natural resource lands, did not provide sufficient criteria to site EPFs, and was inconsistent with the County comprehensive plan. Lastly, the Board set a precedent by invalidating sections of the Ordinance even though Petitioners did not seek invalidation in their issue statements. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010*)

On compliance, the County's legislation clarified inconsistencies in the County's comprehensive plan and imposed limitations on siting Essential Public Facilities in relation to critical areas. The Board found compliance and closed the case. *Order Finding Compliance, (July 19, 2011).*

Key Holdings: Essential Public Facilities, Critical Areas, Invalidity, Goal 8, Goal 10, Natural Resource Lands, Evidence

- ***The Port of Shelton v. City of Shelton, et al.,* Case No. 10-2-0013**
  The Port, operator of a general aviation airport, alleged the City's Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map amendments which potentially authorized residential development in the vicinity of the airfield would be incompatible with continuing airport operations. The Board concluded, based on the Record before it, the proposed residential use would result in incompatibility as envisioned by RCW 36.70.547. The Board further found incompatible uses by their very nature have the propensity to adversely impact EPFs by interfering with their continued operation, future expansion or improvement. Internal comprehensive plan inconsistencies were also found and the Board imposed invalidity. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010).*

  Thereafter, a Board majority found the City had failed to achieve compliance, stating the City's compliance action was based on a fundamentally different approach to determining compatibility with the airport. The majority found the City was obligated to engage in further consultation with WSDOT and the Port in accordance with RCW 36.70.547. *Compliance Order, (July 13, 2011).* The Board's Compliance decision was reversed by the Superior Court and an Order of Dismissal was entered. *Order of Dismissal, (May 30, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Airports, Amicus Curiae, Public Participation

- ***David Stalheim, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 10-2-0016c[10]**
  Petitioners challenged Whatcom County's adoption of a comprehensive plan amendment extending the Ferndale and Birch Bay Urban Growth Areas (UGAs). The Board found in sizing the Ferndale UGA the County improperly relied both on a market supply factor and "local circumstances". The market supply factor already included and accounted for "local circumstances", resulting in an over-estimate of residential land needs and an over-sized UGA. Whatcom County failed to be guided by RCW 36.70A.020(1) and (12) as it approved the Ferndale UGA in the absence of adopted fire and sewer plans. The absence of capital facilities

[10] Case No. 10-2-0016c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-2-0014, 10-2-0015 and 10-2-0016.

plans for fire and wastewater were found to be a violation of RCW 36.70A.110(3) as there were not "adequate existing public facility and service capacities to serve such development", the approval created an inconsistency between the UGA Reserve Criteria (Adequate Public Facilities and Services) and the Comprehensive Plan map, in violation of RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble) and, the absence of adequate capital facilities plans for fire and wastewater resulted in a violation of RCW 36.70A.070(3).

The County amended its Comprehensive Plan to reduce the size of the Ferndale UGA and adjusted its fire and sewer provisions in its capital facilities plan. The Board found the County addressed the areas of non-compliance found in its April 11, 2011 FDO and closed the case. *Order Finding Compliance, (October 6, 2011)*.

Key Holdings: Urban Growth Areas (UGAs), State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), Urban Services

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 10-2-0017**
  Petitioner City of Oak Harbor challenged Island County's review of urban growth areas based on a twenty-year population forecast. The County conceded it had not met a September 28, 2008 deadline to complete this work and the Board issued an order finding non-compliance under RCW 36.70A.130. *Order Finding Non-Compliance-Failure to Act, (December 20, 2010*). The County then achieved compliance when it adopted two ordinances completing the 2005 county-wide population projection and UGA boundary review. *Order Finding Compliance-Failure to Act, (July 12, 2011*). Subsequently, the City filed substantive challenges to the County's compliance action: Case No. 11-2-0005.

- ***Weyerhaeuser Company, et al v. Thurston County,* Case No. 10-2-0020c[11]**
  Quarry and mining site owners challenged County's adoption of mineral resource land designation criteria. Addressing both designation and conservation of mineral resource lands, including the appropriate time to apply newly adopted designation criteria, the Board found noncompliance in several respects and remanded. *Amended Final Decision and Order, (June 17, 2011*). The Board then found the County had achieved compliance with RCW 36.70A.172 through its inclusion of Best Available Science but had failed to achieve compliance with RCW 36.70A.170(1) and (2) as its adopted criteria: 1.) precluded dual designation of forest lands and mineral resource lands of long-term commercial significance without first determining whether they were incompatible and without ascertaining which of the incompatible natural resource lands had the greater long-term commercial significance, and; 2.) precluded dual designation of mineral resource lands of long-term commercial significance and critical areas. *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012*). On compliance, the County allowed the co-designation of forest lands and mineral resource lands and critical areas and mineral resource lands, addressing potentially incompatible or inappropriate uses through development regulations. The case was closed. *Compliance Order, (March 15, 2013)*.

[11] Case No. 10-2-0020c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-2-0018, 10-2-0019 and 10-2-0020c

Key Holdings: Critical Areas, Internal Consistency, Invalidity, Jurisdiction, Mineral Resource Lands, Natural Resource Lands, Property Rights, Public Participation, Minimum Guidelines

- ***Futurewise v. Pacific County,* Case No. 10-2-0021**
  Futurewise challenged Pacific County's adoption of comprehensive plan amendments arguing the update failed to include and properly designate and conserve agricultural lands of long-term commercial significance; properly size urban growth areas; and properly designate LAMIRDs. The Board found there was enough vacant, buildable land within the municipal boundaries of each of the cities to accommodate future growth. *FDO, (June 22, 2011*). The County was subsequently found in compliance. *Compliance Order, (August 8, 2012*). The Board was affirmed in a Court of Appeals Division II unpublished opinion issued December 10, 2013, *Futurewise v. Growth Management Hearings Board, et al.*, Docket Number: 43643-4, 2013 Wash. App. LEXIS 2802.

  Key Holdings: Amendment, Urban Growth Areas (UGAs), Market Factor

2011 Cases

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001**
  Petitioner challenged a Whatcom County ordinance establishing a six-month interim, one-time extension for land use development permits that would otherwise expire. The County challenged the Board's jurisdiction as the ordinance expired one day before the HOM. The Board held it had jurisdiction based on five Supreme Court criteria, the Ordinance failed to be guided by Goal 10 (environment), failed to protect critical areas and the environmental review of the proposal did not incorporate SEPA. The Board found inconsistency between the comprehensive plan and development regulations and remanded the matter to the County. A determination of invalidity was entered. *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011).*

  Upon compliance, the Board determined the County addressed the findings of noncompliance and the case was closed *Compliance Order, (June 21, 2012*). Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging the County failed to consider BAS or other regulations adopted since the permits were issued. Petitioner claimed permits extended by the County were still out of compliance with the GMA. The Board denied the motion finding it could not require the County to conduct BAS threshold determinations or apply other more recent development regulations to expired permits, or those set to expire. The Board expressed serious concerns about the County's actions to extend permits, but remedies for those permits were not available to the Board. *Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, (July 17, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Environment (Goal 10), Internal Consistency, Invalidity, Jurisdiction, Moratoria, Public Participation, SEPA, Permits

- ***C. Dean Martin v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0002**
  Petitioner challenged Whatcom County's rezone of approximately 770 acres from R10 (Rural One Unit per 10 Acres) to R5 (Rural One Unit per 5 Acres). Petitioner alleged the rezones:

failed to protect agricultural land of long term commercial significance; were inconsistent with the County's Comprehensive Plan; violated public participation provisions of the GMA; and violated SEPA. The Board upheld the rezones, determining that the R5 zone was not demonstrated to impair ALLTCS. The Board likewise failed to find public participation or SEPA violations. However, the Board found the rezones were inconsistent with County Plan Policy 2K-1 which indicated the County should "Limit land in one-hundred year floodplains to low-intensity land uses such as open space corridors or agriculture." *FDO, (July 22, 2011).*

Upon compliance, the County amended its Comprehensive Plan by rezoning approximately 98 floodplain acres from R5A to R10A. The Board found the County in compliance and closed the case. *Order Finding Compliance, (December 22, 2011).*

Key Holdings: Agricultural Lands, External Consistency, Mootness, Public Participation, SEPA

- ***Ronald N. Nilson, Friends of Mineral Lake, Roberta Church and Eugene Butler v. Lewis County,* Case No. 11-2-0003**
  Petitioners challenged comprehensive plan and development regulation amendments rezoning RCW 36.70A.170 designated natural resource forest land from a classification/designation of Forest Lands of Long Term Commercial Significance (1du/80 acres) to one of Forest Lands of Local Importance (1 du/20 acres). The Board found the County action resulted in plan and zoning map inconsistencies as similarly situated properties were classified and designated differently. Invalidity was denied. *Final Decision and Order, (August 31, 2011).*

  Respondent and Intervenor's motions for reconsideration were denied. *Order Denying Motions for Reconsideration, (October 3, 2011).* The Thurston County Superior Court upheld the Board following which the County took action to adopt separate comprehensive plan and zoning maps, action which it argued addressed noncompliance. The Board disagreed, finding the County in continuing noncompliance due to a failure of the zoning designations to be consistent with and to implement the comprehensive plan. *Compliance Order, (September 6, 2012*). The FDO and Compliance Order include extensive discussion of the classification and designation of natural resource lands. The County rescinded the challenged Resolution and Ordinance and the matter was dismissed. *Order Finding Compliance and Dismissing Case, (April 25, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Inconsistency, Natural Resource Lands, Settlement

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0004**
  Petitioner challenged timing of comprehensive plan amendments and consistency between sub-area plans and comprehensive plans. The County argued the issues were not ripe for review and moved to dismiss. The Board initially considered whether granting the County's Motion would preclude subsequent jurisdiction over the County's action and whether such a ruling would bar future petitions challenging the substance of the ordinance. The Board found the County's preliminary action was merely a step toward completing work to design an urban

area in Southern Whidbey Island. It concluded the challenge was premature and dismissed the case. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, (July 8, 2011), pages 5-6.*

Key Holdings: Sub-Area Plans

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0005**
  Petitioner City of Oak Harbor challenged Island County's amendments to population projections and urban growth area boundaries. The Board concluded the City failed to demonstrate the County's action were clearly erroneous and in violation of the GMA. *Final Order and Decision, (December 12, 2011).* Oak Harbor appealed the Board's decision to Thurston Superior Court on March 22, 2012. (Court No. 12-2-00032-5) On June 21, 2013, Thurston Superior Court affirmed the Board's December 12, 2011 Final Decision and Order.

  Key Holdings: Comprehensive Plans, Public Participation, Urban Growth Areas (UGAs)

- ***City of Bellingham v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0006**
  Bellingham requested the Board dismiss their appeal as a settlement agreement between it and Respondent Whatcom County had been satisfied. The Board dismissed the case. *Order Granting Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss, (June 15, 2012*).

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c,[12] coordinated with *Futurewise v. Whatcom County and Gold Star Resorts, Inc., Intervenor*, Case No. 05-2-0013**
  The County adopted Comprehensive Plan and development regulation amendments pertaining to Limited Areas of More Intensive Rural Development (LAMIRDs) and rural development.

  The Board found that in revising its rural element, the County failed to include adequate measures within the Rural Element to protect rural character, its development regulations for LAMIRDs failed to provide that the development permitted in LAMIRDs would be based on the existing area or existing use as of July 1, 1990 and those provisions were found to be invalid. Some of the LAMIRDs were oversized or improperly established adjacent to a UGA and they were found to be invalid.

  The Board found the County created an inconsistency between the rural area population allocation allowed by the County's development regulations and the allocation provided for in the Comprehensive Plan, the County failed to properly coordinate with the City of Bellingham and other service providers with respect to water service and fire protection services required by the new rural land use provisions, and certain provisions were inconsistent with water quality protections for the Lake Whatcom Watershed. *Final Decision and Order, (January 9, 2012.*

[12] Case No. 11-2-0010c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 11-2-0007, 11-2-0008, 11-2-0009 and 11-2-0010. Case No. 05-2-0013 is coordinated with this case.

Key Holdings: Rural Character, LAMIRDs, Rural Densities, Rural Element, Interjurisdictional Coordination, Comprehensive Plan, Burden of Proof, Jurisdiction

On January 4, 2013, the Board issued an order finding partial compliance but finding continuing non-compliance and imposing invalidity on several development regulations and comprehensive plan policies concerning LAMIRDs and measures to protect rural character. Because Petitioners had filed a new challenge to the compliance action (Ordinance 2012-032) concerning measures to protect surface and groundwater resources, the Board held its consideration of the County's measures to protect rural water resources to Case No. 12-2-0013. *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013).*

Key Holdings: Rural Element, Innovative Techniques (Clustering), LAMIRDs, Legislative Findings

Several parties filed appeals of the Board's January 4, 2013 Compliance Order and the Board issued a Certificate of Appealability for direct review. *Certificate of Appealability, (March 15, 2013).* In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals Div. I upheld the Board's finding of compliance on rural population. *Hirst v. GMHB, 2014 Wash.App. LEXIS 1675 (June 30, 2014).*

Key Holdings: Certificate of Appealability

On November 8, 2013, partial compliance was found but certain LAMIRD development regulations and specific LAMIRD boundaries remained non-compliant. The Board granted a stay of the compliance schedule pending court appeals. *Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance, Extending Invalidity, and Granting Stay of Compliance Schedule, (November 8, 2013).*

On January 23, 2014, the Board found compliance on all but one issue: reliance on clustering as a measure to protect rural character. *Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, (January 23, 2014); Order Finding Compliance and Non-Compliance, As Amended on Reconsideration, (January 23, 2014).* The County amended its regulations and the Board found compliance. *Order Finding Compliance, (May 14, 2014).*

Key Holdings: Burden of Proof, Innovative Techniques (Clustering), Invalidity

- ***John Peranzi, Vallie Jo Fry and Tony and Isobel Cairone v. City of Olympia,* Case No. 11-2-0011**
  The Petitioners challenged the City of Olympia's adoption of an ordinance which amended development regulations to authorize a permanent "County Homeless Encampment" as a conditional use on property within the City's Light Industrial Zoning District. The Board found allowance of the homeless encampment in an industrial district was not consistent with and failed to implement the comprehensive plan. *FDO, (May 4, 2012).* During the compliance period Petitioners asserted RCW 36.70A.130(2) precluded the City from amending its Comprehensive Plan to attain compliance as they had only challenged the adopted development regulations. The City requested clarification from the Board. *Order on Motion for Clarification, (June 21, 2012).*

On compliance the City amended the Comprehensive Plan thus eliminating the development regulation inconsistency and failure to implement. The case was closed. (*Compliance Order, November 16, 2012*)

Key Holdings: Compliance

2012 Cases

- ***Futurewise and City of Bellingham v. Whatcom County and Caitac USA Corp, Intervenor,* Case No. 12-2-0003c**[13]
  The Board issued an order extending the case for settlement purposes. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to an order of dismissal and the Board dismissed and closed the case. *Order of Dismissal, (March 11, 2013).*

- ***Alvin Alexanderson, Dragonslayer, Inc. and Michels Development, LLC v. City of La Center,* Case No. 12-2-0004**
  Petitioners challenged a City Resolution authorizing extension of sewer service to property on which the Cowlitz Indian Tribe proposed to build a casino resort, recreational vehicle park and other tribal facilities on 150 acres approved by the United States Department of Interior to be taken into trust on behalf of the Tribe for reservation purposes. The Board addressed a jurisdictional challenge, framing the issue as follows: Whether the Resolution has the effect of amending the City's Comprehensive Plan and/or its development regulations? The Board found the analysis of the Court in *Alexanderson v. Clark County*, 135 Wn. App. 541, dictated the Board's finding that it had jurisdiction as the Resolution constituted a *de facto* Comprehensive Plan amendment. *Order on Dispositive Motion, (May 4, 2012).* The Board subsequently dismissed the matter. *Order of Dismissal on Stipulation, (July 9, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Comprehensive Plan

- ***Haggen, Inc. and Briar Development Company, LLP v. City of Ferndale,* Case No. 12-2-0006c**[14]
  See Case No. 12-2-0010c.

- ***Concrete Nor'West and 4M2K, LLC v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0007**
  Petitioners challenged the County's denial of requested comprehensive plan and zoning amendments which would include Petitioners' property in a Mineral Resource Overlay, claiming the County failed to follow its comprehensive plan criteria and process for a MRL designation change. The Board found neither the GMA nor the County's plan/regulations imposed a duty on it to designate mineral resource lands during an annual plan update. *Final Decision and Order, (September 25, 2012).*

[13] Case No. 12-2-0003c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 12-2-0002c (previously consolidated with 12-2-0001) and 12-2-0003.
[14] Case No. 12-2-0006c was the consolidation of Case Nos. 12-2-0005 and 12-2-0006.

An appeal was filed in October, 2012 with the Thurston County Superior Court. The Board declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability. *Order on Request for Certificate for Appealability, (December 13, 2012)*. The Board's FDO was affirmed in Cause No. 12-2-02214-1. The Court of Appeals, Cause No. 45563-3-II, affirmed the Board finding the comprehensive plan did not require the County to designate the property at issue as MRL and thus the decision of the County did not violate RCW 36.70A.120. Review denied, Washington Supreme Court Cause No. 91378-1, July 8, 2015.

Key Holdings: Amendment

- ***Sawarne Lumber Company, Ltd. and Ferndale Town Center, LLC v. City of Ferndale,* Case No. 12-2-0009c**[15]
  See Case No. 12-2-0010c.

- ***Sawarne Lumber Company, Ltd. and Ferndale Town Center, LLC v. City of Ferndale,* Case No. 12-2-0010c**[16]
  Petitioners Sawarne Lumber Company and Ferndale Town Center challenged the City of Ferndale's adoption of Ordinances 1693, 1707, 1708 and 1710 claiming violations of GMA public participation requirements, SEPA, and GMA procedural flaws. The case was extended for settlement purposes. On October 8, 2013 the Parties stipulated to dismiss the case and the Board closed the case on October 10, 2013 *Order of Dismissal, (October 10, 2013)*.

- ***Thurston County Farm Bureau v. Thurston County,* Case No. 12-2-0011**
  Petitioner challenged a County enactment arguing it constituted regulation of existing and/or new agricultural activities in violation of the Voluntary Stewardship Program. Following numerous extensions a settlement was reached and the parties stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal, (March 3, 2014)*.

- ***Governors Point Development Company, Triple R. Residential Construction, Inc., and The Sahlin Family v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0012**
  The parties stipulated to dismissal and the case was closed.

- ***Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013**
  In deciding a challenge to Whatcom County Ordinance No. 2012-032, the Board found the County Comprehensive Plan Rural Element did not include the measures needed to protect the rural character by ensuring patterns of land use and development consistent with protection of surface water and groundwater resources as required by RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(v), RCW 36.70A.030(15), RCW 36.70A.020(10) and RCW 36.70A.070(1). The Board ruled Petitioners did not successfully argue inconsistencies between the Comprehensive Plan Rural Element and Transportation Element. *Final Decision and Order (June 7, 2013).*

[15] Case No. 12-2-0009c was the consolidation of Case Nos. 12-2-0006c, 12-2-0008, and 12-2-0009.
[16] Case No. 12-2-0010c is the final consolidation of Case Nos. 12-2-0006c, 12-2-0009c, and 12-2-0010.

Thereafter, the Board found Whatcom County in continuing non-compliance. *Compliance Order, (January 10, 2014*). *Second Order on Compliance, (April 15, 2014).* The Board issued a Certificate of Appealability in the interest of definitive resolution of the water resource protection issues in the case. *Certificate of Appealability, (June 26, 2014).*

The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Board used improper procedure and faulty legal analysis. An appeal is pending before the Washington Supreme Court, *Hirst v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd*., 2015 Wash. LEXIS 785 (Wash. 2015) , No. 91475-3.

Key Holdings: Rural Element, Rural Character, Water, Invalidity, Certificate of Appealability

- ***David Carlsen v. City of Bellingham,* Case No. 12-2-0014**
  Petitioner Carlsen challenged the City of Bellingham's adoption of the Fairhaven Neighborhood and Urban Village Plan on grounds that it was inconsistent with the City comprehensive land use plan, capital facilities and transportation plans and did not meet several GMA goals. Petitioner argued the City was responsible for providing sufficient parking facilities. The Board found that publicly-financed parking facilities are not a GMA requirement and the City had analyzed and addressed transportation and parking needs in Fairhaven. The City adopted a new plan and development regulations to meet the needs of a growing population and parking demands. Their action included adopting progressive transportation demand management policies, requiring the private sector to provide parking and allowing infilling for urban residential and commercial ventures within Fairhaven. The Board did not find the City was not guided by GMA goals nor did it find inconsistency violations. The case is closed and dismissed. *Final Decision and Order (April 10, 2013)*

  Key Holding: Capital Facilities

- ***Allen Richard Curtis and Michael Whitney v. City of Raymond,* Case No. 12-2-0015**
  Petitioners challenged amendments to Raymond's Comprehensive Plan, zoning maps and related development regulations, alleged SEPA violations and a failure of the City to adopt a public participation plan under RCW 36.70A.140. The City repealed the challenged amendments and issues related to the amendments were dismissed. *Prehearing Order, Order Granting Settlement Extension and Order of Dismissal (December 28, 2012)*. The City acknowledged it had not adopted a public participation plan and the parties stipulated to a stay. The City then adopted the participation plan and the matter was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal on Stipulation (April 9, 2013).*

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County,* Case No. 12-2-0016**
  The Petitioners alleged the County had failed to review and update its comprehensive plan and development regulations for fish and wildlife habitat conservation critical areas. The County stipulated to non-compliance and the Board remanded the matter. *Order on Stipulation of Noncompliance, (January 25, 2013)*. Following adoption by the County of its FWHCA critical area

update, the Board found compliance and the case was closed. *Order Finding Compliance, (October 24, 2014)*.

2013 Cases

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0001**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0002**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0003**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0004**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***P.J. Taggares Company v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0005**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***P.J. Taggares Company v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0006**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***P.J. Taggares Company v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0007**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Common Sense Alliance v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0008**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Common Sense Alliance v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0009**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Common Sense Alliance v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0010**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***William H. Wright v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0011**
  See Case No. 13-2-0012c.

- ***Friends of the San Juans, P.J. Taggares Company, Common Sense Alliance, William H. Wright, and San Juan Builders Association v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0012c**[17]
  Five Petitioners raised more than one-hundred issues challenging the County's adoption of critical area regulations, including inadequate public participation, property rights, external inconsistency, failures to properly designate (including RCW 36.70A.480 challenges involving shorelines) and protect critical areas, failures to properly include BAS, and State Environmental Policy Act violations. The primary, substantive challenges focused on the designation and protection of the various types of critical areas and whether or not the County properly included the best available science. Those issues included alleged violations of RCW 36.70A.060, RCW 36.70A.170 and RCW 36.70A.172, the GMA mandates which include the requirements to designate and protect critical areas and to do so while including BAS. Analysis of those issues was necessarily fact specific involving the BAS assembled by the County and whether or not the adopted development regulations reflected inclusion of BAS or, alternatively, whether the County provided the necessary justification for departure from BAS.

  The Board found some of the regulations violated RCW 36.70A.060 and RCW 36.70A.172, and that their adoption actions was not guided by RCW 36.70A.020(9) and (10). Specifically, the regulations found to be in violation of the GMA involved allowance of or exemptions for specific activities/uses in wetlands, FWHCAs and/or their buffers, including new and expanding agricultural activities, sewage disposal systems, and transmission and utility lines within private or public rights of way. The Board also found water quality buffer widths and habitat buffer widths fell outside of the range for buffer widths recommended by the BAS, without any reasoned justification. *Final Decision and Order (September 6, 2013).*

  Four of the Petitioners filed appeals of the Board's decision and some asked the Board to stay the effectiveness of its FDO. Others and the County objected. The Board denied the request. For discussion, see *Order Denying Motions for Stay (October 17, 2013)*.

  The Board subsequently found the County to be in compliance with two exceptions. The compliance order, including the dissent, presents extensive discussion of departure from BAS. *Order Finding Compliance and Continuing Non-Compliance (August 20, 2014)*.

  The Board later found the County had achieved compliance and closed the case. *Order Finding Compliance (May 14, 2015)*.

  The San Juan County Superior Court's decision upholding the Board was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision. *The Common Sense Alliance v. Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs. Bd.,* 215 Wash. App. LEXIS 1908 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2015). The Supreme Court denied review. 189 Wn. App. 1026 (August 10, 2015)

[17] Case No. 13-2-0012c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 13-2-0001, 13-2-0002, 13-2-0003, 13-2-0004, 13-2-0005, 13-2-0006, 13-2-0007, 13-2-0008, 13-2-0009, 13-2-0010, 13-2-0011, and 13-2-0012.

Key Holdings: Critical Areas, Definitions, External Consistency, Public Participation, Stay , Mitigation

- ***Green Diamond Resource Company v. Mason County,* Case No. 13-2-0013**
  Petitioner Green Diamond Resource Company challenged Mason County when it denied a redesignation of property. The issue was whether Mason County acted in conformity with its comprehensive plan and whether the Board had jurisdiction. Petitioners withdrew their appeal and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (April 2, 2013).*

- ***Association of Citizens Concerned About Chambers Lake Basin, Save L.B.A Forest and Trails, Emilie M. Case, John Cusick, Brian Faller, Cristiana Figueroa-Kaminsky, Lou Guethlein, George Guethlein, Steve Moore, Eric Nelson, Dennis Ohare, Rhonda Olnick, Daniel Perry, and Jane Stavish v. City of Olympia,* Case No. 13-2-0014**
  Petitioners challenged the City of Olympia's non-project specific downzone of 80 acres from Neighborhood Village to Residential 4-8 and asserted the City's action was based on an inadequate environmental analysis thus violating SEPA as well as GMA requirements for internal consistency. The Board found the City adequately evaluated the environmental impacts, including alternatives and cumulative impacts and that the EIS correctly addressed the need for more detailed environmental analysis when a site-specific proposal is submitted. No GMA inconsistencies were found. The appeal was denied and the case closed. *Final Decision and Order (August 7, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: SEPA

- ***Futurewise v. Thurston County,* Case No. 13-2-0015**
  The Petitioner challenged the dedesignation of 185 acres of agricultural natural resource land. The landowner intervened, the parties requested and were granted settlement extensions, and the matter was resolved. Order of Dismissal (July 17, 2014).

- ***Jack Petree v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 13-2-0016**
  See Case No. 13-2-0018c.

- ***WV Wells Testamentary Trust and Marilyn Wells Derig v. City of Anacortes,* Case No. 13-2-0017**
  The Petitioners raised an internal comprehensive plan consistency challenge under RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble). The City had finalized its RCW 36.70A.130 comprehensive plan update in 2007, which incorporated its "City of Anacortes Shoreline Master Plan, 2000" by reference. In 2010, the City received DOE approval of its SMP update which was titled: "City of Anacortes Shoreline Master Program, 2010". The challenged Ordinance amended the City's Comprehensive Plan by changing the title of the incorporated SMP to the 2010 title. The Board dismissed the matter on the City's motion, finding Petitioners' challenge was time barred as any comprehensive plan inconsistency arose at the time the SMP was approved in 2010. The 2013

comprehensive plan amendments were mere title changes and could not have resulted in an internal comprehensive plan inconsistency. *Order of Dismissal (July 5, 2013)*

- ***Petree and Westergreen, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 13-2-0018c**[18]
  Petitioners challenged a Whatcom County resolution which requested the Department of Natural Resources to reconvey 8,844 acres of state forest land to the County for park purposes pursuant to RCW 79.22.300 and 330. Petitioners argued this was a de facto amendment to the County's comprehensive plan or development regulations. Finding the Board lacked jurisdiction over the County's action, the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (July 17, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction, De Facto Amendment

- ***William H. Wright v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0019**
  While the Petitioner asserted chapter 43.21C RCW (SEPA) violations, his two issue statements alleged a violation of RCW 90.58.100(1) and a failure to assemble "current, accurate, and complete scientific and technical information", apparently in regards to an ongoing Shoreline Management Program update. The Board dismissed the matter, finding: 1) there was no final, appealable decision made by the Department of Ecology, (2) any challenge alleging violations of chapter 43.21C RCW in regards to SMA amendments can only be raised in conjunction with a final DOE decision, (3) the PFR was frivolous, and (4) Petitioner failed to invoke the Board's jurisdiction to consider a shoreline master program amendment and/or a SEPA violation. *Order of Dismissal (July 5, 2013).*

- ***Olympia Master Builders v. City of Olympia,* Case No. 13-2-0020**
  The Petitioner challenged the City's reallocation of funds to the purchase of park land, alleging the action constituted a de facto comprehensive plan amendment. Numerous parties intervened. Settlement extensions were granted culminating in a stipulation for dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (November 6, 2013).*

- ***JW The John Wilson Group v. City of Tumwater and Thurston Regional Planning Council,* Case No. 13-2-0021**
  The Board found there was no final, appealable decision made by the City of Tumwater. The Petition for Review on its face did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the GMA and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (October 28, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction

- ***Nicole Brown, Wendy Harris, and Tip Johnson v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 13-2-0022**
  Petitioners alleged the County's decision to allow packing houses of up to 20,000 square feet in designated agricultural resource lands failed to assure conservation of those lands and failed to protect critical areas, water quality and quantity. The parties requested and were granted

[18] Case No. 13-2-0018c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 13-2-0016 and 13-2-0018

several settlement extensions. The parties then filed a stipulation for dismissal. The case was closed. *(Order of Dismissal on Stipulation, October 1, 2014)*.

2014 Cases

- ***Dragonslayer, Inc. and Michels Development, LLC v. City of La Center,* Case No. 14-2-0001**
  See Case No. 14-2-0003c.

- ***Greg and Susan Gilbert v. City of La Center,* Case No. 14-2-0002**
  See Case No. 14-2-0003c.

- ***Dragonslayer, Inc., Michels Development, LLC, Greg and Susan Gilbert, and Clark County v. City of La Center,* Case No. 14-2-0003c**[19]
  Three petitions challenging the City's decision to extend sewer service to 151 acres planned for a Cowlitz Indian Tribe casino complex were consolidated. The PFRs alleged violations involving inter jurisdictional consistency/coordination, internal consistency, preservation of designated agricultural lands, extension of sewer service beyond urban areas and SEPA.
  Petitioners challenged the City of La Center's decision to extend sewer service to land outside the City's Urban Growth Area planned for a Cowlitz Indian tribal casino complex. Petitioners alleged violations involving inter-jurisdictional consistency/coordination, internal consistency, preservation of designated agricultural lands, extension of sewer service beyond urban areas and SEPA. The Board found inconsistencies between the City's comprehensive plan policies and the Countywide Planning Policies. *Corrected Final Decision and Order, (October 24, 2014)*.
  To comply with the Board's order the City deleted language referring to development "adjacent to" its City boundary and references to evaluating development opportunities with the Cowlitz Tribe. However, the Board found a City Plan policy remained inconsistent with a County 20-year Planning Policy and a Comprehensive Plan Policy in violation of RCW 36.70A.100 and RCW 36.70A.210. *Compliance Order, (May 29, 2015)*.

  The Thurston County Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision (Cause No. 14-2-02193-1). That ruling was appealed and the parties then requested the Court of Appeals stay the matter pending the City's compliance action. Following that action, the Board found compliance and the appeal was dismissed.

  Key Holdings: Comprehensive Plan, Urban Services

- ***John Wilson NFC v. City of Tumwater,* Case No. 14-2-0004**
  The Petitioner challenged three separate ordinances. The City's motion to dismiss was granted based on the Petitioner's failure to include a detailed statement of issues, his lack of standing to

[19] Case No. 14-2-0003c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 14-2-0001, 14-2-0002, and 14-2-0003.

challenge one of the ordinances, and a failure to serve the respondent Thurston Regional Planning Council. *Order of Dismissal (April 23, 2014)*. A motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (May 28, 2014)*.

- ***William H. Wright v. San Juan County,* Case No. 14-2-0005**
  The Petitioner challenged an ordinance adopted for the purpose of complying with the Board's Final Decision and Order in Case No. 13-2-0012c. The County's motion to dismiss the seven issues raised was granted based on the Petitioner's failure to include a detailed statement of issues in some of the issue statements, the fact one of the issues failed to challenge a comprehensive plan, a development regulation, or an amendment of same, and allegations of violations of administrative rules which did not include applicable requirements. *Order on Motion to Dismiss (May 29, 2014)*.

  The Petitioner initially moved to disqualify the panel designated to hear the case. Each member of the panel declined, filing responses to the motion to disqualify. See *Determination on Motion to Disqualify (Board Member Roehl)*, *Determination of Board Member Raymond Paolella*, *Determination on Motion to Disqualify (Board Member Carter)*.

  Key Holdings: Recusal

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel LLC, dba Thorndyke Resource v. Washington State Department of Ecology and Jefferson County,* Case No. 14-2-0006**
  See Case No. 14-2-0008c.

- ***Olympic Stewardship Foundation, J. Eugene Farr, Wayne and Peggy King, Anne Bartow, Bill Eldridge, Bud and Val Schindler, and Ronald Holsman v. Jefferson County and State of Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0007**
  See Case No. 14-2-0008c.

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c[20]**
  Jefferson County adopted and the Department of Ecology approved an updated Shoreline Master Program. Challenges were filed by Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, a mineral extraction business, and by two advocacy groups, Olympic Stewardship Foundation and Citizens' Alliance for Property Rights. Petitioners' request for discovery by depositions was denied. *Order on Motion for Discovery (July 16, 2014)*. The Board dismissed Petitioners' assertions of constitutional claims. *Second Amended Prehearing Order and Order on Dispositive Motion, (September 5, 2014)*. Numerous violations of the Shoreline Management Act and applicable guidelines (WAC 173-26) were alleged, but the Board determined Petitioners failed to demonstrate non-compliance. *Final Decision and Order, (March 16, 2014)*. The Board issued a *Certificate of Appealability, (June 5, 2015)*. The appeal is pending in Case No. 47641-0, Div. II.

[20] Case No. 14-2-0008c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 14-2-0006, 14-2-0007, and 14-2-0008.

Key Holdings: Evidence, Jurisdiction, Shoreline Management Act – Standard and Scope of Review, Abandoned Issues, Shoreline Master Program, Property Rights (Goal 6), Internal Consistency

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County,* Case No. 14-2-0009**
  The Petitioner challenged Island County's adoption of comprehensive plan and development regulation amendments for fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas. The Board concluded the County failed to include BAS in designating and protecting the functions and values of critical area ecosystems, including the habitat of certain flora and fauna. It failed to protect specific types of FWHCAs: a Natural Area Preserve, as well as Westside Prairies, Oak Woodlands, and Herbaceous Balds. The Board remanded the Critical Areas Ordinance to the County to correct these and other non-compliant provisions. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015).* The County's appeal was dismissed due to a failure to make timely service upon the Board as required by RCW 34.05.542(2) and (4). (Island County Superior Court Case No. 15-2-00416-1, September 23, 2015).

  Key Holdings: Critical Areas, Critical Areas (FWHCAs), Administrative Discretion, Interim Ordinances, GMA Compliance/ Statutory Construction

2015 Cases

- ***Rob Kavanaugh v, City of Lacey ,* Case No. 15-2-0001**
  The PFR expressed concerns regarding tree cutting by the City. The Board dismissed the matter as (1) there was no final, appealable [GMA] decision made by the City, (2) the PFR did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the GMA, and (3) the Petitioner failed to invoke the Board's jurisdiction. *Order of Dismissal, (November 9, 2015)*. A motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (December 2, 2015)*.

- ***Olympia Master Builders, Thurston County Chamber of Commerce, Hinkle Properties, Inc., and Hinkle Homes v. Thurston County,* Case No. 15-2-0002**
  Petitioners alleged the County "implicitly approv[ed] staff implementation" of a development permit review process designed to protect Mazama pocket gopher habitat resulting in *de facto* Critical Area Ordinance amendments.

  The Board denied the County's motion to dismiss which alleged the PFR was filed beyond the date of "publication". The County argued extensive publicity, including press releases, newspaper and magazine articles constituted sufficient publication. The Board denied the motion. *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, (February 8. 2016)*.

  The Board concluded certain aspects of the challenged permit review process constituted *de facto* amendments of the CAO, that those changes were made in violation of the public participation requirements, and remanded. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015).*

  Key Holdings: Publication of Notice of Adoption

2016 Cases

- ***Friends of the San Juan v. San Juan County,* Case No. 16-2-0001**
  A challenge of a San Juan County ordinance which de-designated four parcels totaling approximately 30 acres from designated forest land to a rural category. Based on the County's failure to include and consider mandated de-designation criteria, the Board found violations of RCW 36.70A.170 and RCW 36.70A.130(1)(d) Final Decision and Order, *(June 30, 2016)*.

  Key Holdings: Natural Resource Lands (Designation/De-designation)

- ***Friends of Clark County & Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 16-2-0002**
  Petitioners moved for summary judgment, remand, and invalidity. They alleged the County failed to meet a statutory deadline in RCW 36.70A.367(6) and RCW 36.70A.130(4) to designate two industrial land banks. The Board found the County violated the GMA deadline, granted the motion for summary judgment and remanded the ordinances, but declined to impose invalidity. Final Order Granting Summary Judgment, (September 9, 2016).

  Key Holdings: Statutory interpretation

- ***Olympia Master Builders, Thurston County Chamber of Commerce, and Hinkle Properties, Inc. d/b/a Hinkle Homes v. Thurston County*, Case No. 16-2-0003**
  This was a second challenge of Thurston County's use of an interim process to identify and regulate properties containing actual or potential Mazama pocket gopher habitat as a de facto amendment to its Critical Area Ordinance. See Case No. 15-2-0002. The matter is pending.

- ***Friends of Clark County & Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 16-2-0004**
  Challenge of Amended Ordinance No. 2016-06-12 updating the County's comprehensive plan. The case was consolidated into Case No. 16-2-0005c below as both petitions challenged the same ordinance.

- ***Clark County Citizens United, Inc. v. Clark County,* Case No. 16-2-0005c [21]**
  Challenge of Clark County Amended Ordinance 2016-06-12 updating the County's comprehensive plan. This matter is pending.

[21] Case No. 16-2-0005c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 16-2-0004 and 16-2-0005.

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Abandoned Issues

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c:** Pursuant to WAC 242-03-590(1), failure of a party to brief an issue in the opening brief is deemed abandonment of that issue. Further, the Board has held "[a]n issue is briefed when legal argument is provided; it is not sufficient for a petitioner to make conclusory statements, without explaining how, as the law applies to the facts before the Board, a local government has failed to comply with the Act." …[W]here Petitioners have not provided specific legal argument for citations listed in their issue statements, and specified which provisions of the law they claim are violated, the Board will deem those claims abandoned. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 13.*

Administrative Discretion

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County, Case No. 14-2-0009*:** [In considering administrative allowance of an exemption from critical area regulations,] The Board's concern is the lack of adequate standards to guide a County administrator in determining what constitutes an "appropriately limited and reasonable amount of time". The County has the obligation to protect critical areas and the absence of clear standards could lead to the resumption of agricultural activities, with potential negative impacts on the functions and values of FWHCAs, following a decade or more of no agricultural activity. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 43.

Agricultural Lands

- ***Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 07-2-0027:** The three "prongs" to consider regarding the designation/de-designation of ALLTCS, as restated by the Court of Appeals, are:
    1. A determination of whether the land is characterized by "urban growth".
    2. A determination of the commercial productivity of the land or the land's capability of being commercially productive. (The Court observed that "[t]his factor requires an assessment of whether "the land is actually used or capable of being used for agricultural production," citing *City of Redmond*);
    3. A determination of the "long-term commercial significance" for agricultural production of the parcels. The Court stated this determination requires consideration of soil composition, proximity to population areas, the possibility of more intense uses of the land, and the 10 factors in former WAC 365-190-050(1). *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 10.*

    If merely being within one-quarter mile of a UGA boundary justifies de-designation of ALLTCS, there is nothing to prevent the inexorable loss of fertile farmland. This expansion of the UGA followed by its urbanization will lead to the identical argument being made to justify further expansion as the nearby ALLTCS land will then be found to be adjacent or in proximity to urban growth. As the Court of Appeals stated: "Under the GMA, the 'logical

place' for expansion and growth is to build higher within the UGA, not to expand it." *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 15.*

[In addressing land values under alternative uses, one of the WAC factors, the Board stated] The Board has previously noted the mere potential for de-designation may drive up land values, citing the Board's decision in GMHB Case No. 12-3-0002c, FDO, p. 54 where it was stated: " . . . de-designation of ARL and RF lands not only paves over 182 acres of prime farm lands but sends a signal to other farmers that zoning will not long protect them from urbanization, particularly if mere urban adjacency becomes the overriding factor in the de-designation analysis." *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 17.*

Elevating economic factors in regards to Area WB above the GMA goal to maintain and enhance agricultural lands and the agricultural industry reflects the same failing the Court of Appeals noted in discussing the La Center de-designated areas LB-1, LB-2, and LE. As the Court stated there:

> Moreover, the County's overtly heavy reliance on economic factors when deciding whether land has long-term agricultural commercial significance runs afoul of several of the GMA's planning goals – namely, the County's duty to "designate and conserve agricultural lands." Soccer Fields, 142 Wn.2d at 558 (analyzing the GMA's "[n]atural resource industries" planning goal – RCW 36.70A.020(8)). In addition, the County's emphasis on economic factors violates RCW 36.70A.020(5), which requires counties to "[e]ncourage economic development . . . within the capacities of the state's natural resources, public services, and public facilities" (emphasis added). 161 Wn. App. 204, 243; *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 19.*

[In addressing the question of whether land is primarily devoted to the commercial production of agricultural products (the Lewis County second prong), the Board referenced Supreme Court decisions in stating] "Land is so devoted if it is in an area used or capable of being used for agricultural production", as well as the guidance provided by the Court of Appeals in its remand decision: "All [these] areas are capable of being farmed." *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 21.*

- ***Martin v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0002:** The County fulfilled its obligation to designate resource land including ALLTCS in 1997, and the adequacy of these designations is not before the Board. Its development regulations adopted to protect agricultural lands were upheld and those provisions both then and now applied to R5 and R10 lands meeting the criteria of the ordinance. The rezone in this case did not amend GMA compliant APO development regulations originally adopted in 1997 to protect agriculture. Those provisions apply to the area at issue when zoned R10 and they continue to apply now that the area is zoned R5. *FDO, (July 22, 2011), pg. 10.*

Airports

- ***Port of Shelton v. City of Shelton*, Case No. 10-2-0013:** [As to consideration of WA Department of Transportation – Aviation comments] As an agency division within the Department of Transportation, WSDOT Aviation has been granted general supervision over aeronautics in this state. It has developed specialized knowledge and thus its opinions should be given substantial weight as the Board stated in the FDO. *Order on Reconsideration, (Dec. 9, 2010), pg. 8*.

  [In addressing Incompatible Uses – RCW 36.70A.510; 36.70.547 - the Board stated that it] agrees that no "bright line" residential density limit should be applied within Sanderson Field's Zone 6, or to any other airport's safety zones for that matter … a "one size does not fit all"; rather, the individual facts applicable to an airport, proposed uses in that airport's vicinity, and the record developed in each case are determinative. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pg. 10.*

  RCW 36.70.547 requires cities and counties to "discourage the siting of incompatible uses." The term "incompatible" was not defined by the Legislature, but its common meaning refers to something that cannot subsist with something else. In terms of land uses and airport operations, the Board sees two types of potential incompatibility: those which arise or are created by impacts of the land use itself on airport operations and those which may arise or be created by the operation of the airport and affect surrounding uses. An example of land uses which could affect airport operations, including aircraft safety, would be the height or location of buildings, transmission lines, and the like. An example of airport activities which could negatively impact adjacent land uses is excessive noise. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pgs. 12-13.*

  It is not the role of this Board to determine at what specific DNL sound level compatibility with the continued operation of Sanderson Field would occur in relationship to the Property. However, it is appropriate for the Board to observe and find that incompatibility, as envisioned by RCW 36.70.547 and as applied to the Property on the Record before the Board, is a sound level below that which is harmful to human health... Consequently, the Board finds that the 65 DNL level cannot be considered to be per se compatible with residential uses of two units per gross acre on the Property. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pgs. 19-20.*

  The Board can only conclude from the Record that the 65 DNL sound level is that which is harmful to human health. Sound levels resulting in negative impacts to human health are greater than those that would result in incompatibility as envisioned by RCW 36.70.547. That conclusion is reached after reviewing the entire record and determining there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the City's conclusion regarding compatibility. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pgs. 21-22.*

Amendment

- ***Futurewise v. Pacific County,* Case No. 10-2-0021:** Petitioner argued all aspects of the newly adopted Comprehensive Plan were subject to challenge because the County adopted the amendments by repealing and replacing the prior Plan in its entirety. The Board found this would be elevating form over substance, as the adopted revisions were relatively few in

number and a new Plan was adopted for purposes of administrative efficiency. *FDO, (June 22, 2011), pg. 5.*

The update was intended and served as the County's mandated Comprehensive Plan update as required by RCW 36.70A.130. The County had not amended its designation of, or policies and regulatory standards pertaining to, Agricultural Lands of Long Term Commercial Significance after their initial adoption in 1987, and the adoption of the initial GMA Pacific County Comprehensive Plan in 1998. A party may challenge a county's failure to revise a comprehensive plan only with respect to those provisions that are directly affected by new or recently amended GMA provisions. But an annual update "creates no 'open season' for challenges previously decided or time-barred." Therefore, the scope of permissible challenges in this appeal was limited to those areas amended by the County or affected by new or recently amended GMA provisions. *FDO, (June 22, 2011), pg. 5.*

Where the changes in the Plan at most recited the statutory requirements of RCW 36.70A.170 and made reference to WAC 365-190-050 which contains language pertaining to the designation of ALLTCS, such references cannot be read as adopting new designation standards. *FDO, (June 22, 2011), pgs. 9-10.*

- ***Concrete Nor'West and 4M2K, LLC v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0007:** The Petitioners can prevail if, and only if, the GMA, the County's Plan or its development regulations impose a duty on the County to designate MRL during an annual update when all applicable designation criteria are met. *FDO, (September 25, 2012), pg. 11.*

  A local government legislative body has the discretion to adopt or reject a particular proposed comprehensive plan amendment in the absence of a GMA or comprehensive plan mandate. *FDO, (September 25, 2012), pg.13.*

Amicus Curiae

- ***Port of Shelton v. City of Shelton*, Case No. 10-2-0013:** [Amicus] argument shall be limited solely to the issues before the Board in this proceeding. That is, the Board will only consider the legal arguments raised by [Amicus] as they relate to the issues now before the Board, not argument related to issues beyond the record. *Order Granting Status as Amicus Curiae, (Sept. 9, 2010).*

Burden of Proof

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County, Case No. 11-2-0010c:*** [In considering measures to protect rural character] the County asserts it need not respond to academic studies which may not be germane to local circumstances. The Board finds it need not consider non-local studies but cannot ignore current [site-specific] authoritative reports in the record [concluding petitioners carried their burden of proof with multiple current local reports.] *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 43.*

- Under RCW 36.70A.320(4) a county "subject to a determination of invalidity made under RCW 36.70A.300 or 36.70A.302 has the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance or resolution it has enacted in response to the determination of invalidity will no longer substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of" the GMA. The County's burden under RCW 36.70A.320(4) is limited to invalidity determinations under the standard in RCW 36.70A.302(1), and this burden of the County does not apply to compliance determinations. As to compliance, the burden is always on the Petitioner to overcome the presumption of validity and demonstrate that any action taken by the County in an attempt to achieve compliance is clearly erroneous in light of the goals and requirements of the GMA. *Order Finding Compliance and Non-Compliance, As Amended on Reconsideration, (January 23, 2014), p. 6.*

Capital Facilities

- ***David Carlsen v. City of Bellingham,* Case No. 12-2-0014:** RCW 36.70A.070(3) and (6) requires the city to inventory existing capital facilities, forecast future needs, propose location for future facilities, develop 6-year financing plans and reassess land uses to ensure coordination. Parks and recreation facilities are the only specific requirement to be included in the plan. The City completed a Transportation Improvement Program for their Comprehensive Plan Transportation Chapter to meet the requirements of .070(3) and (6). The City chose not to build or operate public parking facilities in Fairhaven. This is not a violation of RCW 36.70A.070(3) or (6) because this statute does not require publicly-financed parking facilities to be included as a capital facility nor does it define them as such. Whether or not to include parking facilities in a capital facilities plan is a decision within the discretion of local governments. *Final Decision and Order (April 10, 2013) at 17-18.*

Certificate of Appealability

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** [The Board found delay in appellate review would be detrimental to the public interest,] [a]s … "there is nothing in the Comprehensive Plan or development regulations prevent(ing) the vesting of development rights to accommodate virtually all of the County's projected population in rural lands, establishing patterns of sprawl and detracting from compact urban development." [The Board also found a fundamental statewide issue was raised concerning accommodation of rural population.] *Certificate of Appealability, (March 15, 2013*).

- ***Eric Hirst, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013:** [A Certificate of Appealability was granted in the interest of definitive appellate resolution of the water resource protection issues in the case.] *Certificate of Appealability, (June 26, 2014).*

Compliance

- ***John Peranzi, Vallie Jo Fry and Tony and Isobel Cairone v. City of Olympia,* Case No. 11-2-0011:** [In response to the argument RCW 36.70A.130(2)(b) did not provide the City with an exemption from the requirement of once-a-year comprehensive plan amendments, the Board found the City was not precluded from amending its comprehensive plan to achieve compliance as that exception applied only to comprehensive plan amendments, not development regulations] The

exception was provided by the Legislature to avoid the conundrum the City would face if the Board's order found comprehensive plan violations. If the Board had done so, the exception would allow the City to achieve compliance within the time allotted by the Board pursuant to RCW 36.70A.300(3). In this instance, the violation did not involve challenges to comprehensive plan provisions but rather to development regulations. Therefore, the Legislature needed to provide no exception. *Order on Motion for Clarification, (June 21, 2012), pgs. 3, 4.*

Comprehensive Plan

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0005:** The Board held the County did not need to change its planning horizon because the County had an unforeseen six-year delay due to appeals of its SEPA process. Re-setting the time period would alter data collection and the need to comply with GMA deadlines. The Board held the County was not required to expand its urban growth boundary because it had analyzed population projections, had conducted a market factor analysis and land capacity analysis before making its decision. After the analysis the County decided to expand the UGA by 18 acres instead of 180 acres as requested by the City of Oak Harbor. In regards to the market factor analysis, the Board agreed the County laid out a clear rationale and used its discretion to reject a 126% market factor analysis because this percentage was larger than past MFAs accepted by the Board. *Final Decision and Order, (December 12, 2011)*, pages 8-12; 32-43.

- ***Governors Point Development Company et al. v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0010c**: The *Kittitas County* case does not result in a mandate that every isolated Comprehensive Plan policy must be devoid of conditional language and contain only directional provisions but, instead, the Comprehensive Plan must be considered in its entirety to determine if there is compliance with the GMA. The word "should" is appropriate *so long as* the Comprehensive Plan provides a framework that ensures compliance with the GMA and provides measures by which a jurisdiction will be held accountable. *FDO, (January 9, 2012)*, pg. 29.

- ***Dragonslayer, Inc., Michels Development, LLC, Greg and Susan Gilbert, and Clark County v. City of La Center,* Case No. 14-2-0003c*:*** Countywide planning policies are a key element of the GMA consistency framework. . . . To implement [Goal 11], RCW 36.70A.100 provides that "[t]he comprehensive plan of each county or city that is adopted pursuant to RCW 36.70A.040 shall be coordinated with, and consistent with, the comprehensive plans adopted pursuant to RCW 36.70A.040 of other counties or cities with which the county or city has, in part, common borders or related regional issues." . . . The Department of Commerce's guidelines at WAC 365-196-305(3) state categorically: "The comprehensive plans of . . . cities must comply with both the countywide planning policies and the [GMA]". *Corrected Final Decision and Order, (October 24, 2014)*, pg. 17.

  "[RCW 36.70A.100] mandates that the comprehensive plan of each county shall be coordinated with, and consistent with, the comprehensive plans of cities with which the county has common borders or related regional issues, while [RCW 36.70A.210] requires consistency of city plans with county-wide planning policies." *Order on Compliance (May 29, 2015)*, pg. 22.

City Policy 4.2.3(b) is inconsistent with the County's Comprehensive Plan because extending sewers beyond an urban growth boundary contradicts the County's 20-Year Planning Policy 6.3.8 prohibiting such extensions. (CPP 6.3.8 Extension of public sewer service shall not be permitted outside urban growth areas. . . .) With this inconsistency, the City violates RCW 36.70A.100 . . . *Order on Compliance, (May 29, 2015)*, p. 13.

- ***Alvin Alexanderson, Dragonslayer, Inc. and Michels Development, LLC v. City of La Center,* Case No. 12-2-0004:** The Board concludes that because the Resolution explicitly provides for sewer service in violation of the Comprehensive Plan's annexation requirement, the Resolution constitutes a *de facto* Comprehensive Plan amendment. As the *Alexanderson* Court stated: "What was previously forbidden is now allowed" and, for the Board to find to the contrary would be "to exalt form over function". *Order on Dispositive Motion, (May 4, 2012)*, pg. 13.

Critical Areas

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** When the County used a conditional use permit process, subject to hearing examiner review, the Board concluded that the hearing examiner may impose "reasonable" conditions of approval that do not render the EPF impractical. The Board has decided numerous cases giving discretion to an administrator. In this case, however, the Board decided the hearing examiner did not have clear guidance about what would constitute "reasonable" conditions for an EPF. Without clearer guidance about what constitutes "reasonable", and without requirements to fully mitigate impacts, the Board found the County's regulation on siting EPFs in critical areas lacked guidance on mitigation, Best Available Science, and failed to protect critical area functions and values. Critical areas are the "natural infrastructure" and the foundation of a landscape and cannot be overruled or "trumped" by siting EPFs. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pg. 24.*

- **Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: WAC 365-190-040(7) provides that the " . . . designation process may result in critical area designations that overlay . . . natural resource land classifications" and that " . . . if a critical area designation overlies a natural resource land designation, both designations apply". Additionally, WAC 365-190-020(7) provides " . . . that critical areas designations overlay other land uses including designated natural resource lands. For example, if both critical area and natural resource land use designations apply to a given parcel or a portion of a parcel, both or all designations must be made". Precluding designation of mineral resource sites that contain CARA 1, class I or 2 wetlands (and their buffers), certain habitat and species areas (and their buffers), as well as 100 year floodplains and geologically sensitive areas, may in fact be justifiable. However, the record fails to provide that justification. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 29.*

  [The challenged action, which precluded the designation of Mineral Resource Land within certain critical areas affects critical areas regulation. RCW 36.70A.172 mandates the application of BAS when "protecting critical areas," but the County failed to utilize BAS.] *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 51.*

The Board conclude[d] that the exclusionary criteria designed to protect critical areas included in the Resolution's Comprehensive Plan violate RCW 36.70A.170's mandate to designate MRL of long term commercial significance and critical areas and the WAC Minimum Guidelines which provide that if such designations overlap, both designations apply. *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012)* pg. 26.

- ***Friends of the San Juans, et al. v. San Juan County*, Case No. 13-2-0012c:** The Board dismissed alleged violations of RCW 36.70A.040(3) regarding the designation and protection of critical areas stating that statute "established the requirement that jurisdictions adopt initial comprehensive plans and implementing development regulations" and the County "had adopted the required comprehensive plan and development regulations many years ago." *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 9.

  [Petitioners challenged an exception from the CAO's for public agencies and public/private utilities when such an entity "has difficulty" meeting protection regulations resulting in preclusion of the proposal, to which the Board responded] "The clause 'would preclude a development proposal' does not include a qualifier that places the initial burden on the agency to show the location of the proposed development is necessary. . . the initial determination under the County's system, the location of the 'development proposal', is left solely to the proponent, notwithstanding the possibility the proposal could be located in an area with fewer negative impacts to a critical area. The County has the obligation to protect critical areas and leaving the choice of location to the proponent is in effect a delegation of authority, would abrogate the duty to protect critical areas and fails to assure no net loss of ecological functions. Furthermore, there are no standards by which to determine that a project proponent would "have difficulty" meeting standard critical area regulations." *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 33, 34.

  [T]he decision on whether or not to designate species or habitats of local importance lies with the County in accordance with WAC 365-190-130. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 39.

  The Board is unaware of any requirement in the GMA which mandates the establishment of a process for designating new habitats of local importance. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 42.

  If development regulations allow harm to critical areas, they must require compensatory mitigation of the harm. Development regulations may not allow a net loss of the functions and values of the ecosystem that includes the impacted or lost critical areas. When developing alternative means of protection, counties and cities must assure no net loss of ecological functions and values and must include the Best Available Science. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 45.

  For critical areas, the preferred option is to avoid negative impacts. However, when that is not an option, steps to reduce and mitigate adverse impacts are appropriate when a jurisdiction follows a mitigation sequencing process. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 67.

The Board finds and concludes that a blanket exemption for activities which could result in significant impacts to a critical area, without any consideration of the quality of a wetland, and which does not include steps to avoid, minimize or mitigate, fails to protect critical areas. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 71.

The Board also observes that the [Petitioners'] argument highlights the difficulty of citing Board or appellate court decisions in regard to BAS and the BAS record. The BAS in any particular decision may not be similar to BAS relied on by a different jurisdiction and reflected in the decision challenging that decision. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 73.

[Contrary to an assertion that RCW 36.70A.170 and RCW 36.70A.480 required the County to classify and designate specific areas as FWHCAs], the Board stated " . . . Department of Commerce regulations specifically anticipate the need to designate critical areas using 'maps' and/or 'performance standards,' with a preference for performance standards when adopting land use regulations because maps are less precise", citing WAC 365-190-040(5)(b) and WAC 365-190-080(4) *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 90, 91.

While the County has assembled some critical area maps, it is clear that those maps do not serve to designate FWHCAs. Conditions in the field control. As addressed elsewhere in this FDO, the County's system is site specific. Mapping of specific fish and wildlife habitat conservation critical areas is not a GMA requirement. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 92.

Establishing property-specific buffers is indeed one approach [to protecting FWHCAs] and, as stated in *Wetlands Volume 2* ". . . is probably the most consistent with what a review of the scientific literature reveals about buffer effectiveness." However, that is not the only method: "Three basic types of buffer regulations are generally recognized: variable-width, fixed-width, or some combination." *Order Finding Compliance and Continuing Non-Compliance, (August 20, 2014)*, pg. 17.

The *Yakima County* (*Yakima County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.*, 168 Wn. App. 680) decision required a reasoned explanation of a jurisdiction's BAS departure decision or identification of other GMA goals being implemented by that decision. *Order Finding Compliance and Continuing Non-Compliance, (August 20, 2014)*, pg. 45.

[In discussing the requirement for a "reasoned justification" for departure from BAS, the Board stated]: a "reasoned justification" should include a consideration of the science in the record together with predominantly scientific, technical, or legal factors that support a departure from Best Available Science recommendations. Social, cultural, or political factors should not predominate over the scientific, technical, and legal factors as a rationale for departing from science-based recommendations. *Order Finding Compliance and Continuing Non-Compliance, (August 20, 2014)*, pg. 35.

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County*, Case No. 14-2-0009:**[The County failed to protect critical areas as it allowed] "grandfathered non-conforming uses" which no

longer comply with more recently enacted and, presumably, more protective land use laws, [to be] be considered a "reasonable use" when determining whether a proposed use met the reasonable use criteria. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 8.

Under the statutory definition, "Critical Areas" include "areas and ecosystems," and it is the functions and values of those areas and ecosystems that counties and cities are required to protect. Development regulations may not allow a net loss of the functions and values of the ecosystem that includes the impacted or lost critical areas. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 21.

Critical Areas (FWHCAs)

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County*, Case No. 14-2-0009*:*** [Allowing an exemption from the FWHCA regulations for removal of beaver and beaver dams based on] reliance on the issuance of an HPA from WDFW, an agency which is precluded from considering any functions and values beyond fish life, fails to protect critical area functions and values and fails to include BAS. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 12.

  FWHCAs are "areas that serve a critical role in sustaining needed habitats and species for the functional integrity of the ecosystem". In sum, the GMA requires the County to protect the functions and values of Critical Area Ecosystems. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 21.

  "An ecosystem consists of all the organisms that live in a particular area along with physical components of the environment with which those organisms interact. There must be an appropriate mixture of plants, animals, and microbes if the ecosystem is to function. . . So complete is the interconnectedness of the various living and nonliving components of the ecosystem that a change in any one will result in a subsequent change in almost all the others." *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 21.

  [The Board disagreed with the County's view that the sole purpose of FWHCAs, including Natural Area Preserves, is the protection of the species found therein] By failing to establish buffers for the NAP based on an assumption that it encompasses "the land required for species preservation", the County has failed to protect the NAP's habitat or the functional integrity of its ecosystem. [Citing WAC 365-190-130(3)(a) and the role of buffers to separate incompatible uses from habitat areas.] *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 24-2.

  The GMA guidelines focus on the "functional integrity of the ecosystem" and make no distinction between plant and animal species. Plants and animals are interconnected components of all terrestrial ecosystems. The GMA statutes make no distinction between plant and animal species; rather the GMA statutes require protection of the integrated habitat area and ecosystem. The County [failed to consider] WAC 365-190-130(1)(a)'s guideline to consider

for classification and designation, among other things, "areas where endangered, threatened, and sensitive species [which may be plant or animal] have a primary association". *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 28.

It is the County's obligation to designate and protect habitat areas and ecosystems; the protection afforded by other entities or regulations is irrelevant. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 31.

WAC 365-190-130(2) directs jurisdictions to consider and designate areas where endangered, threatened, and sensitive species have a primary association. The County's prairies have such an association with the three referenced [ETS] plant species. *Final Decision and Order, June 26, 2015*, p. 34.

[Citing WAC 365-190-130(2)(b)'s direction to consider habitats and species of local importance for classification and designation, the Board found the County had failed to protect critical areas by its decision to] not designate Westside prairies, Oak woodlands and herbaceous balds as habitats of local importance [notwithstanding] the record establishe[d] these areas constitute rare or vulnerable ecological systems and habitat or habitat elements. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 37.

De Facto Amendment

- ***Petree and Westergreen, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 13-2-0018c**: [The Resolution] began a process with DNR which may or may not result in a change of ownership to the land. A change in ownership is not a change in land use. [T]he Resolution does not govern the use of the land. Finally, Whatcom County's current Commercial Forestry District policies are not superseded or contradicted. …There is no basis for finding a de facto amendment when the challenged action is consistent with provisions of the comprehensive plan. Thus, the Board finds and concludes the County's action did not constitute a de facto comprehensive plan or development regulation amendment. *Order of Dismissal, (July 17, 2013)* at 10.

Deference

- ***Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 07-2-0027:** The Board took note of the following observation included in the Court of Appeals decision remanding this matter and shares the concerns expressed:

  > The County's contention that the Growth Board is required to give its 2007 de-designation deference over its 2004 designation is unpersuasive. The County designated these parcels as ALLTCS in its 2004 comprehensive plan, which it intended to follow for 20 years. Absent a showing that this designation was both erroneous in 2004 and improperly confirmed by the Growth Board, or that a substantial change in the land occurred since the ALLTCS designation, the prior designation should remain. Without

> such deference to the original designation, there is no land use plan, merely a series of quixotic regulations. Moreover, under such ever-changing regulations, the GMA goal of planning, maintaining, and conserving agricultural lands could never be achieved. *FDO On Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 4.*

[T]he Board rejects any implication it is limited to considering only such evidence as may support a jurisdiction's decision. To the contrary, the Board is required to reach a decision "in view of the entire record before the board and in light of the goals and requirements of this chapter." RCW 36.70A.320(3). *FDO on Remand, (March 11, 2014), pg. 6.*

Definitions

- ***Friends of the San Juans, et al. v. San Juan County*, Case No. 13-2-0012c:** [[Responding to an argument that a regulation's definition was vague and susceptible to multiple interpretations resulting in a lack of sufficient guidance to County staff administering the CAOs, the Board found]: "In the Board's view, the question is not the definitions but rather how those definitions are used in the CAO's regulatory scheme. One cannot view the definitions in isolation but must relate them to the regulations themselves. It is not a requirement that a definition include adequate standards for appropriate, consistent administration. The GMA requires those standards to be included somewhere in the regulations." *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 93.

Economic Development (Goal 5)

- ***Skagit D06 v. Skagit County*, Case No. 10-2-0011:** The Board does not find a policy that delays extension of sewer service to the periphery of the UGA until annexation violates Goal 5. *FDO, (August 4, 2010), pg. 14.*

Environment (Goal 10)

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** [The Board considered a six-month interim, one-time extension ordinance for land use development permits that would otherwise expire.] Applications to be renewed under the Ordinance dated from the 1990's into early 2000. The Board found the Ordinance allowed out-of-date development standards to stay in effect without applying the critical areas assessment required by the County's current codes [which incorporate RCW 36.70A.172 requirements for Best Available Science in both the CAO and SMP]. The Board found the . . . Ordinance failed to protect critical areas. Finally, the Board found the County was not guided by GMA Goal 10 due to its failure to incorporate BAS. *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 12.*

Essential Public Facilities (EPFs)

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** The GMA definition section does not define EPFs. Rather, in RCW 36.70A.200, the Legislature created parameters for EPFs that are "those facilities that are typically difficult to site". This GMA provision provides a non-exclusive listing of types of facilities that can be EPFs – airports, state education facilities and state/regional transportation facilities [RCW 47.06.140], state/local correctional facilities, solid

waste handling facilities, and in-patient facilities. Further guidance on how to identify and site EPFs is in WAC 365-196-550. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pg. 8.*

Evidence

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** Because the Board's review is limited to the record before the County during the decision making process, the Board does not generally permit supplementation of the record with exhibits produced after the adoption of the challenged ordinance. *Order on Motion to Supplement, (July 8, 2010), pg. 2*.

External Consistency

- ***Martin v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0002:** In analyzing whether there is a lack of consistency between a plan provision and a development regulation, arising to a violation of the GMA, this Board has held that such a violation results if the development regulations preclude attainment of planning goals and policies. Here, County staff correctly concluded that: "Rezoning the subject areas to R(5) would provide for a greater intensity of land use and further subdivisions where divisions are currently prohibited. Rezoning these properties would be in direct conflict with Policy 2K-1." The Board agrees that, at least as to the 92 of the 770 acres rezoned that are in the floodplain, a doubling of the density *encourages* development in the floodplain and directly conflicts with the policy to limit land in one-hundred year floodplains to low-intensity uses such as open space corridors or agriculture. The County argues that in areas outside of UGAs that are not suitable for agricultural or other resource land designation, such as this area in Birch Bay, the only remaining use is rural zoning, and both the R5 and R10 zones allow for the same low intensity uses. *FDO, (July 22, 2011), pg. 17.*

- ***Friends of the San Juans, et al. v. San Juan County*, Case No. 13-2-0012c:** A difficulty with the blanket allegation of RCW 36.70A.130(1) violations … is the failure to tie each and every one of those alleged development regulation inconsistencies to specific comprehensive plan goals . . . a careful review of briefing and oral argument fails to disclose instances where [Petitioner] establish[ed] a direct inconsistency between the adopted development regulations contained in the CAO ordinances and Comprehensive Plan goals and policies….Establishing a development regulation's inconsistency with comprehensive plan goals is a difficult hurdle to surmount. First of all, the GMA grants local jurisdictions broad discretion and imposes a presumption of validity that comprehensive plans and development regulations are valid on adoption. . . . The Board's determinations of RCW 36.70A.130(1)(d) inconsistencies in its recent decisions have found such violations when there is a direct conflict between the comprehensive plan goal or policy and the adopted development regulation. *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 22-24.

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c*:*** [Petitioners sought to depose County and Ecology staff to determine questions of improper interference, bias, and inadequacy of public involvement.] Pursuant to WAC 242-03-300(1), discovery shall not be permitted unless the Presiding Officer finds extraordinary circumstances warrant seeking more information outside the existing record. [Finding the

issues were raised in the record,] the Board will address Petitioners issues from . . . the record. *Order on Motion for Discovery, (July 16, 2014), p. 4.*

GMA Compliance/Statutory Construction

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County*, Case No. 14-2-0009:** For compliance with the GMA, jurisdictions must first look to the wording of the GMA statutes. Other than the Minimum Guidelines included within chapter 365-190 WAC, administrative code sections adopted to assist jurisdictions in compliance are extremely helpful but are secondary. Resort to statutes or rules unrelated to the GMA for interpretation of its provisions is rarely appropriate. Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015), pps. 28, 29.

Goals

Goal 8: Natural resource industries (*See* ***Natural Resource Lands***)

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** The Board determined the County substantially interfered with Goal 8 because natural resource lands would be developed for an EPF and would thereby convert that land to a non-resource use. The natural resource land would thus not be available for agricultural and forestry. The lack of any siting limitations to conserve the most productive land and prevent conflicting uses also adversely impacts the continued operation of the natural resource industry. If invalidity is not imposed regarding Goal 8, San Juan County could allow development which has the potential for foreclosing the proper application of the GMA's natural resource lands and critical areas provisions. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pg. 37.*

Goal 10: Environment (*See* ***Environment***)

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** Substantial interference with Goal 10 resulted because the development of an EPF is not required to fully mitigate for its impacts, thereby allowing environmental degradation. By permitting EPFs in areas which serve important environmental functions, these functions would be lost if the area is developed. If invalidity is not imposed regarding Goal 10, San Juan County could allow development which has the potential for foreclosing the proper application of the GMA's natural resource lands and critical areas provisions. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pg. 37.*

Housing Element (Goal 4)

- ***Skagit D06 v. Skagit County*, Case No. 10-2-0011:** Goal 4 seeks to ensure not only housing affordable to all economic sectors but also a variety of residential densities and types. The Board does not find that refusing to extend sewer service to an area outside the city limits thwarts Goal 4. Properties on the periphery of the UGA may not be developed until late in the 20 year planning period, but, once sewer is extended, more intensive levels of development can occur. *FDO, (Aug. 4, 2010), pg.13.*

Inconsistency

- ***Nilson et al v. Lewis County,* Case No. 11-2-0003:** . . . an inconsistent interpretation of [a] Comprehensive Plan and LCC phrase . . . , in and of itself, is not an issue within the Board's jurisdiction. The Board's jurisdictional purview is limited to consideration of the results of such an "inconsistent" interpretation. Has that interpretation, for example, resulted in an internal Comprehensive Plan (which includes the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map) inconsistency in violation of RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble)?" *Final Decision and Order, (August 31, 2011*) pg. 15.

  [An inconsistent interpretation of designation criteria resulted] in " . . . an inconsistent Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map and an inconsistent zoning map, in violation of RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble) and RCW 36.70A.130(1)(d) [as] . . . similarly situated properties [were] designated and zoned differently on both the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map and the zoning map. *Final Decision and Order, (August 31, 2011*) pg. 20.

Innovative Techniques

Clustering

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** In reading [RCW 36.70A.070(5)(b); RCW 36.70A.090; *Suquamish Tribe,* 156 Wn.App. 743; and WAC 365-196-425(5)(b)), a fundamental concept emerges regarding Rural Cluster Development -- if a county chooses to allow Rural Cluster Development, the county must do so in a permanent manner that is **consistent with rural character** and provides **appropriate rural densities** that are **not characterized by urban growth**. Thus, clustering regulations that give too much discretion to local building officials do not adequately protect rural character. And the rural cluster can create smaller individual lots than would normally be allowed in a Rural Area, but only so long as there is a significant area of compensating open space that is permanently protected. *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 35.*

- [T]he County's action amending WCC 20.36.310(6) to remove limits on number of lots and remove spacing between clusters on all but the smallest developments does not comply with the GMA. …This exemption allows increased densities and uses that are characterized by urban growth [as defined by RCW 36.70A.030(19)] and are not consistent with rural character [as defined under RCW 36.70A.030(15)]. The exemption also violates the "patterns of land use and development" for rural areas as defined by RCW 36.70A.030(15). Further, this exemption does not contain or control rural development, assure visual compatibility with the surrounding rural area, nor reduce conversion of undeveloped land as required in RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c). *Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, (January 23, 2014), p. 6.*

Interim Ordinances

- ***Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County,* Case No. 14-2-0009:** The adoption of an interim ordinance cannot cure non-compliance; the Board cannot determine compliance until the adoption of a permanent amendment. *Final Decision and Order, (June 26, 2015)*, p. 5.

Interjurisdictional Coordination

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** In designation of LAMIRDs, the GMA [RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(iv)] requires a County to "address the ability to provide public facilities and services…" When a County's land use plans rely on other agencies as providers of public services, those agency plans must be consulted. The County should ascertain "that the service provider should have the capacity to make adequate service available to the area. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 141.*

Internal Consistency

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c:** [In dismissing claims based on 36.70A.070, the Board held this statute does not support a challenge to development regulations.] RCW 36.70A.070 requires the internal consistency of comprehensive plan policies, not consistency between a comprehensive plan and development regulations. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pgs. 14-15.*

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County, Case No. 11-2-0001*:** [The Board considered a six-month interim, one-time extension ordinance for land use development permits that would otherwise expire.] The Board found an inconsistency between Comprehensive Plan Action Item 58,… which requires the County to amend its CAO consistent with RCW 36.70A.172 (the BAS application requirement) to preserve or enhance anadromous fisheries, [and] the Ordinance, which included amendments to the CAO, [but] was adopted without application of BAS. *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 17.*

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c:** OSF reads those statutes [RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble) and RCW 36.70A.480(1)] to mean ". . . that a SMP must be consistent with Comprehensive Plan policies." However, OSF's interpretation leaves out a significant qualifier: it is the goals and policies of the SMP that must be consistent with the comprehensive plan goals and policies under RCW 36.70A.070. OSF completes that quoted sentence with the statement ". . . and its own [the SMP] provisions must be internally consistent." That statement is accurate if, and only if, the word "provisions" refers to the SMP's policies. Consistency between comprehensive plan policies (including SMP policies) and a jurisdiction's development regulations is not a requirement covered by RCW 36.70A.070's preamble. In this case it is necessary to show that no goal or policy of the challenged SMA precludes the achievement of a comprehensive plan goal or policy or vice versa. …. Further, the inconsistency claims raised are within the Board's jurisdiction only when they are raised in relationship to shorelines, not shorelines of statewide significance. RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c). **…** OSF falls far short of establishing that any "feature precludes the achievement of any other" when it fails to cite any mutually exclusive provisions. Mere conclusory statements alleging inconsistency without substantial evidence, are insufficient to meet a petitioner's burden. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 55, 57.*

Invalidity

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County,* Case 10-2-0012:** The Board overruled its long-standing precedent that a petitioner needed to present invalidity as an issue statement within its Petition for Review. The Board concluded invalidity is a remedy. Nothing in the GMA obligates a Petitioner to frame invalidity as an issue. In overruling prior holdings, the Board does not discount the foundation for the Board's historic position in regards to invalidity as articulated in *Citizens for Mt. Vernon* - the burden of demonstrating the challenged action substantially interferes with the fulfillment of the GMA's goals is still on the Petitioner. Therefore, although the Board will prospectively no longer require invalidity to be set forth as an issue within a PFR, this Board does require that a petitioner expressly request invalidity as a form of relief within the PFR and support that request within the briefing. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pgs. 34, 35.*

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v. Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: [In denying a Determination of Invalidity, the Board stated] Invalidity is a discretionary remedy available to the Board when it determines the continued validity of the challenged legislative enactment would substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the GMA goals. [A failure to be guided by a GMA goal] does not inevitably equate to substantial interference. Nothing was presented to the Board that during the pendency of the compliance period, mineral lands of long-term significance would be adversely impacted so as to result in a permanent loss of those minerals for future extraction thereby substantially interfering with the maintenance and enhancement of the industry. In addition, nothing was presented to the Board that the demand for mineral resources in and from Thurston County could not be satisfied by the mines currently in operation until such a time as the County adopts compliant legislation … the basis of Weyerhaeuser's arguments results in the County's actions substantially interfering with the fulfillment of Weyerhaeuser's business goals, not the GMA's. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 60-61.*

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** The Board concluded the County violated RCW 36.70A.060(2) and RCW 36.70A.480 as the Ordinance failed to incorporate Best Available Science and failed to comply with RCW 43.21C.030 (2). . . [Board invalidated the Ordinance based on Goal 10.] *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 27.*

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** Under RCW 36.70A.320(4) a county "subject to a determination of invalidity made under RCW 36.70A.300 or 36.70A.302 has the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance or resolution it has enacted in response to the determination of invalidity will no longer substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of" the GMA. The County's burden under RCW 36.70A.320(4) is limited to invalidity determinations under the standard in RCW 36.70A.302(1), and this burden of the County does not apply to compliance determinations. *Order Finding Compliance and Non-Compliance, As Amended on Reconsideration, (January 23, 2014), p. 6.*

Jurisdiction

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: RCW 36.70.430 is a provision of the [Planning Enabling Act] PEA. … The Board has not been granted jurisdiction to determine compliance with the PEA. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 9.*

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** [In addressing a challenge to the Board's jurisdiction based on expiration of an interim ordinance which purported to remain in effect until March 1, 2012 notwithstanding the fact it "expired" on June 19, 2011] the Board found under the *Westerman* test the appeal was not moot: since the ordinance modified development regulations [it]was of a "public nature"; the decision provided future guidance to public officers in local jurisdictions who may be considering adopting temporary measures with extended effectiveness dates and the situation may recur if the County decided to extend the "one-time economic hardship" ordinance; there was a genuine level of adverseness; the Ordinance was no longer in effect (but the policy was still being implemented) [and] absent exercise of the Board's jurisdiction, the issue would "escape review." *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 7.*

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** Where Whatcom County has not chosen to be governed by the Planning Enabling Act and has not adopted the public participation requirement of the PEA [as its GMA comprehensive plan adoption process], the Board has no jurisdiction to consider allegations that Whatcom County violated the Planning Enabling Act. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs 21, 22.*

- ***Eric Hirst, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013:** [Where the County incorporated pre-existing development regulations into its comprehensive plan,] the Board cannot impose invalidity on pre-existing development regulations not challenged within 60 days of adoption. *Second Order on Compliance, (April 15, 2014).*

- ***Petree and Westergreen, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 13-2-0018c:** [A] challenge to the land uses allowed in the Commercial Forestry District would be untimely as the County's development regulations were adopted and not appealed years ago. The Board does not have jurisdiction over a collateral attack on land uses that are already permitted through previously unchallenged development regulations. *Order of Dismissal (July 17, 2013)* at 9.

- ***JW The John Wilson Group v. City of Tumwater, et al.,* Case No. 13-2-0021:** In dismissing the matter, the Board stated: "The PFR instead refers to a process the 'end result [of which] will be designing and needlessly constructing multiple ill-advised road improvements'-implying final action is yet to come. The PFR also fails to include the required detailed statement of issues. At best there is the suggestion the public participation allowed to date has been inadequate. Finally, the PFR does not allege a specific GMA violation; in fact, there is no reference to any GMA statute whatsoever." *Order of Dismissal (October 28, 2013)*, pg. 2.

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c:** OSF [alleged constitutional issues before the Board] in order to exhaust their

administrative remedies. The Board is created by statute as a quasi-judicial body of limited jurisdiction with no inherent or common law powers. [*Skagit Surveyors & Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit Cnty.*, 135 Wn.2d 542, 565 (1998)]. The Board lacks jurisdiction to address constitutional claims. RCW 36.70A.280; RCW 36.70A.300(1). Accordingly, issues alleging constitutional claims are dismissed. *Second Amended Prehearing Order and Order on Dispositive Motion, (September 5, 2014), p. 3-4*.

Legislative Findings

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** The County states its CP policy statement for Rural Communities (Type I LAMIRDs) is based on legislative findings in RCW 36.70A.011, i.e., that rural counties must have the flexibility to retain existing businesses and allow them to expand. The Board notes that legislative findings do not create legally binding obligations; rather, duties of compliance are created by the substantive provisions of a statute. *(=Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 67.*

Limited Areas of More Intensive Rural Development (LAMIRDs)

- ***Eugene Butler and Richard Battin v. Lewis County,* Case No. 10-2-0010:** Rural development is allowable throughout those areas which have been designated as rural by Lewis County as well as within LAMIRDs. However, for LAMIRDs, such development is governed, in part, by different rules. *FDO, (July 22, 2010), pg. 10.*

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** The common ownership of contiguous lands is not a statutorily established basis for inclusion of lands within a LAMIRD. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 52.*

  Although the GMA does not define "area", a common sense understanding of the term would lead to the conclusion that it could include a mere portion of a large parcel. Failure to use the term "area" as used throughout RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)'s description of LAMIRDs could suggest the inclusion of a parcel, only a small portion of which met the statutory criteria for LAMIRD inclusion, resulting in an oversized LAMIRD. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 55.*

  In the context of the requirements of RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(iii), the phrase "*should be separated*" in reference to non-residential uses, fails to sufficiently ensure that certain uses in Type III LAMIRDs are isolated as required by the Act. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 59.*

  While it is not necessary for plan provisions that establish LAMIRDs to use the exact same words as RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d), plan provisions for establishing LAMIRDs must utilize the same *criteria* that are set out in the Act. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), Pgs. 60-61.*

  The fundamental problem of the County's approach is that its development regulations fail to limit LAMIRDs in the manner required by the GMA. Rather than determining the size, scale, use and intensity of uses that *existed in a particular area* to be designated as a LAMIRD, and limiting

future development in the LAMIRD on that basis, the County instead allows uses [and size, scale, intensity] in a particular LAMIRD based on the zoning designation applied to a LAMIRD, regardless of whether those uses were present in that LAMIRD on July 1, 1990. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 92.*

The presence of a water or sewer line on a property, without more, is not evidence of intensive rural uses. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 94.*

A pre-1990 utility pipe may be considered as part of the built environment in determining a logical outer boundary for a LAMIRD, but there must be some evidence of more intensive rural uses to justify LAMIRD designation in the first place. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs. 94-95.*

Establishment of a LAMIRD immediately adjacent to a UGA prevents a more efficient expansion of the UGA to areas that can be readily developed at urban densities. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 96.*

It is not a violation of the GMA that there are areas that the County could have designated as LAMIRDs but chose not to. LAMIRDs are a discretionary rather than mandatory designation. RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d) provides the "rural element *may allow* for limited areas of more intense rural development." Thus, a county does not violate the GMA, let alone commit clear error, by choosing not to create a LAMIRD. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs. 163- 164.*

A county's decision not to create a LAMIRD complies with GMA's mandate to minimize and contain intensive rural development because a county prevents further intensification by holding future development at rural levels. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 164.*

- The fundamental problem of the County's approach was that its development regulations failed to limit LAMIRDs in the manner required by the GMA. Rather than determining the size, scale, use and intensity of uses that *existed in a particular area* to be designated as a LAMIRD, and limiting future development in the LAMIRD on that basis, the County instead allowed uses in a particular LAMIRD based on the zoning designation applied to a LAMIRD, regardless of whether those uses were present in that LAMIRD on July 1, 1990…. Upon compliance, the County analyzed existing uses and sizes of buildings in each LAMIRD and adopted a table in WCC 20.80.100(1) showing allowable uses and sizes of buildings in each LAMIRD which reflect those existing in 1990. *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 62.*

- In *Gold Star* (167 Wn.2d at 727-28), our Supreme Court recognized that RCW 36.70A.070(5)(d)(i) allowed areas of a county to be designated as LAMIRDs, allowing for "infill, development, or redevelopment of existing commercial, industrial, residential or mixed use areas." Specifically for Whatcom County, the Court stated that "an existing area or existing use is one that was in existence …[o]n July 1, 1990." Further the Court stated "LAMIRDS are not intended for continued use as a planning device, rather, they are 'intended to be a one-time recognition of existing areas and uses and are not intended to be used continuously to meet

needs (real or perceived) for additional commercial and industrial lands.'" *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 66.*

- [T]he County stepped beyond GMA bounds (and beyond the bounds of the *Gold Star* decision) when it adopted WCC 20.80.100(2), (3) and (4) because these sections exempt Type I LAMIRDs from GMA requirements for existing character in 1990 and exempt Type III LAMIRDs from requirements for size, scale, use and intensity [through direct exemptions or an administrative approval process]. *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 69.*

Logical Outer Boundary

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al. v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** The Board has previously ruled that expanding the boundaries of a Type I LAMIRD "across lands otherwise not eligible for inclusion to reach a smaller area of 'built environment' exceeds the proper scope of a logical outer boundary." Indeed, as Gold Star explained, extension beyond the LOB of the existing developed area "allow[s] a new pattern of low-density sprawl" in violation of GMA Goal 2 – "Reduce the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density development." …[T]he Board finds the existence of one small building with a commercial use in 1990 does not equate to an area of "more intense" rural development when separated by seven acres from other development. The Board finds the dog-leg does not create a boundary that is "clearly identified and contained," as required by the statute, nor is it a logical boundary "delineated predominately by the built environment." *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013*), p. 76.

Major Industrial Developments (MIDs)

- ***Eugene Butler and Richard Battin v. Lewis County,* Case No. 10-2-0010:** MIDs (RCW 36.70A.365, RCW 36.70A.367) are an optional, not a mandatory, planning tool under the GMA. *FDO, (July 22, 2010), pg. 10.*

Market Factor

- ***Futurewise v. Pacific County,* Case No. 10-2-0021:** The market supply factor is designed to account for land unavailable due to the nature of the land and its devotion to public uses, and that a further reduction for "market unavailability" amounts to a double counting of the market supply factor. *FDO, (June 22, 2011), pg. 20.*

Mineral Resource Lands

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: RCW 36.70A.170(1) mandates the designation of MRL that have long-term significance. Minerals are defined to include gravel, sand, and valuable metallic substances. MRL are not defined by the GMA; nor does the GMA clarify the phrase "long-term significance for the extraction of minerals" [although "Longterm commercial significance" is defined] *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 21-22.*
  The aforementioned and other GMA provisions establish the following requirements for the designation of MRL, the first five of which would similarly apply to crafting MRL designation

criteria:
1. Lands that are not already characterized by urban growth;
2. Lands that have long-term significance for the extraction of minerals;
3. Consideration of the land's proximity to population areas;
4. Consideration of the possibility of more intense uses of the land;
5. Consideration of the mineral resource lands classification guidelines adopted by the Department of Commerce;
6. Consideration of data and information available from the Department of Natural Resources relating to mineral resource deposits. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 22.*

In considering whether forestry and mining were incompatible "uncertainty" is an insufficient basis on which to reach a conclusion that the two natural resource land designations are incompatible under WAC 365-190-040(7)(b). *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 29.*

[There are] three types of natural resource lands, together with critical areas, that the GMA requires cities and counties to designate and conserve. The designation and conservation of these natural resource lands prevents the irreversible loss of such lands to development. The importance of natural resource land designation is underscored by the fact designation of natural resource lands is the first imperative of the GMA. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 21.*

[N]either the County's brief nor the record explain the extent to which Thurston County applied the specified WAC factors when crafting its MRL designation criteria. Furthermore, while it is clear the County included designation criteria not specifically tied to the WAC factors, the record contains no discussion, no analysis and no rationale for departing from the Minimum Guidelines. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 27.*

Basing [designation] decisions on "uncertainty" or on "unknown" results fails to provide sufficient justification for departure from the minimum guidelines, let alone the requirements of RCW 36.70A.170 to establish designation criteria that would lead to GMA compliant MRL designations. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 28.*

The County's argument that it was merely "balancing" the competing goals of the GMA is without merit in the context of [the GMA mandate to designate natural resource lands. RCW 36.70A.170.] Prior to reaching a stage in the planning process which necessitates a balancing of the GMA goals, jurisdictions must first comply with GMA requirements. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pgs. 30-31.*

Minimum Guidelines

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: [T]he Board concludes, in light of the *Manke* and *Lewis County* decisions, that RCW 36.70A.170(2) and RCW 36.70A.050 must be read to require jurisdictions to follow the Minimum Guidelines' MRL requirements. Jurisdictions have the flexibility to assign varying weight to the factors related to long term commercial significance included in RCW 36.70A.030 and the applicable Guidelines. Jurisdictions also have the discretion to depart from other portions of the Guidelines which are

merely suggestions, provided the departure provides comparable benefit. That freedom, however, does not extend to deviating from those portions of the Minimum Guidelines which are requirements. *Compliance(Order, July 17, 2012), pg. 15.*

The Minimum Guidelines state that a jurisdiction *must* determine if two applicable yet overlapping natural resource designations are incompatible. *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012), pg. 16.*

[T]he County's failure to determine whether overlapping MRL and FRL designations are incompatible and, if incompatible, to determine which resource provides the greatest long-term commercial significance, violates RCW 36.70A.170(2), WAC 365-190-020(5) and WAC 365-190-040(7)(b). *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012), pg. 19.*

[T]he classification and designation of natural resource lands of long-term commercial significance, including both the criteria for doing so as well as subsequent actual designations pursuant to RCW 36.70A.170, should be based on the factors set forth in the RCW 36.70A.030(10) definition of long-term commercial significance as well as the Minimum Guidelines. It is then the function of development regulations to conserve natural resource lands (as well as the protection of critical areas). *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012), pg. 19.*

Mitigation

- **Friends of the San Juans, P.J. Taggares Company, Common Sense Alliance, William H. Wright, and San Juan Builders Association v. San Juan County, Case No. 13-2-0012c:** "Mitigation" and "mitigation sequencing" are not always clearly understood. Those terms are easily confused with "compensatory mitigation". The latter is the step in the mitigation sequence that occurs after avoidance and minimization. It involves restoring (re-establishing, rehabilitating), creating (establishing), enhancing, or preserving wetlands to replace those lost or degraded through permitted activities. "Mitigation" and "mitigation sequencing" have a broader meaning: they include as the first option, avoidance of any impact. If avoidance is not possible, the second step in mitigation sequencing is minimization. Only after those first steps does one then consider compensatory mitigation. Order Finding Compliance, p. 10 (May 14, 2015).

Mootness

- ***Martin v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0002:** In 1972, the Court [*In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373* at 377(1983)(citing *Sorenson v. Bellingham* , at 558)]adopted criteria to consider in deciding whether a matter, though moot, is of continuing and substantial public interest and thus reviewable. The three factors considered essential are: (1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature; (2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) whether the issue is likely to recur.
  A determination of the County's compliance with repealed Policy 2DD-10 would not be of guidance to other public officers because the policy is likely to be unique to Whatcom County, and also because cities and counties are vested with great discretion in the adoption and wording of their plan policies. *FDO, (July 22, 2011), pgs. 18-19.*

Moratoria

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** [The Board addressed an interim ordinance which purported to remain in effect until March 1, 2012 notwithstanding the fact it "expired" on June 19, 2011] While the Ordinance stated it was in effect for only six months, it [purported] to allow permit extension requests to be filed for up to two years. If it remains effective [that long], the County was required to develop a work plan, something for which it failed to make provision. *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 21.*

- ***Skagit D06 v. Skagit County*, Case No. 10-2-0011:** A moratorium exists where a city denies a property owner the ability to submit an application for an otherwise permissible use or activity under the governing zoning even if other uses are not barred. *FDO, (Aug. 4, 2010), pg. 7*.

  The GMA envisions a hierarchy of development within the UGA – first in areas already characterized by urban growth which have adequate existing public facilities/services, second in areas characterized by urban growth, but that will be served by both existing and additionally needed facilities, and lastly in the remaining areas of the UGA. If a City were required to extend sewer service to every property in the unincorporated UGA, this would create chaotic, leap-frog development. *FDO, (Aug. 4, 2010), pgs. 11-12.*

Natural Resource Lands (Goal 8)

- ***Friends of the San Juans v. San Juan County*, Case 10-2-0012:** RCW 36.70A.200 requires San Juan County to not preclude EPFs within its borders. This does not lessen its duty in relationship to protecting natural resource lands. As with critical areas, natural resource lands must be designated using best available science. The Legislature gave clear direction that natural resource lands are a foundation around which other land uses must be adjusted. The natural resource lands functions have a priority over other functions on that land or even on adjacent lands. The Board concluded that natural resource lands were at risk because the development regulations, as adopted by San Juan County (Ordinance 2-2010), only disfavored EPFs in natural resource lands. The County did not specifically guide or limit siting EPFs to conserve land to maintain the natural resource industry that relies upon it. *FDO, (Oct. 12, 2010), pgs. 30, 31.*

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al. v. Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c:** Although the language of Goal 8 [36.70A.020(8)] makes no express reference to mineral resources, the language is non-exclusive and the mineral resource industry is indisputably a natural resource industry since its very existence relies upon the geological deposits it extracts from the land. Therefore, when considering amendments to its criteria for the designation of mineral resource lands, Thurston County's actions were to be guided by this goal – with the applicable guiding principle being the maintenance and enhancement of the industry. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 58.*
  [A]ny claim … alleging a failure to adopt regulations designed to assure the conservation [of Natural Resource Lands] would more appropriately be based on RCW 36.70A.040, not RCW 36.70A.060. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 37.*

Claims alleging a failure to assure that adjacent uses do not interfere with the continued use of MRL are properly raised under RCW 36.70A.060(1) as it is the provision of the GMA which imposes the requirement. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 37-38.*

[T]he County's failure to determine whether overlapping MRL and FRL designations are incompatible and, if incompatible, to determine which resource provides the greatest long-term commercial significance, violates RCW 36.70A.170(2), WAC 365-190-020(5) and WAC 365-190-040(7)(b). *Compliance Order, (July 17, 2012)* pg. 19.

- ***Nilson, et al. v. Lewis County,* Case No. 11-2-0003:** [Petitioners challenged county action alleging a failure to assure the conservation of designated forest lands] The Board found claims based on RCW 36.70A.060 alleging a failure to initially adopt regulations designed to assure the conservation of the County's forest resource lands would appropriately be based on RCW 36.70A.040, not RCW 36.70A.060. *FDO, (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 11.*

Designation/De-designation

- ***Friends of the San Juan v. San Juan County,* Case No. 16-2-0001:** Significantly, the County did not conduct a county-wide or regional analysis pursuant to WAC 365-190-040 and WAC 365-190-060, a fact which the County acknowledged. *Final Decision and Order, (June 30, 2017) p. 15.*

  The process description and recommendations in this section [WAC 365-190-040(3)] incorporate those clarifications arising from legal challenges and describe both the initial designation and conservation or protection of natural resource lands and critical areas, as well as subsequent local actions to amend those designations and provisions." . . . It is settled law that de-designation must follow the same thorough analytic process as required for designation. *Final Decision and Order, (June 30, 2017), pps. 16-17.*

Permits (Goal 7)

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** In regards to Goal 7 (Permits), the Petitioner argued the County reversed what had been "settled agreements" that permits would be reviewed against BAS contained in the CAO. The Ordinance created a mechanism by which older, vested projects could remain vested for another two years thus by-passing that public expectation. . . . The Board found the County has the ability to adopt ordinances (interim or permanent) that may contradict long-held public expectations . . . but the county legislative body is nevertheless entitled to do so when they follow the required public procedures. *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 21.*

  Petitioner claimed the County's repeal of an ordinance extending permits failed to result in compliance with the FDO because repeal failed to protect critical areas and incorporate BAS and were adopted without SEPA compliance. The Board found the County had addressed the FDO requirements, except for permits which the County extended while subject to the invalidity finding. While the County had failed to comply with Chapter 43.21C RCW (SEPA)

when adopting the original Ordinance, upon compliance the County repealed the challenged ordinance. If the Board had remanded the then-repealed ordinance to the County to conduct a threshold determination, this action would not address Petitioner's concerns. Those concerns related to expired permits, or those set to expire, which were extended without application of development regulations adopted since the permits were originally issued. While the Board expressed its serious concerns regarding the County's action to extend permits without the most recent regulatory requirements, the Board had no remedy to address the impact of extended permits, rather Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction to address "land use decisions" (RCW 36.70C.020) which includes permit extensions. While the Board appreciated Petitioner's zealous advocacy for environmental protection, the Board did not have authority to grant relief. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, (July 17, 2012), page 4.

Property Rights (Goal 6)

- ***Skagit D06 v. Skagit County*, Case No. 10-2-0011:** Neither a right to annexation nor to sewer extension are the types of rights the Legislature intended to be protected under Goal 6. *FDO, (Aug. 4, 2010), pg.15.*

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c**: [In addressing Goal 6] The property right Weyerhaeuser argues has been impacted is the use of its land for the extraction of mineral resource for off-site commercial purposes. Similarly, Segale asserts a "use of land" argument but not just for itself but for undefined land owners. The Board is well aware that the ability of a property owner to use property has been recognized as a property right, although the Board knows of no cases finding that a property owner has the right to use property for any purpose it deems fit or which would result in the greatest economic return. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 56.*

  [As to Goal 6 – Property Rights] Weyerhaeuser's argument … questions whether the adopted criteria, which restricted use [of mineral resource lands], were reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose or whether it conforms to nexus and proportionality rules. The Board has previously articulated that although Goal 6 opens with a statement related to the unconstitutional taking of property, it has no authority to determine constitutional issues. The language relied upon by Weyerhaeuser is grounded in holdings of the courts addressing constitutional issues [for which the Board lacks jurisdiction.] *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pg. 56.*

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology*, Case No. 14-2-0008c:** [Claiming provisions of the SMP would render its vested project application nonconforming and deprive it of property rights, Hood Canal asserts the County did not meaningfully analyze constitutional issues raised as required in WAC 173-26-186(5) which requires application of the Attorney General's memorandum on avoiding unconstitutional takings. Two documents in the County's record summarize the County's analysis, with some portions protected under attorney-client privilege. The Board finds the County analyzed and responded to the AG memorandum as required by WAC 173-26-186(5).] *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 83-85.*

Publication of Notice of Adoption

- ***Olympia Master Builders, Thurston County Chamber of Commerce, Hinkle Properties, Inc., and Hinkle Homes v. Thurston County,* Case No. 15-2-0002**
  The 60-day appeal period applies only to "adopted" comprehensive plan or development regulation amendments and only begins to run following "publication" of notice of the jurisdiction's action. *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, (February 8, 2016), p. 3*

  RCW 36.70A.290 provides no specific guidance as to what might constitute sufficient "publication" of notice of an ordinance's final adoption. Counties are required to "publish a notice", petitions for review must be filed within 60 days "after publication", and "the date of publication for a county shall be the date the county publishes the notice that it has adopted" [a plan, development regulations, or amendments]. *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, (February 8, 2016), p. 3.*

  Although RCW 36.70A.290 lacks guidance regarding post-action publication requirements, the purpose of the requirement is clear.

  The purpose of requiring publication before an ordinance is adopted is to afford an opportunity to parties-in-interest and citizens to be heard on the subject matter and content of the ordinance while the purpose of publication after the passage of an ordinance is to afford the chance to have the ordinance judicially reviewed. (citations deleted). *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, (February 8, 2016), p. 4*

  [Referencing an AGO and chapter 65.16 RCW, the Board found "extensive publicity" did not constitute "publication"] RCW 36.70A.290(2) requires that counties must publish notices of final-action (i.e. ordinances amending comprehensive plans or development regulations) as required by applicable state law. In this instance, chapter 65.16 RCW establishes publication requirements for ordinances adopted by counties. [The Board acknowledged it lacked jurisdiction to determine compliance with that chapter], basing its conclusion on a failure to comply with RCW 36.70A.290(2). *Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, (February 8, 2016), p. 6*

Public Participation/Citizen Participation (Goal 11)

- ***Port of Shelton v. City of Shelton*, Case No. 10-2-0013:** RCW 36.70.547 requires consultation with, among others, the Aviation Division. While [Shelton] was not required to comply with the Aviation Division suggestions, the Aviation Division has a level of technical competence to be given due weight. While it was not clear error to ignore the Aviation Division's guidance, it was clear error to make decisions based on a misinterpretation of the evidence in the Record. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pg. 21.*

  [Petitioner asserted the City "failed to coordinate with the Aviation Division, the FAA, the Port (another municipal entity), and the community of pilots . . . to reconcile conflicts" as it "disregarded" the concerns of those entities and individuals. The Board stated] Ultimately, the GMA grants the legislative body of the jurisdiction with land-use planning authority the final

decision on comprehensive plans, development regulations and amendments to them. "Ensuring coordination" as used in RCW 36.70A.020(11) and "consultation" as used in RCW 36.70. 547 do not shift the decision-making authority to others; in this instance, to the Port or WSDOT Aviation. Rather, it was incumbent upon the City to: 1) encourage public involvement in the planning process and actively consult with the entities/individuals listed in RCW 36.70.547 and; 2) substantively consider the comments it received. The Board concludes public comment was allowed, formal consultation took place, and the Record reflects the City considered the information and opinions it received. *FDO, (Oct. 27, 2010), pg. 32.*

- ***Weyerhaeuser, et al v Thurston County*, Case No. 10-2-0020c:** The issue clearly presented is whether or not the change from dual designation [of Forest Resource and Mineral Resource lands] to a preclusion of dual designation was within the scope of the alternatives available for public comment and therefore excused the County from providing an additional opportunity for comment under RCW 36.70A.035(2)(b)(ii). The County states that it was considering comprehensive plan and development regulation changes to its MRL designation criteria: "the scope of the proposal was the entire designation process." However, that argument would literally allow any change to the amendments proposed and presented for public hearing. It would be difficult to envision any situation where RCW 36.70A.035(2)(a) would apply … The Board simply cannot agree with that proposition. *AFDO, (June 17, 2011), pgs. 9-10.*

- ***Martin v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0002:** While the Petitioner has alleged a violation of RCW 36.70A.140 in his Petition for Review, nothing in his briefing articulates how that section was violated. This section of the GMA requires jurisdictions to establish a public participation program providing for early and continuous public participation in the development and amendment of comprehensive plans and development regulations implementing those plans. Petitioner has pointed to nothing in the record that would demonstrate that the County failed to comply with this section. If, as the County infers, Petitioner is basing his public participation challenge on the County's failure to do a parcel by parcel analysis of the rezoned area, Petitioner would need to demonstrate that such level of analysis was required by the GMA. *FDO, (July 22, 2011), pgs. 11-12*.

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0005:** The City contested the adequacy of the County's public involvement process and consultation with the City. The Board found the County complied with all public notice and consultation requirements. An inter-jurisdictional disagreement does not mean the County violated the GMA. See pages 20-25 of the FDO. Final Decision and Order, (December 12, 2011), page 19-25.

- ***Friends of the San Juans, et al. v. San Juan County*, Case No. 13-2-0012c:** [In response to Petitioners' alleged violations of the Open Public Meetings Act, chapter 42.30 RCW, the Board stated:] "First of all, the Board lacks jurisdiction to determine whether or not an OPMA violation has occurred. The Board is, however, empowered to consider challenges alleging violations of GMA public participation requirements. . . it is possible that facts sufficient for a court to determine an OPMA violation occurred could similarly be sufficient to support proof of a GMA public participation violation or of a violation of a jurisdiction's public participation plan.

Conversely, the opposite is true as well. Any such situations would be unique to the specific facts of a case." *FDO (September 6, 2013)*, at 15.

Recusal

- ***William H. Wright v. San Juan County,* Case No. 14-2-0005:** [In addressing a motion for recusal/disqualification, Board members considered] the Growth Management Hearings Board's Code of Ethics, RCW 34.05.425, and the statutes governing Ethics in Public Service, chapter 42.52 RCW. See *William H. Wright v. San Juan County*, Case No. 14-2-0005, *Determination on Motion to Disqualify (Board Member Roehl)*, *Determination of Board Member Raymond Paolella*, *Determination on Motion to Disqualify (Board Member Carter)*.

Rural Character

- ***Eugene Butler and Richard Battin v. Lewis County,* Case No. 10-2-0010:** Rural character as envisioned by RCW 36.70A.030(15) refers to patterns of land use and development. That is, it takes a broad approach - an area wide approach - rather than a site specific one, which is evidenced by the use of words such as "patterns", "predominate", and "landscapes"... RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c), on the other hand, is more tightly focused. That section mandates the inclusion of measures within a jurisdiction's rural element that, among other things, assure the visual compatibility of rural development with the surrounding rural area. *FDO, (July 22, 2010), pgs. 16-17.*

  Per RCW 36.70A.011 and RCW 36.70A.070(5), [t]he GMA does not prohibit business development in rural areas … the rural element is to include provisions for rural development … and Rural Development is defined at RCW 36.70A.030(16) … the parameters for allowable rural development … include ensuring such uses are not characterized by urban growth and that they are consistent with Lewis County's rural character. *FDO, (July 22, 2010), pgs. 11-12.*

  The entirety of that definition [Urban Growth RCW 36.70A.030(19)] also references an incompatibility with the primary use of the land for "rural uses and rural development" [not just agricultural production]. Rural development can consist of a variety of uses. All parcels in the rural area need not be capable of producing food, fiber or mineral resources ... Consequently, the Board concludes the referenced portion of the definition of urban growth ("makes intensive use of land") does not refer necessarily to the use on a single parcel. *FDO, (July 22, 2010), pgs. 12-13.*

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** Aspirational language in a Comprehensive Plan - The *Kittitas County* case does not result in a mandate that every isolated Comprehensive Plan policy must be devoid of conditional language and contain only directional provisions but, instead, the Comprehensive Plan must be considered in its entirety to determine if there is compliance with the GMA. The word "should" is appropriate *so long as* the Comprehensive Plan provides a framework that ensures compliance with the GMA and provides measures by which a jurisdiction will be held accountable. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 30.*

RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c) provides that the rural element of a comprehensive plan must contain measures to protect rural character. While development regulations may require consistency with the Comprehensive Plan for the various zoning districts, the Plan itself must clearly spell out the measures to "contain and control" development in rural designations to meet the RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c) standard. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs. 30, 33-34.*

The Board reads the Supreme Court *Kittitas* decision as requiring that the rural element itself contain provisions ensuring that applications for rezones do not result, over time, in a uniform low-density sprawl. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs. 72-73.*

RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv) requires "measures that apply to rural development" and protect rural character by "protecting critical areas … and surface water and ground water resources." [Measures necessary to protect surface and ground water resources in the Lake Whatcom area are clearly identified in the record, as are measures to protect the Chuckanut Wildlife Corridor.] Incorporating such measures into the Rural Element should be a straightforward task. *FDO, (January 9, 2012)*, pgs. 40, 44.

- ***Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013:** Thus, current science-based studies conclude that most water resource degradation in the Puget Sound region and Whatcom County in particular can be attributed to land use and land development practices. The GMA requires rural character to be protected by measures governing development that provide patterns of land use consistent with water resource protection. From the evidence in the record about the extent and persistence of water pollution and lack of water availability in Whatcom County, and the need to integrate land use and water resource planning, the Board finds the County has not employed effective land use planning that contains measures to protect water supply and water quality as required by the GMA. *Final Decision and Order (June 7, 2013)*, at 34.

Rural Densities

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** A density overlay, potentially allowing for a small number of lots smaller than five acres in size in a total area comprising only 1.4 percent of all county rural lands, will not lead to the "inappropriate conversion of undeveloped lands into sprawling, low-density development" if contained by appropriate Comprehensive Plan rural element measures. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pg. 128.*

Rural Element

- ***Governors Point Development Company, et al v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0010c:** The GMA specifically allows counties to consider local circumstances when planning a rural element, providing that the county develops a written record explaining how the rural element harmonizes the GMA planning goals and meets GMA requirements. A "written record" need not be a discrete document. *FDO, (January 9, 2012), pgs. 129-130.*

Ordinance 2012-032 still contains no criteria differentiating R5 and R10 that would assure long-term continuance of any rural lots larger than R5… There are no measures to prevent the subdivision of **all** larger lots into five acre lots. So the potential to develop five acre lots throughout the rural area is not contained as RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(i) requires, and the "variety of rural densities" described in RCW 36.70A.070(5)(b) is effectively limited. … Further, the Board has found no criteria in the Plan providing for the continuance of **any** rural areas less densely developed than 1du/5ac. *Compliance Order and Order Following Remand on Issue of LAMIRDS, (January 4, 2013), p. 31.*

- ***Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013:** Read together, these GMA provisions [RCW 36.70A.030(150(d) and (g), 36.70A.020(10), 36.70A.070(1); and 36.70A.070(5)(c)(v)] indicate that patterns of land use and development in rural areas must be consistent with protection of instream flows, groundwater recharge and fish and wildlife habitat. A County's Comprehensive Plan rural lands provision must include measures governing rural development to protect water resources. *Final Decision and Order (June 7, 2013)*, p. 21.

Settlement

- ***Nilson et al v. Lewis County,* Case No. 11-2-0003:** [In response to a request by Petitioners for the Board to ban an intervenor from participating in settlement discussions] The Board encourages settlement efforts but views them as options to be decided upon by the parties. A decision to allow an intervenor to participate in such discussions is properly one for the jurisdiction (or a petitioner) itself and not a decision that should either be mandated or precluded by the Board. *Order on Church/Nilson Motions, (April 27, 2011), pg. 4.*

Shoreline Management Act – Standard and Scope of Review

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c:** The "applicable guidelines" referenced in RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c), the statutes which set forth the scope of the Board's jurisdiction for SMP challenges, are included in Part III of chapter 173-26 WAC [i.e., WAC 173-26-171 through 173-26-251], but the Board's scope of review also includes "the minimum procedural rule requirements of WAC 173-26-101 through 173-26-160" due to the referenced incorporation [in WAC 173-26-201(1)(a)]. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 11.*

Shoreline Master Program

- ***Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC, et al. v. Jefferson County and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-2-0008c:** Jefferson County does not need to "justify an adoption of a new SMP" in lieu of making discrete amendments to the original SMP. [The periodic update of the Shoreline Master Program required by RCW 90.58.080(2)(a) does not require evidence of changed local conditions.], *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 19, 31.*

  [WAC 173-26-201(3)(d)] does not require, as OSF claims, an analysis of "various shoreline studies with intent to correlate the 'cause-and-effects' scientific link between the ecological

stressors and the degree of development impacts." Instead, the Board determines that the County … completed requirements in WAC 173-26-201(3)(c) to "inventory shoreline conditions" and in WAC 173-26-201(3)(d) to "analyze shoreline issues of concern." The Board found the [Shoreline Inventory] and the [Cumulative Impact Analysis] to be comprehensive and informative in addressing these WAC requirements. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 21.*

WAC 173-26-186(8) establishes the governing principles of the Guidelines and sets forth the no net loss standard that applies to SMPs: … "(b) Local master programs shall include policies and regulations designed to achieve no net loss of those ecological functions." [Board rejects argument that No Net Loss is not an SMA concept and cannot be used to trump SMA balancing policies.] *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 31-32.*

WAC 173-26-186(8) establishes the principle that "protecting shoreline ecological systems is accomplished by … a process that identifies, inventories, and ensures meaningful understanding of current and potential ecological functions provided by affected shorelines" as well as containing "policies and regulations designed to achieve no net loss of those ecological functions." SMPs are to include "regulations and mitigation standards ensuring that each **permitted** development will not cause a net loss of ecological functions of the shoreline." . . . RCW 90.58 and WAC 173-26 intend local governments to implement the goals of the SMA through a combination of policies and regulations expressed in the SMP and permits for individual projects. OSF's claim that the County could protect shorelines though permitting alone is unfounded. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 32-34.*

[In responding to an allegation Ecology had no authority to "approve" a CAO, the Board found] Jefferson County's decision to incorporate its CAO into the SMP was proper and appropriate, [citing WAC 173-26-191(2)(b)]. Ecology simply assured through its review that the incorporated CAO met the "no net loss of ecological functions" requirement for SMPs prescribed in RCW 90.58.060 and referenced in RCW 36.70A.480(4). *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 48.*

OSF reads those statutes [RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble) and RCW 36.70A.480(1)] to mean ". . . that a SMP must be consistent with Comprehensive Plan policies." However, OSF's interpretation leaves out a significant qualifier: it is the goals and policies of the SMP that must be consistent with the comprehensive plan goals and policies under RCW 36.70A.070. OSF completes that quoted sentence with the statement ". . . and its own [the SMP] provisions must be internally consistent." That statement is accurate if, and only if, the word "provisions" refers to the SMP's policies. Consistency between comprehensive plan policies (including SMP policies) and a jurisdiction's development regulations is not a requirement covered by RCW 36.70A.070's preamble. In this case it is necessary to show that no goal or policy of the challenged SMA precludes the achievement of a comprehensive plan goal or policy or vice versa. …. Further, the inconsistency claims raised are within the Board's jurisdiction only when they are raised in relationship to shorelines, not shorelines of statewide significance. RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c). **…** OSF falls far short of establishing that any "feature precludes the

achievement of any other" when it fails to cite any mutually exclusive provisions. Mere conclusory statements alleging inconsistency without substantial evidence, are insufficient to meet a petitioner's burden. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 55, 57.*

This petitioner complains there is no analysis anywhere in the record addressing the economic impact of "increased buffers … greater permitting hurdles … creation of nonconforming uses and structures" on "property values, property insurance rates, opportunities for financing and refinancing, or costs of regulatory compliance." … [The County] opted to strike the required balance by allowing various uses in specific Shoreline Environment Designations and by authorizing other uses pursuant to the conditional use permit process. Economic feasibility of regulatory compliance was factored in to many of the County's goals and regulations through consideration of "feasibility". For example, "feasible alternative" is defined in part as an alternative that "can be accomplished at a reasonable cost." [Board upholds County.] *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 59-60.*

The County has the latitude to adopt buffer widths which lie within the range of widths recommended by the assembled scientific information. Those widths when applied in conjunction with other applicable SMP regulations must assure no net loss. WAC 186-26-186(8)(b). CAPR is correct that the decision to adopt 150-foot marine buffers was a "policy" decision but the parameters of the County's policy choice were established by the science it assembled, reviewed, and considered. *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 70.*

Hood Canal's proposed mining operation is not "dependent on the water by reason of the intrinsic nature of its operations" because it has the option of road transportation for aggregates…. "[A] water-dependent commerce or industry, to which priority should be given, is one which cannot exist in any other location and is dependent on the water by reason of the intrinsic nature of its operations. A water-related industry or commerce is one which is not intrinsically dependent on a waterfront location but whose operation cannot occur economically without a shoreline location." … The SMP correctly classifies mining in Jefferson County as "water-related." *Final Decision and Order (March 16, 2015), p. 92-93.*

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)

- ***Stalheim et al v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 10-2-0016c**: SEPA requires the Board to afford substantial weight to an agency's determination of the adequacy of an EIS. SEPA provides for the supplementation of existing environmental review via a Supplement EIS (SEIS). WAC 197-11-405(4) and 197-11-600 provide that a SEIS is required if there are either substantial changes that are likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts or new information is available indicating probable significant adverse impacts. A SEIS is not required if the probable adverse impacts are covered by the range of alternatives and impacts analyzed in the existing documents. *FDO, (April 11, 2011)*, pg.28.

- ***David Stalheim v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 11-2-0001:** No SEPA Threshold Determination was completed prior to the County's adoption of the Ordinance because the County believed its

action was categorically exempt. WAC 197-11-800(19) allows categorical exemptions for procedural actions, but not if they contain "substantive standards respecting…the environment." The Ordinance continued land development permits by amending the County's Zoning Code, Land Division Code, and the Critical Areas Ordinance all of which have considerable impact on and are specifically promulgated to manage impacts on the environment. Without conducting a SEPA Threshold Determination prior to adoption of the Ordinance, the Board found the County failed to comply with RCW 43.21C.030(2). *FDO, (Aug. 2, 2011), pg. 25.*

- ***Martin v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 11-2-0002:** To meet his burden of proof, Petitioner must present actual evidence of probable, significant, adverse impacts resulting from the proposed action. Petitioner points to no evidence in the record establishing the environmental impacts of Ordinance 2010-065 rise to a level of significance. Absent such evidence in the record, there is no basis for the Board to find the County's issuance of the DNS in error. *FDO, (July 22, 2011), pg. 14.*

- ***Association of Citizens Concerned About Chambers Lake Basin, et al. v. City of Olympia,* Case No. 13-2-0014:** SEPA requires government agencies to consider the environmental effects of a proposed action, together with alternatives to the proposed action. When a jurisdiction amends its Comprehensive Plan or changes zoning, a detailed and comprehensive SEPA environmental review is required. The purpose of SEPA is "to provide consideration of environmental factors at the earliest possible stage to allow decisions to be based on complete disclosure of environmental consequences," and SEPA is to provide agencies with environmental information prior to making decisions, not after they are made. Evaluation of environmental impacts of non-project actions must be done up-front and not wait until the project level. *Final Decision and Order (August 7, 2013)*

Statutory Interpretation

- ***Friends of Clark County & Futurewise v. Clark County,* Case No. 16-2-0002**: The question before the Board in this case is whether the Board can interpret legislative intent regarding deadlines to establish industrial land banks. The legislature may have intended to extend the deadlines, but the Board can only construe legislative intent when it is ambiguous, not when the statute is unambiguous. … RCW 36.70A.367(6) unambiguously states a county must act by the deadlines established in RCW 36.70A.130(4), and the deadline in RCW 36.70A.130(4) is the year 2004. Appellate precedent requires the Board to focus on the plain meaning of the words in the Growth Management Act, and if the Act is not ambiguous we are to apply that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent without considering extrinsic sources. Final Order Granting Summary Judgment, (September 9, 2016). See pages 10 and 11.

Stay

- ***Friends of the San Juans, et al. v. San Juan County,* Case No. 13-2-0012c:** [In considering WAC 242-003-860, which addresses the granting of a stay, the Board cited *Clark County v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board*, 161 Wn. App. 204, 227 (2011)]: . . . the GMA 'arguably requires the Growth Board to review a County's progress toward compliance' and to continue enforcement of its orders notwithstanding pendency of an appeal. *Order Denying Motions For Stay, (October 17, 2013)*, pg.3.

  WAC 242-03-860 provides a narrow exception if the Board finds a delay in compliance with the Board's order is not likely to result in actions that substantially interfere with the GMA goals. *Order Denying Motions For Stay, (October 17, 2013)*, pg. 3.

  While the outcome of the appeals now pending in court may render moot some portions of the FDO, or certain aspects of subsequent compliance proceedings, the case will not be rendered moot in its entirety. *Order Denying Motions For Stay, (October 17, 2013)*, pg. 3.

  Delay in achieving compliance with the FDO and in implementation of the Critical Areas ordinances may well result in actions that substantially interfere with the goals of the GMA *Order Denying Motions For Stay, (October 17, 2013)*, pg. 4.

Sub-Area Plans

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0004:** Island County's Comprehensive Plan must be updated by 2016 according to a schedule established in RCW 36.70A.130(5)(b). In this case, the County action was "preliminary approval" of a sub-area plan which would be incorporated into the County's next update to its Comprehensive Plan. The Board found the County's preliminary approval of a sub-area plan would not bar future petitioners from appealing the County's final action to the Board. The Board did not agree with Petitioner City of Oak Harbor's contention that the County sought to avoid Board review by piece-meal adoption of comprehensive plan amendments. The Board dismissed the case as the issues were not ripe for review. *Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, (July 8, 2011)*, pages 5-6.

Urban Growth Areas (UGAs)

- ***Stalheim et al v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 10-2-0016c:** In sizing a UGA, a County may not rely on both on a market supply factor and "local circumstances". As the market supply factor already includes and accounts for "local circumstances", the County thereby over-estimated its residential lands needs and over-sized the Ferndale UGA. *FDO, (April 11, 2011), pg.16.*

  Where, as here, the County has chosen to use a market supply factor in its analysis, by so doing it has thereby considered local circumstances. It may not add additional land beyond what that analysis suggests, in the interests of other local circumstances. *FDO, (April 11, 2011), pg.16.*

- ***Futurewise v. Pacific County,* Case No. 10-2-0021:** [In addressing the County's consideration of land unavailable due to wetlands/slopes, parks, roads and market unavailability, the Board

stated] However, once these reductions have been applied Pacific County cannot attempt to justify excessive acreage utilizing the same factors; it cannot reduce its acreage once by the Land Capacity Analysis and then again by claiming some land is not usable due to local circumstances. This amounts to a "double counting" for which the Board has previously found non-compliance with the GMA's mandates. *FDO, (June 22, 2011)*, pg. 19.

- ***City of Oak Harbor v. Island County,* Case No. 11-2-0005:** It is within the discretion of the County to set the UGA boundaries despite requests from a city to expand those boundaries. Final Decision and Order, (December 12, 2011), page 32-43).

Urban Services

- ***Stalheim, et al. v. Whatcom County*, Case No. 10-2-0016c:** Under the GMA urban growth is to occur in areas where adequate public facilities and services exist. The existence of draft plans is not sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the GMA in this regard. *FDO, (April 11, 2011), pg. 35.*

- ***Dragonslayer, Inc., Michels Development, LLC, Greg and Susan Gilbert, and Clark County v. City of La Center,* Case No. 14-2-0003c:** [RCW 36.70A.110(4) states that it is generally inappropriate to extend urban governmental services to rural areas except in limited circumstances] The Board acknowledges that City's [Policy] amendments were drafted so as to authorize a sewer service extension only after the land has finally been confirmed as Cowlitz Tribal trust land. The Board further acknowledges tribal trust land is not subject to state or local land use regulations. However, the City of La Center is and will remain subject to the GMA and it is the City that plans to extend its sewer service. *Corrected Final Decision and Order, (October 24, 2014),* pg. 31.

Extension Outside UGA

- ***Skagit D06 v. Skagit County*, Case No. 10-2-0011:** The Board disagrees with Petitioner's allegation that *Yakima County Fire Protection District 12 v. City of Yakima* stands for the proposition that the City, as the exclusive provider of sewer, has a duty to provide this service to properties outside city limits. In *Yakima*, the Court held that "Under RCW 35.67.310, which provides that a city "*may* permit connections with any of its sewers . . . from property beyond its limits", the City has authority to provide service outside its borders. (Italics ours.) The use of "may" in RCW 35.67.310 supports the City's argument that the power granted by RCW 35.67.310 is discretionary and that the City is not bound to provide sewer service to persons residing outside its boundaries." The *Yakima* Court recognized an exception to this "no duty" rule in circumstances where a city "holds itself out" as willing to supply sewer or water service to an area or where a city is the exclusive supplier of sewer or water service in a region extending beyond the borders of the city. *FDO, (Aug. 4, 2010), pg. 21.*

Water

- ***Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise v. Whatcom County,* Case No. 12-2-0013:** In sum, the County is left without Rural Element measures to protect rural character by ensuring land use and development patterns are consistent with

protection of surface water and groundwater resources throughout its Rural Area. This is especially critical given the water supply limitations and water quality impairment documented in this case and the intensity of rural development allowed under the County's plan. The record shows that the County has many options for adopting measures to reverse water resource degradation in its Rural Area through land use controls. *Final Decision and Order (June 7, 2013)*, at 43.

Region 3: Central Puget Sound

King • Kitsap • Pierce • Snohomish

Region 3: Central Puget Sound Table of Cases

2007 Cases

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 REMAND]**
  On remand from the Court of Appeals, 156 Wn. App 743 (July 7, 2010), the Board reviewed the challenges to Kitsap County's 2006 Plan Update based on current local circumstances without assumption of a bright-line rule for minimum urban densities. The Board found local circumstances did not support the County's down-zoning of minimum densities in its UGAs. The Board concluded the down-zoning and resultant UGA expansion created inconsistencies with the comprehensive plan, did not comply with RCW 36.70A.110, and was not guided by GMA Goals 1 and 2. As directed by the Court, the Board also addressed issues in the County's land capacity analysis, finding double-dipping in critical areas discounts and determining 4 du/ac was not an appropriate uniform capacity multiplier. Invalidity was denied. The matter was remanded on a one-year compliance schedule. The August 17, 2007 FDO was reversed to the extent inconsistent with this order. *FDO on Remand, (Aug. 31, 2011)* The County revised its minimum urban densities and amended its UGAs. The Board entered a finding of compliance and the case was dismissed. *Order Finding Compliance, (Nov. 6, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: External Consistency, Housing Element, Internal Consistency, Land Capacity Analysis, Public Participation, Reasonable Measures, Urban Density, UGA Size

2010 Cases

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c[22]**
  Three sets of petitioners challenged various amendments to Pierce County's comprehensive plan, including specific UGA expansions, UGA expansion criteria, and electronic billboards in a rural area. The cases were consolidated and proponents of two of the amendments intervened. One issue was segregated for settlement and resolved. *Order of Dismissal [Re: FW 3], (Aug. 4, 2010).* The Board dismissed some of the challenges but found two County amendments expanding the UGA were non-compliant and two amendments were inconsistent with rural character as identified in County sub-area plans. *FDO (Aug. 2, 2010).* Intervenor Merriman's motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Reconsideration, (Aug. 25, 2010).*The County repealed the non-compliant provisions and the Board entered a finding of compliance. *Order Finding Compliance, (Jan. 18, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Service, Intervention, Petition for Review, Rural Element, UGA Size, UGA Location, Amendment, Legislative Findings

- ***Janet Wold, et al v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c[23]**
  Two citizens filed pro se challenges to the City of Poulsbo's comprehensive plan update raising numerous issues, including public participation, environment and critical areas, natural resource lands, urban growth and population, buildable lands analysis, inter-jurisdictional

[22] Case No. 10-3-0003c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-3-0001, 10-3-0002 and 10-3-0003.
[23] Case No. 10-3-0005c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-3-0004 and 10-3-0005.

consistency and coordination, capital facilities, and economic development. The Board found the City's action complied with the GMA and dismissed the petitions. *FDO (Aug. 9, 2010).* Reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Reconsideration, (Sept. 3, 2010).*

Key Holdings: Participation Standing, Forest Lands, Sequencing, Land Use Powers, Interjurisdictional Coordination, Open Space, Public Participation

- ***Downtown Emergency Service Center v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 10-3-0006**[24]
  When the proponent of an essential public facility found a site for the facility in another city, it stipulated to a dismissal of its challenge to Tukwila's moratorium on permit applications. *Order of (Dismissal, July 16, 2010).*

- ***James Halmo, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0007**
  Pierce County adopted development regulations to implement a comprehensive plan amendment allowing electronic billboards in the Graham rural area (*see* Case No. 10-3-0003c). The County repealed the regulation and the parties stipulated to a dismissal. *Order of Dismissal, (Dec. 8, 2010).*

- ***Sleeping Tiger, LLC v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 10-3-0008**
  A property owner challenged Tukwila's zoning code amendments related to Crisis Diversion Facilities, an Essential Public Facility (EPF) under the GMA. The Board ruled the City's action precluded the siting of an EPF. *Final Decision and Order, Jan. 4, 2011). Reversed, Court of Appeals unpublished opinion (2013). Order of Dismissal, (August 23, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Essential Public Facilities

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 10-3-0011c,**[25] **coordinated with *City of Shoreline, et al v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 09-3-0013c**
  Two municipalities and a citizen group challenged the County's comprehensive plan amendments creating an Urban Center at Point Wells. The cases were consolidated as *Shoreline III*, Case No. 09-3-0013c, and the property owner intervened. Subsequently the County adopted development regulations for the Point Wells Urban Center. The same petitioners filed additional challenges, which were consolidated as *Shoreline IV*, Case No. 10-3-0011c. The cases were coordinated for hearing. In its *Final Decision and Order, Corrected FDO, (May 17, 2011),* the Board found non-compliance with the GMA and SEPA, issued a determination of invalidity, and provided an extended compliance period because of the complexity of the matters to be resolved. The County prepared an Addendum to the FSEIS analyzing a mid-range alternative and amended its Plan and regulations. The Board found compliance and the case was dismissed. *Order Finding Compliance and Rescinding Invalidity, (Dec. 20, 2012*).

[24] Case No. 10-3-0006 was coordinated with Case No. 09-3-0014
[25] Case No. 10-3-0011c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 10-3-0009, 10-3-0010 and 10-3-0011.

Key Holdings: Supplemental Evidence, SEPA Standing, Notice, Public Participation, Internal Consistency, Interjurisdictional Coordination, Countywide Planning Policies, Sequencing, Transformation of Governance, Goal 3, Goal 11, Goal 12, SEPA, Compliance, Invalidity, Reconsideration

- ***Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Case No. 10-3-0012,[26] coordinated with *Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Case No. 09-3-0007c**
  Adjacent owners of two commercial properties in downtown Kirkland challenged the City's comprehensive plan and development regulations allowing a commercial redevelopment. The cases were consolidated as Case No. 09-3-0007c**,** and the project proponent intervened. In its *Final Decision and Order (Oct. 5, 2009)*, the Board found noncompliance with respect to (1) lack of off-site alternatives in the SEPA review for a non-project action and (2) failure to amend the CFP and Transportation Element of the comp plan to include all of the transportation improvements required by the proposal. The City subsequently revised its SEPA analysis, CFP and transportation plan, adopting new ordinances for compliance. Petitioners objected to a finding of compliance and also filed a new PFR – **Case No. 10-3-0012.** The matters were coordinated for Board ruling and the Board found compliance. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and Final Decision and Order Case No. 10-3-0012, (Feb. 2, 2011)*. Related proceedings largely affirm the Board: *Davidson Serles & Assocs. et al v. CPSGMHB*, 159 Wn.App. 148 (Dec. 27, 2010); *Davidson Serles & Assocs. v. City of Kirkland*, 159 Wn.App. 616 (Jan. 24, 2011).

  Key Holdings: Compliance, Supplemental Evidence, SEPA, Transportation Element

- ***Andrew Cainion v. City of Bainbridge Island,* Case No. 10-3-0013**
  A property owner applied to the City to amend the land use designation of his land and make textual amendments to two comprehensive plan policies. On the City's dispositive motion, the Board dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction. *Order on Motion to Dismiss (Jan. 7, 2011)*. Reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Reconsideration (Jan. 26, 2011)*

  Key Holdings: Timeliness, Subject Matter Jurisdiction

- ***Toward Responsible Development, et al v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 10-3-0014**
  [Note: Board's order rescinded.] A citizen group challenged the City's approval of ordinances furthering a Master Planned Development. The developer intervened. On cross-motions to determine the Board's jurisdiction, the Board ruled it had jurisdiction and the Intervenor appealed. *Order on Motions, (Feb. 15, 2011)*. The Board issued a *Certificate of Appealability (April 21, 2011)* as to the jurisdictional question and an *Order Denying Certificate of Appealability (May 17, 2011)* as to invalidity. Petitioners' motion for Invalidity based on new information was denied. *Order on Motion for Invalidity Based on New Information (June 20, 2011)* Reversed as to jurisdiction, *B.D.Lawson Partners v CPSGMHB,* 165 Wn.App 677 (2011),

[26] Case No. 10-3-0012 was coordinated with Case No. 09-3-0007c.

rev. denied (April 2012), and remanded for rescission of Board order. *Order of Dismissal (August 20, 2012)*

Key Holdings: Petition for Review, Jurisdiction, Invalidity

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0015**
  A neighborhood organization challenged Pierce County's repeal of the "no net loss" language in a community plan that protected rural lands. The Board determined the matter fell within the limited exception to concurrent annual review allowed by RCW 36.70A.130(2)(b) and dismissed the petition. *Final Decision and Order (May 18, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Goals, Abandoned Issues, Compliance, Amendment

2011 Cases

- ***Fleishmann's Industrial Park, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 11-3-0001**
  A property owner challenged the City of Sumner's comprehensive plan amendment which excluded petitioner's property from the Manufacturing Industrial Center (MIC) zone. The Board found the SEPA review inadequate and remanded. *Final Decision and Order (July 6, 2011)*. *Order Finding Compliance (June 1, 2012)*.

  Key Holdings: SEPA, Economic Development, Goals, Property Rights

- ***Overton & Associates LP, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 11-3-0003c[27]**
  Timber and land companies filed two challenges to Kitsap County's amendment of the Rural and Resource Land chapter of its comprehensive plan. The cases were consolidated and settlement extensions were granted. The parties settled the matter and the Board issued a dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (Oct. 10, 2011)*

- ***Chestine Edgar, et al v. City of Burien,* Case No. 11-3-0004**
  Residents near Lake Burien challenged the City of Burien's denial of amendments to land use designation which they had requested to protect Lake Burien. The challenge was dismissed, the Board finding in essence the petition challenged a land use designation enacted in 1999. *Order on Motions (May 12, 2011)*. Reconsideration was denied. *Order Denying Reconsideration (June 7, 2011)*

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction

- ***Sleeping Tiger, LLC v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 11-3-0005**
  A property owner in the manufacturing industrial district challenged the City of Tukwila's renewal of a moratorium on development permit applications in the district, asserting the moratorium precluded the siting of an essential public facility. The PFR was dismissed, the

[27] Case No. 11-3-0003c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 11-3-0002 and 11-3-0003.

Board finding the petition challenged denial of a permit application which was not within the Board's subject matter jurisdiction. *Order on Motions (May 6, 2011).*

Key Holdings: Jurisdiction, APA Standing

- ***Douglas Tooley v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 11-3-0006**
  A pro se petitioner challenged the SEIS for the Alaska Way Viaduct Replacement Project. The Board dismissed the matter *sua sponte* on the grounds that there was no final action ripe for review, as the Final EIS had not yet been issued. *Order of Dismissal (April 1, 2011)*. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration based on misdirected mailed notice was denied. *Order Denying Reconsideration (May 9, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction

- ***BSRE Point Wells, LP v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 11-3-0007**
  The proposed developer of Point Wells challenged the City's adoption of an emergency amendment to its comprehensive plan that would restrict traffic on Richmond Beach Drive, the access road to Point Wells. The parties were granted extensions for settlement purposes and the matter is pending. The Board denied a request for intervention proposed to impede settlement. *Order Denying Intervention (February 4, 2015).*

  Key Holdings: Intervention

- ***Douglas L. Tooley v. Christine Gregoire, et al,* Case No. 11-3-0008**
  A pro se petitioner challenged the Governor and Seattle City Mayor and Council President alleging that the FEIS for the Alaska Way Viaduct Replacement Project failed to comply with SEPA and the GMA. All parties filed dispositive motions. The Board determined it lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the SEPA challenge did not identify and challenge a specific governmental action. The Board also determined the Petitioner lacked standing to assert a SEPA claim. The matter was dismissed. Pageler issued a partial dissent, arguing the matter should have been dismissed based on defective service. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011).*

  Key Holdings: SEPA, *De facto* Amendment, SEPA Standing

- ***City of Kenmore v. City of Brier,* Case No. 11-3-0009**
  Kenmore challenged Brier's adoption of Critical Areas regulations as inconsistent with Kenmore's Comprehensive Plan and regulations to protect salmon habitat. After extensions for settlement purposes, Kenmore withdrew its appeal and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (August 3, 2012).*

- ***Support the Ordinances and Plan (STOP) v. City of Kirkland,* Case No. 11-3-0010**
  STOP, a neighborhood association, challenged Kirkland's failure to adopt development regulations to implement its comprehensive plan designation for Commercial-Residential Market areas. Potala Village Kirkland LLC, a property owner with pending development application, intervened. The Petitioners withdrew their appeal and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (Jan 23, 2012).*

- ***Friends of Pierce County, Tahoma Audubon Society, American Farmland Trust, PCC Farmland Trust and Futurewise v. Pierce County,* Case No. 11-3-0011**
  See Case No. 12-3-0002c.

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie,* Case No. 11-3-0012**
  The City adopted pre-annexation zoning for a portion of its UGA and approved a pre-annexation agreement for operation of an outdoor driving school. Concerned citizens appealed and the owner and operator intervened. Responding to the City's dispositive motion, the Board found petitioners substantially complied with the service requirements (WAC 242-03-230). The Board determined the pre-annexation agreement was a de facto comprehensive plan amendment within the Board's jurisdiction. *Order on Motions (March 8, 2012)*. Ruling on the merits, the Board rejected petitioners' challenge to the sufficiency of the SEPA DNS. The Board remanded the pre-annexation agreement for action consistent with the comprehensive plan and for submittal to Commerce pursuant to RCW 36.70A.106. *Final Decision and Order (May 8, 2012)*; *Order Finding Compliance (September 12, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Service, *De facto Amendment*, Evidence (Supplemental Evidence and Exhibits), Commerce, Department of, Standing (SEPA), SEPA

2012 Cases

- ***City of Bonney Lake v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0001**
  See Case No. 12-3-0002c.

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c[28]**
  Pierce County amended its comprehensive plan to de-designate agricultural resource lands and expand a UGA to allow commercial development. Environmental and farm support groups appealed, and a network of farm interest organizations filed as amicus. The City of Bonney Lake also appealed, but its dispute was settled and dismissed. The City of Sumner, the developer, and Forterra, a conservancy organization, intervened on behalf of the County. The Board found the County's action failed to comply with criteria in the County's code, but noted a conservation agreement among the parties, if strengthened, showed promise of meeting the Commerce minimum guidelines.

[28] Case No. 12-3-0002c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 11-3-0011, 12-3-0001, and 12-3-0002.

The County also adopted amendments requested by school districts. Pro se petitioners appealed and school districts intervened in support of the County. The Board found the County's allowance of electronic billboards in certain urban communities was within its discretion but remanded an amendment allowing a multi-school complex in the rural area. *Final Decision and Order (July 9, 2012)*; *Order Denying Intervention and Denying Reconsideration (Aug. 20, 2012)*. The parties stipulated to a hold on implementation of the non-compliant amendments, and the Board issued a stay of compliance pending appeal, pursuant to WAC 242-03-860. *Order Granting Stay (Aug. 21, 2012)*. The Board also issued a Certificate of Appealability (Sep. 28, 2012).

The appeal of the school siting portion of the case was stayed and the County amended its regulations. The compliance hearing was coordinated with hearing on a challenge to the new regulations. See below, at *Summit-Waller Community Assn. et al., v Pierce County,* Case No. 15-3-0010c, Final Decision and Order and Case No. 12-3-0002c, Order Finding Continuing Noncompliance Re: Amendment M3 (May 9, 2016). An appeal of the finding of noncompliance is pending.

Key Holdings: Agricultural Lands, Agricultural Lands (Innovative Techniques), Amendment, Burden of Proof, Critical Areas (Geologically Hazardous Areas), Deference, Internal Consistency, Minimum Guidelines, Regional Planning, Rural Element, UGA Size, Stay, Certificate of Appealability

The appeal of the Friends of Pierce County portion of the case was withdrawn and dismissed by the court. The County repealed the non-compliant amendments and the Board entered a compliance order. *Order Finding Compliance [Re: Amendments C-5 and U-3] (May 6, 2014)*.

- ***William M. Palmer, Kitsap Alliance of Property Owners, and Jack Hamilton v. Kitsap County, et al.,* Case No. 12-3-0003**
  Petitioners challenge the County's ordinance adopting amendments to its Countywide Planning Policies. The matter was dismissed on the County's dispositive motion. *Order of Dismissal (February 27, 2012).*

  Key Holdings: Standing, Respondent, Countywide Planning Policies

- ***Elizabeth Mooney and Janet Hays v. City of Kenmore and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0004**
  Pro se petitioners challenged the adoption of an update to the City of Kenmore's Shoreline Master Program for failing to adequately protect the shoreline in light of new information pertaining to contaminants. Petitioners sought to add documentation of the history of industrial contamination in Kenmore's downtown waterfront. *Order on Motion to Supplement, December 10, 2012*. The Board found Kenmore's SMP inventory documented existing contamination and the SMP policies, development regulations, and restoration plan provided

"no net loss" of shoreline functions. The PFR was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order, (February 27, 2013)*.

Key Holdings: Evidence, Shoreline Master Program, Shorelines of Statewide Significance

- ***Potala Village Kirkland, LLC, Lobsang Dargey and Tamara Agassi Dargey v. The City of Kirkland,* Case No. 12-3-0005**
  Petitioners challenged the City's extension of a moratorium. The moratorium expired, and the matter was dismissed as moot. *Order of Dismissal (February 8, 2013)*.

  Key Holding: Mootness

- ***Rita Hagwell, Janet Wold, and Molly Chamberlin Lee v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 12-3-0006**
  Pro se Petitioners challenged the adoption of the Urban Paths of Poulsbo Plan, alleging inadequate public process, compromise of property rights, and failure to protect anadromous fishery resources. The Board found petitioners failed to meet their burden and the case was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order (March 11, 2013)*.

  Key Holdings: Goal 6 – Property Rights, Public Participation, Goal 9 – Open Space

- ***Lowell Anderson, Jeffrey Rodgers, Douglas Hamar, Chad McCammon and Bob Martin v. City of Monroe,* Case No. 12-3-0007**
  Petitioners challenged the City's adoption of a comprehensive plan amendment for the East Gateway area. The City repealed the challenged ordinance and the matter was dismissed as moot. *Order on Dispositive Motion (Dec. 11, 2012).*

  Key Holding: Mootness

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008**
  Petitioner challenged the County's Shoreline Master Program update for failing to protect designated agricultural lands from salmon-habitat restoration projects that could destroy farmland. On dispositive motions, the Board dismissed issues challenging compliance with the GMA and compliance with SMA consultation requirements. *Order on Motions, (December 17, 2012)*. The Board found Petitioner failed to carry its burden given the narrow scope of review allowed in RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c). *Final Decision and Order (March 14, 2013)* (Concurring: William Roehl and Cheryl Pflug). *Order Denying Reconsideration (April 4, 2013)*.

  Key Holdings: Burden of Proof, Shoreline Master Program, Shorelines of Statewide Significance, Reconsideration, Evidence

- ***Pacific Coast Shellfish Growers Association v. Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0009**
  Petitioner challenged provisions concerning aquaculture in the County's Shoreline Master Program update. The parties executed a settlement agreement which was implemented by Snohomish County's adoption and Ecology's approval of a limited amendment to the SMP. The parties stipulated to dismissal and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (May 23, 2014)*.

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II),* Case No. 12-3-0010**
  Petitioner challenged the County's amendment of its comprehensive plan for failing to protect agricultural lands. The amendments linked salmon habitat restoration with preservation of agricultural resource lands. Petitioner alleged the amendments created an implicit exception to the requirement to conduct a de-designation process prior to any restoration activity which would inundate and destroy farmland. The Board was unable to reach Petitioner's underlying question based on the arguments and authorities advanced, and the case was dismissed. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013)*; *Final Decision and Order (May 2, 2013)*.

  Key Holdings: Public Participation, Participation Standing, Evidence, Goal 8, Agricultural Lands

- ***Wood Trails Homes, LLC and PDI Properties, Inc. v. City of Woodinville,* Case No. 12-3-0011**
  Petitioners challenged the City's adoption of a minimum lot size in its R1 zone. Concerned Neighbors of Wellington intervened. After several extensions for settlement purposes, the parties stipulated to dismissal and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (May 27, 2014)*.

2013 Cases

- ***Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 13-3-0001**
  Petitioners challenged portions of Snohomish County ordinances enacted in compliance proceedings in Case Nos. 10-3-0011c and 09-3-0013c. After several extensions for settlement purposes, the petition was withdrawn and the case was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (May 6, 2014)*.

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002**
  The City of Snoqualmie challenged King County's adoption of amendments to its comprehensive plan, countywide planning policies and development regulations and the denial of the City's requested UGA amendment. The Board found the County's countywide planning policies, regulations, and UGA denial were compliant but remanded portions of the comprehensive plan to address failure to respond to legislative amendments. Compliance required the County to revise or explain why no revision was necessary pursuant to RCW 36.70A.130(1). *Final Decision and Order (August 12, 2013)*; *Order Denying Certificate of Appealability (September 27, 2013)*. The County amended its comprehensive plan and the Board found compliance. *Order Finding Compliance (January 30, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Countywide Planning Policies, Legislative Findings, UGA Sizing, Deference, Amendment (Failure to Revise), Certificate of Appealability

On remand from superior court for additional fact-finding, the Board found the Mountains to Sound Greenway location of the proposed UGA expansion was relevant but of minor significance to determination of the issues. *Order on Remand, Supplementing the Record, Making Findings of Fact, and Amending Final Decision and Order (October 29, 2014)*; *Corrected Final Decision and Order (October 29, 2014)*. Affirmed 12/14/2015 Thurston County Superior Court.

- ***Community Alliance to Reach Out & Engage (CARE) v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0003**
  Pro se petitioners challenged the County's zoning code amendment for certain commercial property in the UGA. The Board determined petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof and the case was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order (August 21, 2013).*

  Key Holdings: Internal Consistency, External Consistency, Goals

- ***Peter Connick, Ann Mahony, and M. Jean Patterson v. Lake Forest Park Planning Commission and the City of Lake Forest Park,* Case No. 13-3-0004**
  Petitioners challenged the City's adoption of Ordinances relating to the South Gateway area. The parties stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (June 3, 2013).*

- ***Six Kilns Apartments, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 13-3-0005**
  Petitioner challenged the City's adoption of a resolution surplusing public open space for sale and development. The Board dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. *Order of Dismissal on Motions (July 16, 2013)*. Appeal to superior court dismissed 11/12/2014.

  Key Holdings: De Facto Amendment, Jurisdiction

- ***City of Woodinville v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 13-3-0006**
  The City of Woodinville challenged a Notice of Action published by Snohomish County concerning development of Wellington Park. The parties were granted an extension for settlement purposes and subsequently stipulated to dismissal. *Order of Dismissal (November 25, 2013).*

- ***Lowen Family Limited Partnership v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0007**
  Petitioner challenged the City's adoption of zoning amendments for the South Lake Union Urban Center. On the City's motion, the petition was dismissed on the grounds the Lowen Family lacked standing under GMA, APA and SEPA. *Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013)* Appeal to superior court dismissed 4/4/2014.

  Key Holdings: APA Standing, SEPA Standing

- ***Total Outdoor Corp. v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0008**
  Petitioner challenged the City's denial of its appeal of a DNS for a proposed sign ordinance amendment. Finding the petition provided no evidence of final ordinance adoption by the City,

the Board dismissed the matter for lack of GMA or SEPA jurisdiction. *Order of Dismissal (September 23, 2013).*

Key Holdings: Jurisdiction, Petition for Review, SEPA

- ***Jim Osgood and Susan Richardson v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 13-3-0009**
  Petitioners challenged certain Special District Overlay provisions of the City's critical areas ordinance. The parties were granted an extension for settlement purposes and subsequently stipulated to dismissal. Order of Dismissal (February 27, 2015).

- ***William J. Rehberg, James L. Halmo, Marilyn K. Sanders v. Pierce County,* Case No. 13-3-0010**
  Petitioners challenged various amendments to the County's development regulations concerning signage, clustering, LAMIRDs, and other provisions. The Board ruled the County's recodification and regulatory simplification did not reopen the County's plans and regulations for wholesale review by the Board. One provision of rural signage was remanded as non-compliant with the RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(ii) requirement for "assuring visual compatibility." *Final Decision and Order (April 28, 2014)*. The County amended its ordinance and the Board found compliance. *Order Finding Compliance (August 4, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Compliance, Development Regulations, Rural Character

- ***Six Kilns Apartments LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 13-3-0011**
  Petitioner challenged the City's sale of golf course property for industrial development. The parties were granted extensions for settlement purposes and subsequently stipulated to dismissal. Order of Dismissal (November 21, 2014).

- ***Lake Burien Neighborhood and Robert Howell, Robbie Howell, Chestine Edgar, Len Boscarine and Linda Plein v. The City of Burien and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 13-3-0012**
  Petitioners challenged the City's adoption and Ecology's approval of the Shoreline Master Program for failure to ensure no net loss of Lake Burien's and its shoreline's ecological functions. The Board found petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof and the case was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order (June 16, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Shoreline Master Programs, Public Participation, Critical Areas

2014 Cases

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 14-3-0001**
  The City of Snoqualmie challenged King County's comprehensive plan amendment for failure to address or comply with 2009 legislative amendments. On the County's motion to dismiss under res judicata, the Board dismissed the petition. *Order of Dismissal (April 25, 2014)*.

  Key Holding: Res Judicata

- ***James L. Halmo v. Pierce County,* Case No. 14-3-0002**
  Petitioner challenged Pierce County's amendments to the Gig Harbor Peninsula Community Plan as failing to comply with LAMIRD requirements. The Board found one portion of the LAMIRD lacked a logical outer boundary and remanded the ordinance to the County. *Final Decision and Order (July 23, 2014)*. On remand, the County amended its comprehensive plan LAMIRD provisions and established a logical outer boundary to the challenged LAMIRD. The Board found compliance and the case was closed. *Order Finding Compliance (January 12, 2013)*. Appeal to superior court withdrawn and dismissed 1/27/2015.

  Key Holding: LAMIRDs

- ***Brandi Blair, Matthew Blair, Brett Blair, James Blair, and Lowell Anderson v. City of Monroe,* Case No. 14-3-0003**
  See Case No. 14-3-0006c.

- ***Douglas Hamar and Chad McCammon v. City of Monroe,* Case No. 14-3-0004**
  See Case No. 14-3-0006c.

- ***Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0005**
  An association of downtown Seattle property owners and developers challenged the City's adoption of an amendment to its zoning code which increased fees on developers for affordable housing purposes. On the City's motion, the SEPA claims were dismissed for lack of standing. *Order on Motions (May 16, 2014) dissent in part by William Roehl.* The Board found the petitioners failed to demonstrate the City's ordinance violated RCW 36.70A.540 or was inconsistent with its comprehensive plan. *Final Decision and Order (August 19, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Affordable Housing, Development Regulations, Internal Consistency

- ***Brandi Blair, Matthew Blair, Brett Blair, James Blair, Lowell Anderson, Douglas Hamar, and Chad McCammon v. City of Monroe,* Case No. 14-3-0006c[29]**
  Pro se petitioners challenged the City of Monroe's comprehensive plan amendment and associated upzone of 42 acres from limited open space to general commercial. The Board ruled on questions of standing under SEPA and GMA as well as supplementation of the record. *Order on Motions (May 23, 2014)*. The Board found the City's SEPA review failed to comply with RCW 43.21C.030(c) and that the action substantially interfered with GMA Goal 10 Environment. The Board entered a determination of invalidity. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2014)*. Clerical errors were identified by the parties pursuant to WAC 242-03-830(4) and a corrected FDO was issued. *Order Nunc Pro Tunc Correcting Scrivener's Errors in Final Decision and Order (September 19, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Standing-Participation Standing, Standing-SEPA Standing, Goal 10 Environment, Invalidity, SEPA

[29] Case No. 14-3-0006c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 14-3-0003, 14-3-0004, and 14-3-0006.

- ***BD Lawson Partners LP and BD Village Partners LP v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 14-3-0007**
  The City commissioned a study and adopted it by ordinance for purposes of review and consideration. Petitioners, who have master development agreements with the City that will eventually be subject to mitigation fees, challenged the adoption as a de facto comprehensive plan amendment. The Board found the ordinance did not amend the comprehensive plan and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. *Order of Dismissal (August 18, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: De Facto Amendment, Jurisdiction

- ***Schnitzer West, LLC v. City of Puyallup,* Case No. 14-3-0008**
  Petitioner challenged the City's amendment of its comprehensive plan and zoning which reduced the development capacity on certain industrial property. The property owner intervened in support of petitioner. The parties were granted an extension for settlement purposes.

- ***Talis Abolins and Marla Steinhoff v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0009**
  Petitioners challenged the City's zoning amendments for the North Rainier Hub Urban Village, increasing height limits and adopting affordable housing and open space bonuses. The City's motion to dismiss was denied in most part. Order on Motions (December 10, 2014). Petitioners failed to demonstrate the rezoning violated the statutory provisions cited and the case was dismissed. Final Decision and Order, (April 1, 2015).

  Key Holdings: Dispositive Motions, Sub-Area Plans [Neighborhood Plans], External Consistency, Development Regulations

- ***Daniel Thompson v. City of Mercer Island,* Case No. 14-3-0010**
  Petitioner challenged a preliminary plat approval for development of two homes with an access easement. The Board determined it lacked jurisdiction as the challenged action is a project permit approval and not a de facto amendment to the comprehensive plan or development regulations. *Order of Dismissal (December 5, 2014)*.

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction, De Facto Amendment

- ***Bainbridge Alliance for Puget Sound, Association of Bainbridge Communities, and Coalition to Protect Puget Sound Habitat v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology, Pacific Coast Shellfish Growers Association, Intervenor,* Case No. 14-3-0011**
  Bainbridge Alliance challenged the aquaculture provisions of the City of Bainbridge Island's updated Shoreline Master Program. Shellfish Growers intervened on the side of the City and Ecology. The Board has granted extensions for settlement negotiations.

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Management, et al.,(PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012**
  PRSM challenged the City of Bainbridge Island's updated Shoreline Master Program for failure to comply with requirements for public participation, consideration of applicable science, shoreline substantial development permit exemptions, internal consistency and consistency with the comprehensive plan, SMA preferences for single-family residences and water-dependent uses, and other elements of the SMA and applicable guidelines. Kitsap County Association of Realtors intervened on the side of petitioners. The Board concluded PRSM and Realtors failed to demonstrate the action of the City and Ecology violated the provisions of the Shoreline Management Act, ch. 90.58 RCW, and Master Program Guidelines, WAC 173-26-171 through 251, which formed the basis for the petition for review. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015)*. An appeal is pending.

  Key Holding: Evidence, Intervention, Shoreline Master Program – Process, Notice, Amendment, Shoreline Master Program

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 14-3-0013**
  The Farm Bureau challenged Snohomish County's adoption of an interlocal agreement with Diking District No. 5. The Board determined the county's adoption of an interlocal agreement was a project permit action resolving appeals of the county's issuance of a shoreline substantial development permit. The Board lacked jurisdiction and the petition was dismissed. *Order of Dismissal on Motions (February 4, 2015)*.

  Key Holding: Jurisdiction

2015 Cases

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001**
  Petitioners challenged the City of Bothell's amendments to its comprehensive plan and development regulations which remove protections previously adopted for the North Creek headwaters in order to allow new subdivision development.

  The Board ruled on motions to strike and to supplement the record. *Order on Motions to Strike (April 13, 2014)*.The Board ruled the City's amended development regulations were inconsistent with provisions of its Comprehensive Plan, failed to protect critical area ecosystems from net loss, and substantially interfered with the statutory goal of protecting the environment, including water quality. The Board entered an order of invalidity and remanded the challenged Ordinance to be brought into compliance. *Final Decision and Order (July 21, 2015)*. An appeal to superior court was withdrawn and dismissed, and the City reestablished provisions for protection of the area. *Order Finding Compliance (March 14, 2016)*.

  Key Holdings: Critical Areas, Environment, External Consistency, SEPA Standing, Invalidity

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society (SPS), Janet Way, John Behrens, and Wendy Dipeso v. City of Shoreline, Case No. 15-3-0002***
  Petitioners challenged the City of Shoreline's adoption of a subarea plan for transit-oriented development around a future light rail station and a Planned Action Ordinance for the subarea. The Board determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the Planned Action Ordinance. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015)*. The Board ruled the FEIS for the subarea plan was adequate and procedural errors had been cured. Objections to the subarea plan alleging faulty public process and non-compliance with capital facilities and transportation planning requirements were also dismissed. *Final Decision and Order, (December 16, 2015)*. An appeal iwas dismissed.

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction (Subject Matter), Planned Action Ordinance, Development Regulations (Phasing), SEPA, SEPA Standing, SEPA-Standard of Review, Capital Facilities, Transportation Element, Notice, Administrative Discretion, Subarea Plans

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau (SCFB IV) v. Snohomish Farm Bureau*, Case No. 15-3-0003**
  Petitioner sought review of an ordinance authorizing changes to the diking system along Union Slough to construct the Smith Island Restoration Project. The Board concluded that the challenged action was a component of a project permit, a site-specific land use action not within the Board's review jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed and reconsideration was denied. *Order of Dismissal,(July 22, 2015)*. *Order Denying Reconsideration, (August 17, 2015)*. Affirmed by Snohomish County Superior Court 2/25/2016.

  Key Holdings: Jurisdiction (Subject Matter), Reconsideration

- ***Robert Strahm v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0004**
  Petitioner challenged Snohomish County's ten-year comprehensive plan update for failure to provide sufficient urban land to accommodate the twenty-year population and employment growth projections. Petitioner argued the Land Capacity Analysis was based on flawed methodologies and erroneous data. The Board concluded Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and the case was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order, (January 19, 2016)*. An appeal is pending.

  Key Holdings: Commerce, Department of, Land Capacity Analysis

- ***Jerry Harless v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 15-3-0005**
  Petitioner challenged Kitsap County's Buildable Lands Report (BLR) for failure to comply with RCW 36.70A.215. While approving staff technical analysis and the County's recent progress toward meeting GMA targets, the Board remanded the BLR to the County to include identification and annual monitoring of "reasonable measures." *Final Decision and Order, (January 22, 2016)*.

  Key Holdings: Buildable Lands Review, Reasonable Measures

- ***Ginger Amundson, Paul and Sharon Sheppard, Martin H. Robinett, and Mountain Loop Conservancy v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0006**
  Petitioners challenged Snohomish County's update of its comprehensive plan for failure to protect designated forest lands from incompatible recreational uses and from fire risks. The Board granted extensions for settlement negotiations and the petition was subsequently withdrawn. *Order of Dismissal (March 1, 2016)*.

- ***Robert and Lisa Phillips, Mike Pitman and Jody Heigert v. City of Arlington,* Case No. 15-3-0007**
  Petitioners challenged the City of Arlington's 2016 Comprehensive Plan Update for seeking to expand its urban growth area while failing to provide public services to allow urban development inside existing city limits. The Board granted extensions for settlement negotiations.

- ***Summit-Waller Community Association, and North Clover Creek Community Council v. Pierce County,* Case No. 15-3-0008**
  See Case No. 15-3-0010c.

- ***Futurewise and Pilchuck Audubon Society v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0009**
  See Case No. 15-3-0012c.

- ***Summit-Waller Community Association,North Clover Creek Community Council, Marilyn K. Sanders, William J. Rehberg, James L. Halmo, David M. Friscia v. Pierce County,* Case No. 15-3-0010c[30]**
  Pierce County's ten-year update of its comprehensive plan was challenged by two groups of petitioners who raised objections to a number of plan amendments which revised provisions concerning rural lands and community plans. The Board consolidated the petitions and also coordinated compliance proceedings in *Friends of Pierce County*, GMHB Case No. 12-3-0002c. A number of school districts intervened on the issue of siting schools in rural areas. Several property owners intervened in support of the County. The matter is pending.

- ***John Postema v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0011**
  See Case No. 15-3-0012c.
  Snohomish County's update of its critical areas ordinance (CAO) was challenged by John Postema who alleged the CAO was overly restrictive, in violation of the GMA priority for agricultural uses. Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and the petition was dismissed. *Final Decision and Order (April 8, 2016)*. An appeal is pending.

  Keyholdings: Updates, Critical Areas, Internal Consistency, Goal 8

[30] Case No. 15-3-0010c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 15-3-0008 and 15-3-0010.

- ***Futurewise, Pilchuck Audubon Society, John Postema, and The Tulalip Tribes v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0012c**[31]
  Snohomish County's update of its critical areas ordinance was challenged by environmental advocates and the Tulalip Tribes for failure to protect the environment, particularly with respect to wetlands, critical aquifer recharge areas, fish and wildlife habitat, and landslide-prone areas. The Board granted extensions for settlement negotiations.

- ***Puget Western, Inc. v. City of North Bend,* Case No. 15-3-0013**
  The City of North Bend adopted a series of moratoriums concerning the siting of a truck stop adjacent to Interstate 90. Following several extensions for settlement negotiations, the moratorium was superseded by a new ordinance rendering the original petition moot. The petition was withdrawn. *Order of Dismissal (June 3 2016)*.

- ***The City of Woodinville v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0014**
  See Case No. 15-3-0016c.

- ***Seattle Displacement Coalition v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 15-3-0015**
  The Coalition sought review of the City of Seattle's amendment of provisions for the University Community Urban Center, alleging the City violated SEPA by failing to provide a study of potential displacement of existing businesses or residents as required by RCW 43.21C.420(4)(f). The Board determined the alternative SEPA process for incentivizing transit infill development allowed under RCW 43.21C.420 is not mandatory. The City did not violate SEPA by declining to adopt the alternative process. *Final Decision and Order (May 31, 2016)*.

  Keyholdings: SEPA

- ***Neighbors to Save Wellington Park v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0016c**[32]
  The City of Woodinville and Neighbors for Wellington Park each sought review of Snohomish County's sale of open space/park land to the Northshore School District for a school site. Petitioners alleged violations of SEPA, GMA public participation, and provisions of countywide planning policies discouraging school siting in rural areas. The cases were consolidated and after hearing, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. *Final Decision and Order (May 26, 2016)*. A motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order on Motion for Reconsideration (June 13, 2016)*.

- ***Paul Stickney and Richard Birgh v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 15-3-0017**
  Petitioners challenged the City of Sammamish comprehensive plan update for failure to provide housing policies that meet the demographic needs of all the population in violation of RCW 36.70A.070(2) and contrary to GMA Housing Goal RCW 36.70A.020(4). Petitioners adduced facts demonstrating the City's failure to make adequate provision for existing and projected

[31] Case No. 15-3-0012c was originally consolidated with Case Nos. 15-3-0009, 15-3-0011, and 15-3-0012, but 15-3-0011 was subsequently re-segregated for hearing and decision.
[32] Case No. 15-3-0016c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 15-3-0014 and 15-3-0016.

affordable housing needs. The Board remanded the plan to the City. *Final Decision and Order (June 13, 2016)*. A motion for reconsideration was denied. *Order on Motion for Reconsideration (July 13, 2016)*.

Key Holdings: Burden of Proof, Affordable Housing, Housing Element (Goal 4)

- ***Fred F. Brown v. City of Everett,* Case No. 15-3-0018**
  Petitioner challenged the City of Everett's comprehensive plan update for the Everett Station Area alleging the methodology used in its land capacity analysis was improper and that the City had failed to accommodate growth targets. The Board concluded the Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof to show the City's action was clearly erroneous and dismissed the case. *Final Decision and Order (June 7, 2016)*.

2016 Cases

- ***Puget Western Inc. v. City of North Bend* , Case No. 16-3-0001**
  The City of North Bend's ordinance prohibiting additional commercial truck centers was challenged by Puget Western for failure to accommodate an essential public facility under RCW 36.70A.200 and for non-compliance with SEPA. The matter is pending.

- ***John Hendrickson, Rebecca Hirt, Judith Finn, Ann Anderson, Elizabeth Mooney, Ann Hurst, and Janet Hayes v. City of Kenmore,* Case No. 16-3-0002**
  Petitioners challenge the City's amendment to its critical areas ordinance expanding exemptions for public improvements. The matter is pending.

- ***City of Shoreline v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 16-3-0003**
  See Case No. 16-3-0004c.

- ***Ronald Wastewater District v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 16-3-0004c[33]**
  Challenge of Snohomish County Amended Motion No. 16-135. This matter is pending.

- ***Graham MC, LLC v. Pierce County,* Case No. 16-3-0005**
  Petitioners challenge the adoption of Pierce County's Ordinance 2016-34s. This matter is pending.

- ***City of Bremerton v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 16-3-0006**
  See Case No. 16-3-0012c.

[33] Case No. 16-3-0004c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 16-3-0003 and 16-3-0004.

- ***Bethel School District No. 403, Sumner School District No. 320, Franklin Pierce School District No. 402, Eatonville School District No. 404, and Tacoma School District No. 10 v. Pierce County,* Case No. 16-3-0007**
  Petitioners challenge Pierce County Ordinance 2016-34s amending, *inter alia,* comprehensive plan provisions relating to school siting.

- ***Thomas Hamilton, Barbara Lott, John Hansen, Jim Grose, Albert Miller v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 16-3-0008**
  See Case No. 16-3-0012c.

- ***Jerry Harless v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 16-3-0009**
  See Case No. 16-3-0012c.

- ***Kitsap Alliance of Property Owners v. Kitsap County*, Case No. 16-3-0010**
  See Case No. 16-3-0012c.

- ***West Sound Utility District v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 16-3-0011**
  See Case No. 16-3-0012c.

- ***City of Port Orchard v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 16-3-0012c[34]**
  Challenge of Kitsap County Ordinance No. 534-2016. This matter is pending.

- ***Rob Younger, Howard J. and Melinda L. Bargreen, Owen Bargreen, and Maren Bargreen Mullin v. State of Washington, Department of Ecology,* Case No. 16-3-0013**
  A challenge of the Final Ecology Approval of the City of Everett Shoreline Master Program Limited Amendment. This matter is pending.

- ***King County v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 16-3-0014**
  Challenge of City of Sammamish Ordinance 2016-413. This matter is pending.

[34] Case No. 16-3-0012c is the consolidation of Case Nos. 16-3-0006, 16-3-0008, 16-3-0009, 16-3-0010, 16-3-0011, and 16-3-0012.

Region 3: Central Puget Sound Digest of Decisions by Key Holdings

Abandoned Issues

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v Pierce County*, Case No. 10-3-0015:** [An issue was abandoned when] other than repeating these statutes in the statement of Legal Issue 3, petitioners have made no argument tied to these provisions. WAC 242-02-570(1) provides in part "Failure to brief an issue shall constitute abandonment of the unbriefed issue." An issue is briefed when legal argument is provided. It is not enough to simply cite the statutory provision in the statement of the legal issue. *FDO (May 18, 2011), pg. 11.*

Administrative Discretion

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** The Board's standard for determining a complaint of undue administrative discretion … [calls for] "development regulations that provide administrators with clear and detailed criteria so that in wielding professional judgment, the Director has regulatory 'sideboards' and policy direction." In the [challenged] Ordinance, clear regulatory sideboards for approval of substitute mitigation measures are provided by the requirement of "equivalent mitigation for identified impacts." [This] provides a clear standard to guide administrative discretion. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), pp. 10-11.*

Affordable Housing

- ***Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle*, Case No. 14-3-0005:** "[E]xpansion" of housing bonus programs has historically denoted extension to other areas of the city. This application of "expansion" is consistent with the plain language of [RCW 36.70A.540] which requires the jurisdiction to target specific geographic areas and zone designations for incentive programs. [Holding an ordinance changing the housing bonus program fee-in-lieu provisions did not "enact or expand" the program.] *Final Decision and Order (August 19, 2014), p. 10.*

  The Board finds no basis in RCW 36.70A.540 to require additional incentives in connection with a fee adjustment where the program already provides "increased residential development capacity" over the base zoning and the fee does not exceed the cost of building the affordable units. *Final Decision and Order (August 19, 2014), p. 14.*

- ***Paul Stickney and Richard Birgh v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 15-3-0017**: The Housing Needs Analysis … documents that only 13 affordable housing units were created in the City of Sammamish from 1993 to 2010. Of those, six were affordable to low-income households below 50% AMI and seven to moderate-income households from 50-80% AMI…. On the record before us, 13% of households fall within the moderate to very low income range but only 5% of housing stock is affordable for moderate or low income households and none is affordable for very-low income households. [Board finds record supports Petitioners' housing needs gap analysis.] *Final Decision and Order (June 13, 2016), p. 13.*

  As regards workforce housing, … [r]elatively high rents may contribute to the low proportion of the workforce that can afford to live in this community - necessitating longer commutes and

increasing private and public transportation costs which further shift financial resources of households away from housing. The City's Housing Element must "make adequate provision" for existing and projected housing needs of this economic segment of the community, and the Board finds that the City has failed to do so. *Final Decision and Order (June 13, 2016), p. 15.*

Agricultural Lands

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The GMA emphasis is broader than conservation of individual parcels of agricultural land on a site-specific basis. Rather, in order to preserve or foster the agricultural economy, as mandated by RCW 36.70A.020(8), .060, .120, and WAC 365-190-050(5), a county-wide or agricultural-area process is required. .. [T]he area-wide assessment of de-designation impacts is to *precede* designation amendments, not follow them, according to the process required in WAC 365-190-040(10)(b). *FDO (July 9, 2012), at 32-33.*

  The WAC designation amendment process stipulates that de-designation should be based on an error, change in circumstances, new information, or a change in population growth rates. This rule recognizes the certainty that is required for long-term resource conservation. [Citing *Clark County:* "Without such deference to the original designation, there is no land use plan, merely a series of quixotic regulations."] *FDO (July 9, 2012)*, at 33-34.

  If mere UGA adjacency justifies de-designation of ARL lands, … continued loss of fertile farmland is inevitable. This expansion of the UGA followed by its urbanization will lead to the identical argument being made to justify further expansion as the land abutting the expanded UGA – east, west, and south – will then be adjacent to urban growth. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 51.*

  Petitioners have carried their burden of showing the potential for further incursions on the viability of the agricultural industry, through isolation of ARL lands adjacent to the [expanded] UGA and the continued conversion of prime agricultural land close to metropolitan markets. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 57.*

  [Reviewing de-designation of agricultural resource lands, the Board assessed each of the designation criteria in the County's comprehensive plan and the minimum guidelines.] *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 34-49.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II), Case No. 12-3-0010:*** [The] Farm Bureau's legal issue and arguments in this case do not reach the question whether the GMA requires de-designation [of agricultural lands] before restoration activities [for salmon habitat]. [The Board is constrained by Petitioner's issue statement and argument, and the case must be dismissed.] *FDO (May 2, 2013), at 17, 21.*

Amendment

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** [Challenge to a comprehensive plan amendment was timely and within the Board's jurisdiction when County amendment of its

UGA expansion criteria was not narrowly limited to TDR implementation.] The T-6 Amendment was not part of a required update but was a policy initiative which considered an array of changes to the County's UGA criteria and process. With this initiative, the County essentially reopened the consideration of its UGA Expansion Criteria for public input and amendment. In the context of this expansive review, in part to accommodate absorption of farm lands, compliance with the UGA requirements for protection of agricultural lands was clearly on the table. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pgs. 36-37.*

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County*, Case No. 10-3-0015:** [The County's action] was well within the scope of the limited exception to concurrent annual review provided by RCW 36.70A.130(2)(b). [The challenged action was an amendment to the comprehensive plan, was adopted with appropriate public participation, and was adopted to resolve an appeal to the Board.] *FDO (May 18, 2011), pg. 6.*

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The Board recognizes the disappointment of citizens who have relied on a county or city promise to "establish a process" or engage in some future planning exercise. However, unless the adopted plan provides a fixed date or mandate for that promise, the Board seldom finds a violation…. The Graham Plan may have intended a more focused de-designation analysis and process for RF lands, but there is no mandatory obligation that provides a basis for the Board to look beyond the plain language of [the County Code]. … [Similarly], Staff working documents and representations to community groups do not constitute enforceable adoptions or amendments of plans and regulations. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 110-111.*

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012:** [Board finds post-hearing change to an amendment merely clarified language of the proposed ordinance without changing its effect and was within the scope of public discussion consistent with RCW 36.70A.035(2)(a) and (b).] These GMA provisions are the legislature's common sense recognition that a city council's work is never-ending if every time the council amends its plan in response to public comments it must hold another public hearing to take comments on the amendment. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 28-29.*

Buildable Lands Review

- ***Jerry Harless v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 15-3-0005:** The Board has previously held it will give deference to a jurisdiction's choice of methodology for preparing a BLR [citing *S/K Realtors v King County*, GMHB No. 04-3-0028, FDO, at 16]. … "Thus, if a county and its cities agree upon an evaluation methodology that satisfies the minimum evaluation components of RCW 36.70A.215(3), and the results of that review and evaluation meet the purposes of RCW 36.70A.215(1), the Board will find compliance." *Final Decision and Order, (*January 22, 2016), p. 8, 9.

The County does not dispute that the statute and the comprehensive plan require annual monitoring of existing reasonable measures…. Whether the monitoring is documented in the BLR or in the background record is a secondary question, although it is logical that the BLR, as the data-gathering component of the review and evaluation program, would contain such information. *Final Decision and Order, (January 22, 2016), p*. 12, 13.

Burden of Proof

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The City argues Petitioners cannot meet their burden of demonstrating non-compliance simply by alleging that "it is unclear." Here, however, the Friends (and the City's EIS) have provided information of an imminent water capacity shortfall in meeting peak demand. The Comprehensive Plan requires "documentation" of adequate capacity, and the City's possible solutions were not persuasive to the County staff that analyzed the City's Water System Plan. [Footnote: the burden of production "must shift at some point such that the respondent must refute the evidence proffered by the petitioner."] Under its Comprehensive Plan criteria, the County must have documentation of service capacity before it can approve a UGA expansion. Given the high stakes and long time periods required to secure new water sources or water rights, the Board finds the City's response falls short of the required "documentation." *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 76-77, and fn. 213.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008:** The appellant has the burden of proof in an appeal of a SMP. RCW 90.58.190(2)(d). Correctly identifying the statutory basis for the challenge is a necessary threshold requirement. … [A]t a minimum, the petitioner is responsible for re-reading the applicable statutes in the course of drafting the prehearing brief so that inadvertent errors are caught and corrected. Here, the Petitioner failed to note the error until the Respondents' brief called it out. *FDO (March 14, 2013), at 13.*

- ***Paul Stickney and Richard Birgh v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 15-3-0017** : The City objects that Petitioners rely on conclusory statements and lay person opinions. The Board notes petitioners may be laypersons but they have taken the time to thoroughly review the City's numbers and make calculations based on data in the record as set forth above. … Merely characterizing Petitioners' statistics as personal opinions does not refute them. To the contrary, the Board finds that the record amply supports Petitioners' gap analysis. *Final Decision and Order (June 13, 2016), p. 13-14.*

Capital Facilities

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Requirements of capital facilities (RCW 36.70A.070(3)) and transportation elements (RCW 36.70A.070(6)) of comprehensive plans are summarized and charted.] *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), pp. 18-19.*

[T]he City's planning for water and sewer utilities for the 185th Street Station subarea meets the requirements of the GMA capital facilities element, RCW 36.70A.030(3), and the GMA concurrency goal, RCW 36.70A.020(12). The Board reads the subarea plan as a supplement to the existing comprehensive plan capital facilities chapter which incorporates the [water and sewer] system plans. Altogether, the Board finds that City planning sets forth existing inventory, forecast needs, project costs and finance sources, while recognizing that the water and sewer service providers will need to complete hydraulic modelling in order to properly size and schedule the system improvements to serve ultimate build-out. As the outside purveyors update their system plans, they are required by law to develop plans consistent with the City's land use regulations. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), pp. 24-25.*

The GMA capital facilities and transportation elements require a general financing plan or range of funding sources for the 20-year period and a specific six-year CIP or TIP to ensure public facilities are available to serve development. RCW 36.70A.070(3) and 070(6). Here, the City of Shoreline was not required by the GMA to concurrently, contemporaneously, or simultaneously amend the financing and scheduling of projects on the CIP or TIP when adopting the subarea plan [in view of the long lead time to light rail station completion]. … It is only when the necessary improvements are scheduled (prioritized) that they must be included for funding in the six-year CIP or TIP. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), pp. 26-27.*

Certificate of Appealability

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County, C*ase No. 12-3-0002c*:*** To the extent the applicants are challenging the application of MPPs, the Board finds a fundamental regional issue is raised: whether multi-county planning policies may be applied as framework principles in determining compliance with the GMA [in the Central Puget Sound Region]. *Certificate of Appealability (September 28, 2012), at 6*.

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002:** Neither the parties' nor the public interest requires this matter to be determined on an expedited basis. *(Order Denying Certificate of Appealability (September 27, 2013) pg. 6.*

Commerce, Department of

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie, Case No. 11-3-0012:*** The provisions of RCW 36.70A.106 are mandatory and submission of a proposed comprehensive plan amendment to Commerce is "an unambiguous requirement of the statute." Even if there is no other violation to be corrected, non-compliance with Section 106 requires a remand to the City or County. *FDO (May 8, 2012), pgs. 11-12.*

- ***Robert Strahm v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0004:** [In response to Petitioner's argument that RCW 36.70A.320(3)5 requires the Board to "use" the Department of Commerce guidelines]… RCW 36.70A.320(3) requires the Board to … [consider] the procedural criteria adopted by Department rule to assist counties and cities …. Those guidelines are set forth in WAC Chapter 365-196 in order "to provide assistance in interpreting the act, not to add

provisions and meanings beyond those intended by the legislature." WAC 365-196-020(3). …Thus, the Board considers the recommendations in the guidelines, as well as explanations from other publications by the Department, but determines compliance "based on the [A]ct itself." WAC 365-196-030(3). *Final Decision and Order, (January 19, 2016), pp. 3-4.*

Compliance

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** The Board finds the present case presents unusual complexity, as compliance is likely to require negotiation of interlocal agreements and commitments from regional transportation and other service providers, in addition to revision of SEPA analysis. The Board therefore sets a one-year compliance schedule [RCW 36.70A.300(3)(b)]. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pg. 71.

- ***Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Coordinated Case Nos. 10-3-0012 and 09-3-0007c:** The Petitioners have additional and overlapping objections to [the compliance ordinances] which they have articulated in a new petition for review. While the Board believes all questions of compliance with [SEPA and the GMA Transportation Element requirements] might have been more appropriately raised and resolved in the compliance proceedings, the filing of a new PFR allowed for more thorough review and analysis. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pgs. 10 and 13.

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v Pierce County*, Case No. 10-3-0015:** Nothing in the statute requires a county to limit its compliance response to the most narrow revisions that could resolve the matter. Indeed, the Board has long held that a city or county has various options in most cases for complying with a Board finding of non-compliance. A city may, within its discretion, choose to do more than the minimum necessary to comply with an order of the Board. The Board seldom restricts the jurisdiction to the narrowest compliance option, except where more complex strategies extend delays that frustrate fulfillment of GMA goals. *FDO (May 18, 2011), pg. 16.*

- ***William J. Rehberg, et al. v. Pierce County*, Case No. 13-3-0010:** The Board finds nothing in the GMA that prohibits a county from adopting new regulations at the same time as making changes to comply with a remand order. A remand order does not dictate the manner in which a municipality must bring its legislation into compliance with the GMA. *Order Finding Compliance (August 4, 2014), p. 7.*

Countywide Planning Policies (CPPs)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** Woodway does not allege inconsistency with CPPs or that a CPP has been violated. There is no inter-local agreement between Snohomish County and Woodway giving the Town a deciding voice as to redevelopment of Point Wells. [Although the County's Point Wells designation is "starkly different" from the scenarios in Woodway's plan,] Woodway has not demonstrated the county's action violates the

CPPS which constitute the framework for consistency between a county and its cities. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pg. 33.

- ***William Palmer, et al v. Kitsap County and KRCC,* Case No. 12-3-0003:** The GMA does not provide for public challenge to CPPs. Only cities or the governor may appeal a CPP to the [GMHB]; citizens may not appeal…. Because RCW 36.70A.210(6) is specific to CPPs, Petitioners cannot resort to other provisions of the GMA in an effort to obtain standing. *Order of Dismissal (February 27, 2012), pg. 5-6.*

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002:** [A]greeing to a collaborative process for initiation and screening of subsequent CPP amendments [is not] an unlawful infringement of the County Council's legislative powers. RCW 36.70A.040(3)(a) and RCW 36.70A.120(2)(e) require that CPPs be adopted by the County legislative authority. But nothing in the GMA or the authorities cited to the Board prohibits King County from using the collaborative process agreed to under RCW 36.70A.210(2) to initiate and recommend CPP amendments. *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 21.*

  RCW 36.70A.210(2)(b) provides that the process agreed to by the county and its cities "shall determine" how the county and city subsequently agree to "all procedures and provisions including . . . desired planning policies [and] ratification of final agreements. . . ." In King County the process agreed to was the GMPC collaboration. In the Interlocal Agreement, King County and its cities agreed the GMPC would conduct a "public review process" for CPP development. …Snoqualmie cites no authority requiring additional public process for CPP amendment. *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 23.*

  [Concurrent adoption of CPP revisions and comprehensive plan amendments does not violate RCW 36.70A.210(1).] *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 27.*

Critical Areas

- ***Lake Burien Neighborhood, et al. v. City of Burien*, Case No. 13-3-0012:** BAS may be a key factor as applied to the protection of critical areas under RCW 36.70A.172, but the standard set out in RCW 90.58.100 for the development of SMPs is the applicable standard here. Burien's 2003 Critical Areas Ordinance as incorporated in its SMP is subject to review in this case, but the scope of review is limited to compliance with the SMA and Ecology's Guidelines so that Petitioners may not now argue the City's 2003 CAO was not supported by BAS or challenge various characterizations of Lake Burien's wetlands over the history of Burien's CAO. *Final Decision and Order (June 16, 2014), p. 11.*

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001:** The Board is aware of no statutory authority supporting the City's theory that "balancing" protection of critical areas with the City's achievement of anticipated development [guaranteeing a zoned lot yield] is within its discretion. Instead, the GMA prescribes a consideration of multiple goals and directs cities and counties to

simultaneously accommodate growth and protect critical areas. The Board finds the City's assertion that GMA provisions for accommodating growth trump the GMA provisions for protecting critical areas is clearly erroneous. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), p. 12.* Under the statutory definition of "Critical Areas," counties and cities must protect "areas and ecosystems." Development regulations may not allow a net loss of the functions and values of the ecosystem that includes the impacted or lost critical areas. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), p. 23; see also Raymond Paolella Concurrence, pp. 35-41.*

- ***John Postema v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0011** Postema argues the CAO update must consider Best Available Science concerning the status of agriculture affected by the proposed regulations.] Postema's briefs and oral argument provide no Board or appellate case law as authority for this novel extension of BAS, nor is the Board aware of any. The Board's review of the regulatory guidelines for critical areas ordinances (WAC 365-190) and best available science (WAC 365-195) has identified no provision suggesting BAS analysis must be applied to questions beyond "protection of functions and values of critical areas" themselves. *Final Decision and Order (April 8, 2016), pp 7-8.*

Geologically Hazardous Areas

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** There is no GMA directive that prohibits development [in a lahar or liquefaction zone] because of geological risks. While hazard areas are defined as areas that are *not suited to development* consistent with public health and safety, the GMA definition by itself does not impose an independent duty upon the County to protect life and property by prohibiting development…. The Board notes in the case of flood risks, the Legislature has defined the 100-year floodplain as mapped by FEMA as setting the bounds for more intensive development. No such bounds have been legislated into the GMA for other geological hazards. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 98, 103.*

De Facto Amendment

- ***Douglas Tooley v. Governor Gregoire, City of Seattle, et al.,* Case No. 11-3-0008:** The Board has consistently rejected challenges to city or county resolutions or ordinances that do not adopt plans but simply constitute part of the decision process [citing cases]. … Neither proposing a project for consideration under SEPA nor issuing an FEIS that analyzes the environmental consequences of a proposed project has the effect of requiring that action or altering land use. Thus, the FEIS cannot be construed as a de facto plan amendment sufficient to provide [GMHB] jurisdiction. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011), at 10, 12.*

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie, Case No. 11-3-0012:*** The Board finds a direct conflict between the City's comprehensive plan annexation policies – requiring an annexation implementation plan prior to approval of a proposed annexation – and the Resolution 1115 agreement to annex first and "defer applying the comprehensive plan annexation policies." Resolution 1115 is a de facto amendment of the Snoqualmie Comprehensive Plan annexation policies. *Order on Motions (March 8, 2012) pgs. 12-13.*

- ***Six Kilns Apartments, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 13-3-0005:** The Board finds the Resolution does not contravene the zoning or land use designations for the property, nor is the LOS standard for parks and open space violated. As the Board ruled in *Campbell v. City of Everett* and *Petso v. Snohomish County,* there is no basis for finding a *de facto* amendment when the challenged action is consistent with provisions of the comprehensive plan. *Order of Dismissal on Motions (July 16, 2013), at 9.*

- ***BD Lawson Partners LP, et al. v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 14-3-0007*:*** The Board has consistently rejected challenges to city or county resolutions or ordinances that do not enact plans or regulations but simply constitute part of the decision process. [Finding no de facto amendment and the matter not ripe for review.] *Order of Dismissal (August 18, 2014), p. 6.*

  The Board identifies the following principles as critical to the *Alexanderson [de facto* amendment] analysis: the explicit language of the city's action is not dispositive; whether or not an action is a de facto amendment depends on the actual, legal effect of the action; although a unilateral action may constitute an amendment, the actual legal effect must require a particular legislative result. *Order of Dismissal (August 18, 2014), pp. 5-6.*

- ***Daniel Thompson v. City of Mercer Island*, Case No. 14-3-0010:** The Board finds Thompson's allegations amount to assertion of a violation of Mercer Island's development code in connection with a project permit application. Disputes raised concerning whether the calculation of lot size or impervious surface allocation is consistent with code provisions and definitions are project permit questions to be resolved through administrative proceedings and appealed to superior court under LUPA. Ambiguities in the code provisions or errors in code application do not convert the City's interpretation and application of the code into an amendment or de facto amendment of development regulations. *Order of Dismissal (December 5, 2014), at 8*.

Deference

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The Board has found no analysis of evacuation feasibility [for a UGA expansion proposal in a lahar zone]. However, it defies credulity to suppose a major suburban shopping complex, 650 homes, and a regional YMCA could be notified, evacuated, and reach higher ground in an hour. That said, it is not the Board's prerogative to substitute its judgment for that of the County officials. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 103.*

  The Board notes there is no GMA protection for "urban character." None of the GMA planning goals, definitions, or mandatory comprehensive plan elements addresses signage. From a GMA perspective, urban sign design policy and regulation is fully within the discretion of local elected officials. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 134.*

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002**: The Board finds the County considered the information and analysis proffered by the City, made its own analysis, and reached a

different conclusion within the framework of the GMA criteria. The County's judgment is supported by facts in the record and by Board case law. *FDO (August 12, 2013) at 56.*

Development Regulations

- ***William J. Rehberg, et al. v. Pierce County*, Case No. 13-3-0010:** [D]evelopment regulations that were merely restated or recodified are not now properly subject to review. … Pursuant to WAC 365-196-800, the Board's review of development regulations changed by the Ordinance is limited to whether or not the new regulations are consistent with and implement the County's Comprehensive Plan [defining "implement"]. *Final Decision and Order (April 28, 2014), pp. 7-8.*

- ***Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle*, Case No. 14-3-0005:** [T]he Board has in the past reviewed challenges to consistency of development regulations [with comprehensive plans] under either provision of the statute [RCW 36.70A.040 or RCW 36.70A.130(10(d)], without determining that challenge to amendment of a development regulation must be dismissed if brought solely under RCW 36.70A.040. *Order on Motions (May 16, 2014), p. 7, but see, Partial Dissent of Board Member William Roehl.*

  Establishing a development regulation's inconsistency with comprehensive plan goals … [requires] … a direct conflict between the comprehensive plan goal or policy and the adopted development regulation. Comprehensive plans by their nature address a range of public policy goals which require balanced consideration. … While a specific development regulation may not appear to foster fulfillment of a specific planning goal, it may clearly serve to carry out a different comprehensive plan goal. *Final Decision and Order (August 19, 2014), p. 19.*

- ***Talis Abolins and Marla Steinhoff v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0009:** Regrettably, Petitioners again face the problem that the specific expectations promoted within the *Urban Design Framework* have not been adopted into the City's comprehensive plan and so are not mandated to be included in this rezone. Further, Petitioners have not demonstrated the [comp plan] policy is thwarted by the upzone [development regulations]…. Petitioners have not met their burden to show that the development regulations are inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan. *Final Decision and Order, (April 1, 2015), p. 25.*

Phasing

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Petitioners argued authorization of automatic future zoning map amendments without additional public input violated public participation requirements.] Neither party has provided the Board with any authority on the question of phased zoning. Where the Petitioner has not demonstrated failure of public participation in adoption of the new zoning, deferral of the effective date does not appear to the Board to violate the GMA procedural requirements. *Final Decision and Order, (December 16, 2015), p. 13.*

Dispositive Motions

- ***Talis Abolins and Marla Steinhoff v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0009:** [Motions practice in superior court is distinguished from GMHB dispositive motions.] Where a dispositive motion, if granted, is likely to completely resolve a case or at least *significantly* narrow the issues for review, such a motion is often beneficial. In contrast, there are many cases where deciding an argument on a limited record is difficult or where, even if the Board grants a dispositive motion, portions of many issues will still remain to be decided at the hearing on the merits. In these latter instances, dispositive motions are likely to result in the *inefficiency* inherent in considering the case twice – once on motion on a limited record and again in the case in chief. Order on Motions (December 10, 2014), p. 2-3.

Economic Development (Goal 5)

- ***Fleishmann's Industrial Park LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 11-3-0001:** [City did not violate Goal 5 when it retained heavy industrial zoning for the property but excluded it from the Manufacturing/Industrial Center.] *FDO, July 6, 2011, pg. 25.*

Environment (Goal 10)

- ***Brandi Blair, et al. v. City of Monroe*, Case No. 14-3-0006c:** [The FEIS describes] 75% of the property as undevelopable as a result of steep slopes, a Type 1 stream (the slough), wetlands and shoreline … [T]en of eleven acres deemed "developable" under the FEIS are situated in the center portion of a former oxbow of the Skykomish River … to which 465,000 cubic yards of fill must be added to raise it above the flood plain. … The idea that substantially excavating slopes above a Type 1 stream (currently home to endangered and listed species) while simultaneously adding tens of thousands of cubic yards of fill in order to raise the desired building site above the 100 year floodplain (which presently provides flood storage capacity) constitutes enhancement of environmental function [] suggests the City did not seriously consider the GMA's environmental protection goal. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2014), p. 12-13.*

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001:** Some critical areas, such as wetlands and fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas, may constitute ecosystems or parts of ecosystems that transcend the boundaries of individual parcels and jurisdictions, so that protection of their function and values should be considered on a larger scale. … Thus the Bothell BAS Report … indicates additional measures are required in the [North Creek Protection Area] to protect the hydrologic cycle and to ensure no net loss of ecosystem functions and values. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), p. 23-25.*

Equitable Doctrines

Res Judicata

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County*, Case No. 14-3-0001:** The Central Puget Sound panel of the GMHB repudiates its prior rule [holding the board lacked equitable powers and could not impose remedies such as res judicata]. … [A]uthority to apply res judicata is implied "because the power to dismiss successive petitions raising the same claims or issues is necessary to

expeditious and efficient disposition of GMA petitions." *ICAN v. WWGMHB, 163 Wn. App. 513, 528 (2011)*. *Order of Dismissal (April 25, 2014), p. 3.*

[The City's new petition challenging a compliance ordinance was filed before entry of a final compliance order. Following issuance of the compliance order, the new claim was dismissed as barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.] *Order of Dismissal (April 25, 2014), p. 8.*

Essential Public Facilities (EPFs)

- ***Sleeping Tiger, LLC v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 10-3-0008:** [The Board's FDO finding that the City's action precluded the siting of an EPF was reversed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision (2013)] *FDO (January 4, 2011)*

Evidence (Supplemental Evidence and Exhibits)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** [Aerial maps produced subsequent to the challenged action and annotated by Petitioners were admitted.] The Board views the aerial maps as illustrative exhibits, depicting areas of the County that are familiar to County decision-makers, and annotated with information readily available from public sources [viz – acreage and traffic counts]. These exhibits were not part of the paper file or content of meetings that informed the Council's adoption of the challenged ordinances. However, if relevant, they may assist the Board in understanding matters that were undoubtedly known to County officials. [As to the traffic counts,] the City asserts that the carrying capacity of roadways accessing the County's Urban Centers is necessary to a determination of whether urban services can be provided to serve the zoned densities. The Board agrees that the information appears to be "necessary or of substantial assistance." *Order on Motions to Supplement (Jan. 14, 2011), pg. 3*

  [Petitioners requested that the Board conduct a site visit. The Board declined.] The paper record and supplemental documents – aerial photographs, topographical maps – appear to provide the additional area-specific information necessary to the Board's decision of the issues in this case. *Order on Motions to Supplement (Jan. 14, 2011)*, pg. 8

- ***Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Coordinated Case Nos. 10-3-0012 and 09-3-0007c:** [Petitioners contended changes in design of the project required additional SEPA analysis. Prior to the Board's hearing, the Design Review Board issued its decision.] The Board here only reviews the narrow question of whether the 2010 SEPA review was flawed because it failed to describe and analyze significant changes in the design of the proposal. The Board finds the supplemental documents proffered by Touchstone are "necessary or of substantial assistance" in deciding this question, though they were produced subsequent to the challenged action. The Board reasons that a significant amendment or major modification of the adopted design guidelines might arguably constitute new information for purposes of SEPA analysis. These documents are therefore admitted. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pgs. 18-19.

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie, Case No. 11-3-0012:*** The Board has no authority over the public records request process. Parties to Board proceedings who request documents under the Public Disclosure Act do so for their own purposes. However, if the disclosure provides information that is necessary or of substantial assistance to the Board's decision, a motion to supplement is appropriate. *Order on Motions (March 8, 2012), pg. 16.*

- ***Elizabeth Mooney and Janet Hays v City of Kenmore and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0004:** Persons concerned about planning decisions, including Shoreline Master Program adoptions, have the responsibility to provide city and state officials with the documentation and testimony they believe is relevant. Decision makers should not be sand-bagged with new evidence after they have taken action, and the Board will not base a finding of non-compliance on the decision makers' failure to consider evidence that wasn't presented to them before the vote. *Order on Motions to Supplement, (Dec. 10, 2012) at 3*.

  The Board reviews government compliance with the GMA, SEPA or SMA on the basis of the record the city, county, or state agency has compiled. RCW 36.70A.290(3) … The GMA requires the city or county to provide public notice and opportunities for public input so that the local government has all the information it needs to make wise choices in its planning. RCW 36.70A.035, .140, .130(2). The SMA has similar requirements. [citing RCW 90.58.130, RCW 90.58.090(2)] … Under the SMA, Ecology and the local government are bound to consider the issues raised and the evidence presented by members of the public. The public process is designed to *ensure that the government record contains the documents and other evidence that should be considered*. *Order on Motions to Supplement, (Dec.10, 2012) at 2-3*.

  The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the evidence they wish to add is necessary or of substantial assistance to the Board. To satisfy this burden, the moving party should explain what is in the evidence that makes it relevant, how it is not available elsewhere in the record, and why consideration of the additional evidence would be necessary or particularly helpful to the Board. *Order on Motions to Supplement, (Dec.10, 2012) at 4*.

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008:** The Board's rules, at WAC 242-03-565, require that extra-record submissions be supported by a timely motion to supplement the record. In the absence of such a motion, [the Board granted a motion to strike, noting some of the evidence was irrelevant, some redundant, and one item was "evidence arising subsequent to adoption of the challenged legislation" which is rarely allowed.] *FDO (March 14, 2013) at 8-9.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II),* Case No. 12-3-0010:** [Petitioner seeks to supplement the record with listed documents.] However, copies of the documents are not attached to the motion as required by WAC 242-03-556(1). The Board cannot fairly decide whether a document is likely to be necessary to its determination of a case without reviewing the proffered document. For this reason alone, the motion must be denied. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013) at 14.*

Evidentiary materials must be submitted as exhibits attached to briefs. [WAC 242-03.620] [D]ocuments "do not become evidence until they are referenced in a brief and **submitted to the Board as exhibits to that brief.**" If taken from the Index to the record, the exhibits are automatically admitted, but they still must be attached to the brief and identified by the Index number from which they are drawn. If not taken from the Index, the documents must be supported by a motion to supplement which attaches the requested document. [Evidence not attached to brief or motion denied.] *FDO (May 2, 2013) at 5.*

The Board's rules [allowing official notice at WAC 242-03-640(1)(b)] contain no special procedure allowing citation to a website to substitute for the requirement of exhibits attached to the brief. Here, without printouts of the source documents or relevant excerpts, without a dated website screen shot, the Board cannot judge the context and accuracy of the acreage data. The authenticity of the cited facts is not self-evident and the Board declines to take official notice. *FDO (May 2, 2013) at 8*.

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012:** [The Board denied supplementation per WAC 242-03-620(1) where the] Board's review indicates the materials in Tripp's files Y and Z are unduly repetitious, containing multiple duplications, both internally and with materials elsewhere in the record…. Petitioners have made no effort to identify which of the documents in Y or Z are already in the record and, if not in the record, whether they contain new information or why that information is important to the Board's consideration in this case. *Order on Motion to Supplement the Record (January 5, 2015), p. 5.*

  It is well-established in the Board's GMA jurisdiction that testimonial evidence developed *after* the adoption of a challenged ordinance is not appropriate for supplementation of the record [citing cases]. *Order on Motion to Supplement the Record (January 5, 2015), p. 9.*

External Consistency

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** No fact-specific local circumstances have been offered to demonstrate any incompatibility between the County's prior 5 du/ac minimums in its residential low designations and the corresponding residential low minimums in the associated cities – Poulsbo's 4 du/ac RL, Port Orchard's 4.5 du/ac, or Bremerton's 5 du/ac LDR minimums. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 24.*

- ***Community Alliance to Reach Out & Engage (CARE) v. King County*, Case No. 13-3-0003:** [County's redesignation of a commercial parcel in Renton's Planned Annexation Area was not shown to thwart the city's land use or infrastructure plans.] *FDO (August 21, 2013), at 18-19.*

- ***Talis Abolins and Marla Steinhoff v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0009:** Regrettably, Petitioners again face the problem that the specific expectations promoted within the *Urban Design Framework* have not been adopted into the City's comprehensive plan and so are not mandated to be included in this rezone. Further, Petitioners have not demonstrated the [comp

plan] policy is thwarted by the upzone [development regulations]…. Petitioners have not met their burden to show that the development regulations are inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan. *Final Decision and Order, (April 1, 2015), p. 25.*

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001:** In analyzing whether there is a lack of consistency between a plan provision and a development regulation, the Board determines whether development regulations implement comprehensive plan goals and policies or preclude achievement of any of the Comprehensive Plan policies. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), pp. 20- 21.*

Failure to Revise

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002**: The Board finds the County must articulate how its existing comprehensive plan policies and process comply with SHB 1825 or adopt revisions. The County's failure to revise or explain in the 2012 CP update does not meet the requirements of RCW 36.70A.130(1). *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 43.*

Forest Lands

- ***Janet Wold, et al v City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** The Board points out the difference between GMA designation of natural resource lands and current use classification for tax purposes. The GMA requires counties to designate forest lands, mineral lands, and agricultural lands of long-term commercial significance. These lands are to be protected from urban development and from sprawl. … [Within the UGA or a city] there may be property owners who want to keep a woodlot or pasture or berry farm rather than develop at urban densities. The current use classification allows temporary tax breaks in return for a ten-year commitment for such uses. Current use classification is not the same as a GMA designation of natural resource lands of long-term commercial significance. *Order on Motions to Supplement the Record (May 11, 2010), pg. 12*. [The notice-to-title protections of the GMA do not apply.] *FDO (August 9, 2010), pgs. 38-40.*

Goals

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v Pierce County*, Case No. 10-3-0015:** [The County's motion to dismiss a legal issue challenging consistency with a GMA Goal] misreads the statute and case law. RCW 36.70A.290(2) gives the Board jurisdiction to decide petitions challenging "compliance with the goals and requirements" of the GMA. Except where a specific GMA requirement may set up a conflict with a GMA goal, the Board must review challenged actions "in light of the goals" as well as the requirements of the Act. [RCW 36.70A.320(3)] While the Board seldom finds a GMA violation based on a Planning Goal viewed in isolation from a statutory requirement, the Board is mandated to assess the County's action in light of both the goals and requirements of the Act. [Citing *Suquamish v Kitsap County.*] *FDO (May 18, 2011), pg. 10.*

- ***Fleishmann's Industrial Park, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 11-3-0001:** [Board reviewed consistency with GMA goals independent of a mandatory GMA requirement, citing *LIHI v City of Lakewood,* 119 Wn.App. 110 (2003).] *FDO, July 6, 2011, pgs. 21-22.*

- ***Community Alliance to Reach Out & Engage (CARE) v. King County*, Case No. 13-3-0003:** The test of Comprehensive Plan compliance with GMA goals is consistency, not strict conformity, and should be evaluated in light of all the goals. [County properly considered GMA goals for property rights (6), economic development (5), open space (9), and environment (10) in addition to goals asserted by petitioners – urban growth (1), transportation (3), and coordination between jurisdictions (11).] *FDO (August 21, 2013), at 21.*

Goal 3: Transportation (*See Transportation*)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** [The County's redesignation and development regulations ordinances for Point Wells do not provide efficient multi-modal transportation, are not based on regional priorities, and are not coordinated with city comprehensive plans.] *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pg. 48.

Goal 6: Property Rights (*See **Property Rights***)

- ***Rita Hagwell, Janet Wold, and Molly Chamberlin Lee v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 12-3-0006:** [Citing various City documents and the Ordinance findings,] the Board finds that there is ample evidence in the record that the City Planning Commission, staff, and City Council in fact gave time and consideration to the rights of private property owners. *FDO (March 11, 2013) at 7.*

  [Determining whether the urban trails plan was arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of Goal 6] the Board finds that the City's decision to eliminate further consideration of properties where trail construction is physically impractical was reasonable, not arbitrary, and does provide a rational basis for planning to locate trails elsewhere…. There is a rational basis for the City to include plans for future trail links that may pass through undeveloped, "natural" areas; thus, the UPP is not discriminatory. *FDO (March 11, 2013) at 8, 9.*

  RCW 36.70A.370(1) specifies that the Attorney General's Advisory Memorandum concerns "proposed regulatory or administrative actions." The statute requires local governments to utilize the Advisory Memo process to assure that regulatory and administrative decisions do not impair property rights. [The Advisory Memo *does not apply* to] a legislative action adopting a comprehensive plan amendment. *FDO (March 11, 2013) at 10.*

Goal 8: Natural Resource Lands

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II),* Case No. 12-3-0010:** The *Swinomish* Court [161 Wn.2d 415] determined Goal 8 does not establish a planning priority for land which qualifies both as agricultural land of long term significance and as critical area for salmon habitat. Thus the County's Comprehensive Plan amendments that commit the County

to "net gains" for both salmon restoration and the agricultural industry are not inconsistent with Goal 8. *FDO (May 2, 2013), at 15.*

- ***John Postema v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0011**: Goal 8 to "maintain and enhance" natural resource industries compared with Goal 10 to "protect" the environment] does not establish a planning priority as between preservation of land for agricultural use and protection of critical areas. … Critical area regulations that protect fish and wildlife habitat functions and values are necessary in order to "maintain and enhance" fisheries as a natural resource industry. Thus the Board in *Snohomish County Farm Bureau II* concluded that Snohomish County's Comprehensive Plan policies that commit the County to "net gains" for both salmon restoration and the agricultural industry are not inconsistent with Goal 8. [T]he new farm conservation plan provisions, as one option in protecting critical area functions and values in Snohomish County, [do not] thwart GMA Goal 8 of maintaining and enhancing agriculture. *Final Decision and Order (April 8, 2016), pp 19-20.*

Goal 9: Open Space

- ***Rita Hagwell, Janet Wold, and Molly Chamberlin Lee v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 12-3-0006:** [Petitioners challenged whether a plan for urban trails violated Goal 9 "conserve fish and wildlife habitat" and Goal 10 "protect the environment."] The UPP recognizes and attempts to balance the GMA goals for more recreational opportunities, recreational facilities, and public access to water and the natural environment – provided by a system of trails – with protection of fish and wildlife, water quality, and open space. The City was guided by GMA Planning Goals 9 and 10. *FDO, (March 11, 2013) at 14.*

Goal 11: Citizen Participation and coordination (*See* ***Public Participation/Citizen Participation***)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** Goal 11 is primarily concerned with the planning process, calling for citizen participation and interjurisdictional coordination. [T]he Goal uses the word "ensure" [to] give greater emphasis to the coordination clause of the Goal – "*ensure* coordination between communities and jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts." However, Petitioners' attempt to turn "ensure" into a requirement that all interjurisdictional conflicts be successfully resolved is not supported by any authority. Indeed, giving individual jurisdictions and communities a veto power over adjacent zoning is contrary to the presumption of validity that the statute grants to local GMA enactments. Rather, the Board reads the second half of Goal 11 as requiring a planning city or county to make active outreach to affected communities and jurisdictions in the interest of coordination and conflict-resolution. The County's process in the case before us clearly allowed communities such as the Richmond Beach neighborhood and the adjacent municipalities of Shoreline and Woodway to provide input and seek solutions. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pg. 50.*

Goal 12: Public facilities and services (*See Public Facilities & Services*)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** The development regulations enacted by the County for the Point Wells Urban Center do not adopt a sufficient plan for infrastructure and services [as required within the GMA's 20-year horizon for coordinated land use and infrastructure planning]. Rather, the regulations establish a *process* for developing urban services commitments concurrently with approving project permit applications. … *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*

  BSRE asserts that its promises to fund the building of [required infrastructure] stand in for the governmental commitment required by the GMA. BSRE and the County assert the facilities and services will be available when development is available for occupancy, as set forth in Goal 12. While the Board assumes good faith on the part of the County (and BSRE), good faith is not a substitute for identifying and providing for needed infrastructure and public services. "Trust us" is not a GMA plan. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pgs. 44-45.*

Housing Element (Goal 4)

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** Nothing in the record before the Board suggests that increasing the number of quarter-acre lots for single-family housing provides for a special need of a particular segment of the community. … The Board is not persuaded that additional large-lot urban zoning is called for by any local circumstance related to availability of varied housing types. … The record does not support the County's assertion that reduced UL/UC densities broaden housing options or increase affordable housing. Nevertheless, the Board recognizes the 2006 Plan Update included other actions clearly guided by GMA Goal 4 – Housing [noting provision for new mixed use zoning, increase of maximum densities in Urban High and Commercial designations, and target that 25% of new dwellings be multi-family]. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pgs. 45-46.*

- ***Paul Stickney and Richard Birgh v. City of Sammamish,* Case No. 15-3-0017**: Ordinance 02015-396 violates RCW 36.70A.070(2) because the City of Sammamish failed to establish any numeric or percentage goals for the City's "share" of countywide needs in the moderate, low, and very low income housing categories and failed to make adequate provisions for existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the community. Ordinance O2015-396 was not guided by the GMA Planning Goal for Housing in RCW 36.70A.020(4) because it fails to encourage the availability of affordable housing to all economic segments of the population. *Final Decision and Order (June 13, 2016), p. 16.*

Interjurisdictional Coordination

- ***Janet Wold, et al v City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** The GMA promotes coordinated planning among cities and counties. For a county and its cities to develop an inter-jurisdictional agreement concerning a land capacity methodology is consistent with the coordination contemplated by RCW 36.70A.210. Here the City joined in a negotiated agreement with other cities and Kitsap County to develop a uniform methodology for land capacity analysis. [The

City's use of the methodology for its LCA] does not cede its land-use powers to the County. *FDO (August 9, 2010), pg. 54.*

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** RCW 36.70A.100 requires coordination and consistency of the *adopted comprehensive plans* of adjacent jurisdictions. This section does not reference development regulations. Amendments to development regulations are not properly the subject of a Section .100 challenge [citing cases]. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pg. 28.*

  The requirement of inter-jurisdictional coordination and consistency is a fundamental GMA objective. It is reflected in legislative findings stating "citizens, communities, local governments and the private sector [should] cooperate and coordinate" in land use planning [RCW 36.70A.010]. GMA Planning Goal 11 calls for cities and counties to "ensure coordination between communities and jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts" in developing their plans [RCW 36.70A.020(11)]. GMA requirements for adoption of County-wide Planning Policies (CPPs) are designed to provide a framework for city-county coordination [RCW 36.70A.210(1)]. The mandate of "coordination and consistency" in RCW 36.70A.100 must be construed in this context. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pg. 28.*

  The requirement for inter-jurisdictional coordination and consistency in RCW 36.70A.100 does not require Snohomish County to adopt land use designations or zoning regulations in the unincorporated UGA that are the same as or approved by an adjacent municipality. Inter-jurisdictional consistency does not give one municipality a veto over the plans of its neighbor. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pg. 36.*

  In the unique circumstances of this case, the County's action does not comply with RCW 36.70A.100. Here, substantial evidence in the record demonstrates the Point Wells Urban Center redesignation makes Shoreline's plan non-compliant with the GMA, as Shoreline has no plans or funding for the necessary road projects to maintain the level of service standards which it has adopted pursuant to GMA mandates…. The GMA requires capital facilities and transportation planning *at the same time* as land use designations. Where, as here, the capital planning of necessity involves adjacent jurisdictions, RCW 36.70A.100 mandates that the plans of those jurisdictions be consistent [referencing "interlocal agreements or other secure commitments" that can be incorporated in planning documents.] *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pgs. 36-37.*

Internal Consistency

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** The County had launched a serious and effective effort to increase the rate and density of development in its urban rather than rural areas - an effort reflected throughout the 2006 Plan Update. Lowering the UL/UC minimum density created an internal inconsistency in the Plan. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 34.*

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** Amendments to development regulations are not properly subject to a challenge based on RCW 36.70A.070 [citing cases]. Consistency of development regulations with comprehensive plans is mandated in other GMA provisions. [RCW 36.70A.130(1) and .040.] *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pg. 12.*

  [The Board defers to the County's construction of its comprehensive plan language on Urban Center locational criteria but, considering the criteria in the context of the comprehensive plan Urban Centers policies, including PSRC Vision 2040 principles, concludes the designation of Point Wells as an urban center is internally inconsistent with the County's comprehensive plan land use policies.] *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011), pgs. 14-15, 22.*

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The GMA requires consistency among the elements of a comprehensive plan, including sub-area plans. A framework for consistency is provided by countywide planning policies, and in the Central Puget Sound region, multi-county planning policies. A comprehensive plan amendment must meet these consistency requirements. [Citing RCW 36.0A.070 (preamble), .080(2), .130(1)(d), .210(1), .100, .210(7).] *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 105.*

- ***Community Alliance to Reach Out & Engage (CARE) v. King County*, Case No. 13-3-0003:** The Board echoes the hearing examiner that "a great number of the CPP plan policies identified in this matter as of concern or . . . barring the rezone . . . are either not applicable because of their framework policy nature or other general implementation guidance nature or are irrelevant to the specific rezone action requested." The action at issue cannot be found inconsistent with policies that are inapplicable or irrelevant to the affected property. *FDO (August 21, 2013), at 10.*

  Petitioner advances a theory, "cross-consistency paradigm," in which consistency requirements flow not only from the top down (*i.e.*, DRs must be consistent with CPs), but also from the bottom up … render[ing] a county's Comprehensive Plan inconsistent with GMA if an amendment to the CP is not consistent with a previously-enacted DR. The Board does not find support for this "cross-consistency paradigm" anywhere in statute or in established case law. *FDO (August 21, 2013), at 12-13.*

- ***Koontz Coalition v. City of Seattle*, Case No. 14-3-0005:** Establishing a development regulation's inconsistency with comprehensive plan goals … [requires] … a direct conflict between the comprehensive plan goal or policy and the adopted development regulation. Comprehensive plans by their nature address a range of public policy goals which require balanced consideration. … While a specific development regulation may not appear to foster fulfillment of a specific planning goal, it may clearly serve to carry out a different comprehensive plan goal. *Final Decision and Order (August 19, 2014), p. 19.*

  [T]he Board has in the past reviewed challenges to consistency of development regulations [with comprehensive plans] under either provision of the statute [RCW 36.70A.040 or RCW

36.70A.130(10(d)], without determining that challenge to amendment of a development regulation must be dismissed if brought solely under RCW 36.70A.040. *Order on Motions (May 16, 2014), p. 7, but see, Partial Dissent of Board Member William Roehl.*

- ***John Postema v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0011**: In Mr. Postema's view, the new [critical areas] provisions for farm plans which require county approval and monitoring are restrictive, intrusive, and costly, and will … upset the balance between agricultural viability and environmental protection required by [Comp Plan] Goal NE 4. Comprehensive plans by their nature address a range of public policy goals which require balanced consideration.... Snohomish County's policies require an equal emphasis on protecting environmentally critical areas and enhancement of agriculture. Mr. Postema speculates that a farm conservation plan requiring County approval and monitoring puts too heavy a burden on the farmer. However, he provides no record beyond an assumption of regulatory overreach on which the Board can find [internal inconsistency]. *Final Decision and Order (April 8, 2016), pp 17-18.*

Innovative Techniques

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** Forterra contends the only way to ensure agriculture survives economically in an urbanizing region is through purchase of development rights or conservation easements. Forterra champions a plan for a "green wall" of protected agricultural lands around the Sumner UGA. … Forterra's concept of a 4:1 ratio of permanent protection over de-designated acreage coupled with a "green wall" of protected agricultural lands around the Sumner UGA appears to the Board to be a promising approach to potentially further the GMA's fundamental policies to discourage urban sprawl and to protect resource lands. However, the challenge is to evaluate this concept under the GMA standards for de-designation and within the regional framework to assess whether the long-term *economic viability* of the agricultural industry is maintained and enhanced. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 50, 53*

Intervention

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** The Board has long recognized that the GMA petition system differs from other kinds of land use lawsuits. The Board is charged with determining only whether governments have complied with the GMA. In reviewing a petition challenging a comprehensive plan amendment, the Board does not assume any direct authority over landowners or individual parcels. For this reason, there is no requirement that the petition be served on anyone other than the responsible city, county, or state agency. However, intervention is liberally granted to affected property owners and neighbors. *Order on Motions (April 27, 2010), pg. 4.*

- ***BSRE Point Wells, LP v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 11-3-0007:** RBA's intervention does not address the stated legal issues in the Petition for Review. Rather, the intervention is intended to impede settlement of this action and is antithetical to the Board's preference for voluntary resolution. … WAC 242-03-270 provides that intervention may be granted upon various considerations but mandates "[t]he granting of intervention must be in the interests of justice."

The Board finds the interests of justice will not be served by granting intervention to a group that seeks to prevent completion of a settlement process in which both petitioner and respondent have major investments. *Order Denying Intervention (February 4, 2015)*, at 3.

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012:** Several matters raised by Intervenor are outside the scope of the intervention granted in the Board's January 5, 2015 order allowing intervention and also outside the legal issues established in the prehearing order…. Intervention is not a vehicle for allowing admittance of a belated petition for review. By not filing a timely petition for review, an Intervenor waives any right to argue new issues. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 7-8.*

Invalidity

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** GMA Goals 1, 3, and 12 are linked in their call for coordinated planning that ensures urban growth is efficiently served by multimodal transportation and other urban services. [Board determined the Urban Center designation for an isolated area substantially interfered with Goals 1, 3, and 12, and imposed invalidity.] *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pgs. 72-73.

- ***Toward Responsible Development, et al. v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 10-3-0014:** [I]nvalidity is a discretionary remedy available to the Board when a city or county takes action which not only fails to comply with the GMA but substantially interferes with the goals of the Act. The GMA [RCW 36.70A.302[1]] requires that invalidity be determined on a case-by-case basis. [Citing *Davidson Serles v Kirkland*: "The board's statutory authority to invalidate actions … is not mandatory and certainly is not absolute."] *Order Denying Certificate of Appealability (May 17, 2011), pgs. 4, 6.*

  Generally, when the Board issues a final decision and that decision is appealed, the Board no longer retains jurisdiction over the appealed issue, except for compliance actions where no stay has been issued. [Absent authorization from the superior court, the Board declines to rule on petitioners' motion for invalidity as to which an appeal is pending.] *Order on Motion for Invalidity Based on New Information (June 20, 2011), pgs. 6-7.*

- ***Brandi Blair, et al. v. City of Monroe*, Case No. 14-3-0006c:** Non-compliance with SEPA does not automatically equate to frustration of the GMA goal for protection of the environment. In this decision, however, the rezoned property is largely within critical areas and/or shorelines, and development of this property without an environmental review that properly informs the decision makers of the impact and mitigations of the intensity of development allowed by the proposed zoning would render moot and thwart protection of the environment. [The Board enters a determination of invalidity.] *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2014), p. 31.*

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001:** [Finding invalidity] …The subarea of Bothell subject to Ordinance 2163 is an area of particular environmental significance because of the quality of its surface and groundwater. Subdivision and residential development without appropriate measures to protect the unique hydrology of the area would irreversibly degrade valuable salmon habitat and substantially interfere with the GMA goal of environmental protection. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), p. 31.*

Jurisdiction (Subject Matter Jurisdiction)

- ***Andrew Cainion v. City of Bainbridge Island*, Case No. 10-3-0013:** The Board may review the denial of a comp plan amendment when by such a denial the jurisdiction fails to fulfill an express explicit mandate either from the GMA or the City's own comprehensive plan. … The Board can find nothing in the record or in the Comp Plan itself that gives a clear mandate and/or definitive timeline [to complete the Special Area Planning Process]. [Thus the Comp Plan] establishes no duty upon which the alleged GMA violations could be founded. *Order on Motion to Dismiss (January 7, 2011)*, pgs. 2-3.

- ***Toward Responsible Development, et al v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 10-3-0014:** [On reversal by the Court of Appeals, the Board's finding of jurisdiction is reversed and its *Order on Motions (Feb. 15, 2011)* is rescinded. *(Order of Dismissal (August 21 , 2012)*

  The GMA is predicated on coordinated planning for urban growth and the necessary urban infrastructure and services under an open legislative process. It is in the public interest to have a prompt resolution of the dividing line between comprehensive GMA planning [within the jurisdiction of Board review] and the types of land use matters that may be decided by the City in a non-GMA quasi-judicial process. *Certificate of Appealability (Apr. 21, 2011), pg. 4.*

- ***Chestine Edgar, et al v. City of Burien*, Case No. 11-3-0004:** [While the PFR was filed within 60 days of the City's denial of their proposed down-zoning amendment,] it is clear the Petitioners are directly challenging the Moderate Density land use designation for the Lake Burien area, a legislative action that occurred in 1999. … The PFR, in challenging a 1999 land use designation, is untimely. *Order on Motions, (May 12, 2011), pgs. 4-5.*

  The Board has repeatedly affirmed that an amendment offered and rejected by the legislative body is generally not appealable to the Board except in limited situations [not applicable here.] *Order on Motions, (May 12, 2011), pg. 8.*

- ***Sleeping Tiger, LLC v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 11-3-0005:** [In this case] it is the City's interpretation and application of the moratorium to a site-specific project permit that underlies Sleeping Tiger's challenge … and it is the processing of the permit that it seeks in redress. The Board cannot review applications for project permits; that is the province of the superior court under a LUPA appeal, which Sleeping Tiger currently has pending in King County Superior Court. *Order on Motions, (May 6, 2011), pg. 9.*

- ***Douglas Tooley v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 11-3-0006:** [The Board dismissed a challenge to the Alaska Way Viaduct Replacement SEIS *sua sponte* on the grounds that there was no final action ripe for review, as the Final EIS had not yet been issued.] *Order of Dismissal, (April 1, 2011)*

- ***Six Kilns Apartments, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 13-3-0005:** The Board has no jurisdiction over a city's decision to surplus property. [Where the city surplused its golf course in order to sell the property for industrial development, the Board also decided the Resolution was not a de facto comprehensive plan amendment.] *Order of Dismissal on Motions (July 16, 2013) at 7.*

- ***Total Outdoor Corp. v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0008:** Neither the PFR nor its attachments demonstrate adoption of sign code amendments by the City, and thus the challenge does not fall within the statutory parameters for Board review of compliance with the GMA. *Order of Dismissal (September 23, 2013), p. 3.*

- ***BD Lawson Partners LP, et al. v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 14-3-0007:** [Where the challenged ordinance was neither an amendment nor a de facto amendment to the comprehensive plan, the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. RCW 36.70A.280] *Order of Dismissal (August 18, 2014).*

- ***Daniel Thompson v. City of Mercer Island*, Case No. 14-3-0010:** The Growth Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a challenged development regulation complies with the GMA…."A development regulation does not include a decision to approve a project permit application."[RCW 36.70A.030(7)] … In contrast, the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction under LUPA to decide an appeal of a land use decision on an application for a project permit. … "Project permit" or "project permit application" [includes] site plan review…" [RCW 36.70B.020(4). *Order of Dismissal (December 5, 2014), at 5-6.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 14-3-0013:** The Board's jurisdiction does not include review of site-specific project permit actions. … [T]he County's adoption of the Interlocal Agreement did not amend the County's Comprehensive Plan or its development regulations. The ILA resolved a number of design and construction issues associated with the Smith Island Restoration Project … [and] settled appeals of a shoreline substantial development permit issued by the County for the project. [Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction]. *Order of Dismissal on Motions (February 4, 2015), p. 4-5.*

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Petitioners alleged that public notice of the ordinance was fatally defective for various violations of the Optional Municipal Code, Ch. 35A.63 RCW]. The Board does not have jurisdiction to determine compliance with the Optional Municipal Code. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015)*, pp. 11, 24, 26.

[The Board lacks jurisdiction to review a planned action ordinance that does not adopt or amend a subarea plan or amend development regulations.] *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), pp. 4-5, 13.*

The Board's SEPA review authority is narrow. RCW 36.70A.280 grants review authority only for a petition alleging non-compliance with RCW 43.21C "as it relates to plans, development regulations, or amendments." [The Planned Action Ordinance] is not a comprehensive plan or a development regulation; therefore, the Board concludes, the Board's SEPA review authority does not apply to the question of whether adoption of Ordinance 707 met SEPA procedural requirements. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), pp. 4-5, 13.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County*, Case No. 15-3-0003:** The ordinance pertains only to the Smith Island Restoration Project and is a "land use or environmental permit or license required from a local government for a project action" within the definition of "project permit" in RCW 36.70C.020(4). [The Board lacks review jurisdiction.] *Order of Dismissal, (July 22, 2015)*, p. 5.

Land Capacity Analysis

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** [T]he land capacity analysis is intended to provide the information needed to right-size the UGA to accommodate a projected population. As the GMA Guidelines explain: "The land capacity analysis is a comparison between the collective effects of all development regulations operating on development and the assumed densities established in the land use element." [WAC 365-196-325(2)(a)] Thus, to determine future development capacity, the Guidelines advise looking not solely to the minimum density in each zone, but to the "collective effect of all development regulations." [T]his underscores the Court's insistence on a review of local circumstances – what is actually happening on the ground. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pgs. 55-56.*

  [The Board finds] use of 4 du/ac as a capacity multiplier in the LCA is not supported by local circumstances, first, as it ignores the range of densities allowed in each designation and the trend to higher achieved densities in the UL/UC, and second, as it applies a capacity number lower than the minimums in UGAs associated with all but the smallest of its cities. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 58.*

  In Kitsap County, the UR designation is a very-low density urban designation in lands where a high-degree of environmentally critical areas (more than 50%) is a constraint on capacity for development. Permitted densities are just 1-5 du/ac. In addition to using the much lower density when calculating the capacity of constrained lands, the County's land capacity analysis (LCA) also subtracts mapped critical areas from the available land supply in all urban designations. In the UR lands, because wetlands, unstable slopes, and the like are already excluded from the calculation, the unusually low density is actually applied only to the "high and dry" remainder which is not constrained. The result is that the LCA discounts land capacity twice for environmental protection, resulting in UGAs which are oversized for the forecast growth. … [T]he County's application of a [very-low density] zoning minimum to the LCA

formulation after critical areas are already discounted is a "double-dip" that understates the actual capacity for development of UR-designated lands. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pgs. 50-51.*

- ***Robert Strahm v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0004:** [Petitioner challenged the County's LCA methodology and assumptions, including accounting for land necessary for public infrastructure, assumptions about future development density, use of improvement value to land value ratios to determine likelihood for redevelopment, projections for in-fill growth in housing and employment in the City of Everett, etc.] The Board finds that substituting Petitioner's judgment for that of the County planners is insufficient to overcome the deference due the County. *Final Decision and Order, (January 19, 2016), p.23.*

  Whether the full capacity potential of a parcel will be realized depends on the economy, infrastructure, buyer preferences, and so on. In planning for the growth projected by OFM, all a jurisdiction can do is determine whether, under the existing zoning and allowed uses, it has the capacity to meet allocated growth projections. The fact that *current* economic conditions are not prompting redevelopment does not mean that conditions will not change over the 20-year planning horizon. Thus, Strahm's conclusion that currently *unrealized* capacity is not *real* does not necessarily follow. *Final Decision and Order, (January 19, 2016), p.11.*

Land Use Powers

- ***Janet Wold, et al v City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** For a County and its cities to develop an inter-jurisdictional agreement concerning a land capacity methodology is consistent with the coordination contemplated by RCW 36.70A.210. [The City's use of the methodology for its LCA] does not cede its land-use powers to the County. *FDO (August 9, 2010), pg. 54.*

Legislative Findings

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** Although legislative findings do not create independent obligations, they may provide important assistance to the Board and the parties in interpreting and applying the mandates of the statute. Thus the Board looks to Section .011 for guidance in the analysis of [legal issues concerning rural character, but] allegations of non-compliance with Section .011 are dismissed. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 8.*

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002:** Legislative findings and recitals are not the enacted ordinance itself and do not provide an independent basis for a finding of non-compliance. It is the effect of the ordinance and the controls the ordinance imposes, in relationship to the goals and requirements of the GMA, which lie within the jurisdictional purview of the Board…. The recital does not convert the adopted CPP from a planning framework to a regulatory instrument. *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 28-29.*

Limited Areas of More Intensive Rural Development (LAMIRDs)

- ***James L. Halmo v. Pierce County*, Case No. 14-3-0002:** The Board's review of county LAMIRD provisions is guided by recent court rulings which require the LAMIRD provisions of RCW

36.70A.070(5)(d) to be narrowly construed. [citing cases] … A LAMIRD is an optional planning tool which, if used, must comply with the GMA's provisions. *Final Decision and Order (July 23, 2014), pp. 13-14.*

[T]he fact that post-1990 commercial buildings were lawful when built does not allow the County or the Board to ignore the July 1, 1990 cut-off date for a LAMIRD "existing area or existing use." Pierce County's text amendment encompassing areas which "were approved" in 1990 is clearly erroneous. *Final Decision and Order (July 23, 2014), p. 18.*
The record here presents no road or topographical feature, steep slope, dedicated greenbelt, or body of water to provide a logical outer boundary north of the Howe 1990 improvements. The fact that the residential parcel is underdeveloped by LAMIRD standards is not enough to bring it within the LOB. … The Board finds the LOB fails to minimize and contain the more intensive commercial development in Fisherman's Village. *Final Decision and Order (July 23, 2014), p. 25.*

Mootness

- ***Potala Village Kirkland, LLC, Lobsang Dargey and Tamara Agassi Dargey v City of Kirkland,* Case No. 12-3-0005:** Where the challenged action [moratorium] has expired, the Board can find no live controversy for which it has authority to grant relief. The issue is moot and the case must be dismissed. *Order of Dismissal (February 8, 2013)*, at 6.

- ***Lowell Anderson, et al. v City of Monroe,* Case No. 12-3-0007**: [Notwithstanding Petitioners' concern that the City had again docketed the challenged proposal] the Board finds Ordinance 018/2012 has been repealed by the City of Monroe. The challenged City action is no longer operative and the Board can no longer provide relief. *Order on Dispositive Motion, (December 11, 2012)*, at 6.

Minimum Guidelines

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The Minimum Guidelines provide specific rules for amending natural resource designations. WAC 365-190-040(10)(b) sets forth the *process* for reviewing natural resource designations. First, a parcel-by-parcel approach is prohibited. Second, designation amendments should be based on changed circumstances, an error in designation, new information, or a change in population growth rates. Pursuant to RCW 36.70A.050(3), the WAC 365-190 guidelines promulgated by the Department of Commerce "shall be minimum guidelines that apply to all jurisdictions." The courts have now clarified that these guidelines must be followed. *FDO (July 9, 2012), at 30-31.*

Notice

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** A proposal may be modified during the course of public debate without necessarily requiring publication of a new notice …The text of Amendment 2A was provided to the public and the County received public comment [including from petitioners] prior to the close of its public hearing. [No violation of GMA notice and public

participation requirements for Amendment 2A]. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pg. 18.

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012:** Petitioners further contend the City should have provided individual mailed notice to all shoreline homeowners. Petitioners provide no authority for such a requirement. Neither the SMP guidelines nor incorporated GMA provisions require individual notice of planning actions. Our courts have ruled that the GMA provisions for notice and public participation do not require individual notice [citing Holbrook, Inc., v. Clark County, 112 Wn. App. 354, 49 P.3d 142 (2002)]…. The Holbrook reasoning applies equally to shoreline master program planning procedures. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 22-23*.

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Petitioners alleged that public notice of the ordinance was fatally defective for various violations of the Optional Municipal Code, Ch. 35A.63 RCW]. The Board does not have jurisdiction to determine compliance with the Optional Municipal Code. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015)*, pp. 11, 24, 26.

  [Alleged defects in a published notice and a mailed notice were not fatal where, additionally,] notice of the City's action was delivered via emails, *Alert Shoreline* notifications, *Currents* publications, press releases, website postings, and targeted postal mailings to households within the subarea… The public notice provided by the City amply met the statutory requirements. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015)*, p. 23.

  [Petitioner] has documented no specific changes that were outside the scope of the proposal or enacted after public comment closed so as to necessitate additional notice. Their complaint has been that the plan adoption was a moving target, with changes too frequent for citizens to keep up and provide effective comment. The Board's decisions establish that so long as public comment is allowed until the council's final action, amendments within the scope of the noticed action are allowed without requiring a new notice and hearing. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015)*, p. 23.

  There is no GMA requirement that each proposed variation within the scope of a proposal be re-noticed and circulated to the public for comment prior to council consideration. *Final Decision and Order, (December 16, 2015), p. 11.*

Open Space/Parks and Recreation (Goal 9)

- ***Janet Wold, et al v City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** The Board notes the overlapping values of the designations for open space, habitat, and critical area buffers. For example, 'open space corridors' can serve a variety of purposes such as 'recreation, wildlife habitat, trails, and connection of critical areas.' [RCW 36.70A.160] Petitioners have not shown that a Comprehensive Plan map which simply aggregates various kinds of open spaces, from parks to

trails to protected habitat, somehow diminishes or merges the different regulatory or access regulations that may apply. *FDO (August 9, 2010), pg. 33.*

Petition for Review

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** [A petition will not be dismissed because of alleged misstatements of fact.] The Intervenors' objections have been addressed and fully remedied. The Board has restated the legal issues. [One issue was withdrawn and another reference to intervenors was deleted in the restated legal issues.] *Order on Motions (April 27, 2010), pg. 7.*
- ***Toward Responsible Development, et al v. City of Black Diamond,* Case No. 10-3-0014:** RCW 36.70A.290's requirement for a petitioner to articulate its issues within 60 days prohibits the addition of issues beyond the statutory appeal period. Refinement and/or clarification of the issues can occur after the appeal period has elapsed, however, for the Board to allow new previously-unarticulated issues to be presented would simply amount to a PFR becoming an issue "placeholder" contrary to .290's requirement for a "detailed statement of the issues." *Order on Motion to Amend Prehearing Order (Jan. 18, 2011), pg. 3.*

- ***Total Outdoor Corp. v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0008:** The Board must dismiss a petition when the Board determines jurisdiction was not properly invoked, since the Board has no power to adjudicate that particular case. [Where] there was no final, appealable decision made by the City of Seattle, … the PFR on its face does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the GMA or SEPA. *Order of Dismissal (September 23, 2013), p. 4.*

Property Rights (Goal 6)

- ***Fleishmann's Industrial Park LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 11-3-0001:** To prevail on a Goal 6 challenge, petitioner must prove the City's action was both arbitrary and discriminatory. Fleishmann's has demonstrated the action was discriminatory [its property was the only heavy industrial land excluded from the MIC, although it adjoins the MIC on two sides], but has not met its burden of demonstrating the action was arbitrary [as a staff report provides rationale]. *FDO, July 6, 2011, pg. 28.*

Public Participation/Citizen Participation (Goal 11)

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** [C]itizen comments supporting the lowered urban minimums do not articulate how that would further the GMA requirements and County Plan policies of (1) directing the bulk of growth to urban areas and (2) differentiating urban from rural areas to reduce sprawl and protect rural character. Moreover, the written record of citizen comment does not provide any specific information about neighborhood character that would support a whole-sale down-zoning. Therefore [citing *Kittitas County,* Supreme Court Case No. 84187-0], the Board finds the record of community input fails to identify current local circumstances to support lowering UL/UC minimum densities. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pgs. 20-21.*

- ***Janet Wold, et al v City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** The Board finds that while the City erred at the beginning of the public participation process by not establishing a public participation plan for the duration of the development and passage of the Comprehensive Plan, it took corrective action at the beginning of Phase 2 with the passage of Resolution 2009-3 implementing a public participation plan [thus curing the non-compliance]. *FDO (August 9, 2010), pg. 16.*

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** *Burrows* and other Board decisions establish that requirements for effective notice and fair public process do not mandate that the final language of the ordinance be available for public comment before it can be adopted. Rather, when a proposal is amended after the public process is closed, the Board must determine whether it was "within the scope of alternatives available for public comment," [RCW 36.70A.035(2)] or whether a new notice and opportunity for comment is required. … [Reviewing the record] the Board is not persuaded the [challenged] amendments are beyond the scope of alternatives the public had an opportunity to review. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pgs. 20, 22.

- ***Rita Hagwell, Janet Wold, and Molly Chamberlin Lee v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 12-3-0006:** The GMA does not preclude a local government from amending legislation after, and quite possibly in response to, public comment. RCW 36.70A.035(2) requires that if legislative changes or amendments are proposed after the public comment period has closed, the process must be reopened for public consideration and comment. However, "an additional opportunity for public review and comment is not required" if "the proposed change is within the scope of the alternatives available for public comment." *FDO, (March 11, 2013) at 11-12.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II)*, Case No. 12-3-0010:** The Bureau cites no authority for the proposition that "broad dissemination" [RCW 36.70A.140] requires individual outreach to each known interested person or organization. The Board notes Webster's Dictionary defines "dissemination" as "to spread abroad as if sowing seed." Thus, "broad dissemination" requires that proposals be generally published and made available to the public, in contrast to the individual notice that the Farm Bureau claims is mandated. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013) at 5.*

  Response to public comments does not require accepting or agreeing with them – only taking them into consideration…. The County complied with the RCW 36.70A.140 requirement to "consider and respond to public comments" by discussing and voting on the Farm Bureau's proposed amendments. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013) at 8.*

  RCW 36.70A.100 is a substantive requirement of the GMA, calling for coordination and consistency among comprehensive plans. It is not a "notice and public participation" requirement subject to [summary disposition under] WAC 242-03-560. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013) at 10.*

- ***Lake Burien Neighborhood, et al. v. City of Burien*, Case No. 13-3-0012:** The Open Public Meetings Act is beyond the jurisdiction of this Board…. [With respect to development of a Shoreline Master Program] WAC 173-26-201(3)(b)(i) defines the public participation requirements with which local government shall comply. WAC 173-26-100 additionally [provides hearing and notice provisions.] … The Board empathizes with Petitioners' frustration that the short time frame between hearing the revised SMP and its adoption provided the public with minimal time to understand or respond to all the provisions, However, the statute does not require a longer period. *Final Decision and Order (June 16, 2014), pp. 19-20.*

Reasonable Measures

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** The GMA requires a County to enact "reasonable measures" likely to increase the rate and density of growth in the urban areas "in lieu of expanding the UGA." Accordingly, Kitsap's 2006 Plan Update contains a significant commitment to Reasonable Measures. The Board [finds] reduction of minimum densities in 70% of the UGA, with concomitant UGA expansion, is inconsistent with the Plan's reasonable-measures goals and policies. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 29.*

- ***Jerry Harless v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 15-3-0005:** In the Board's view, the BLR duty to "identify reasonable measures" requires, at a minimum, (a) a list of currently-adopted reasonable measures, with perhaps a summary of monitoring data as to their effectiveness, and (b) suggested additional measures for discussion, preferably with a brief notation as to the particular inconsistency each measure is hoped to address. *Final Decision and Order, (January 22, 2016)*, p. 16.

Reconsideration

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** [Board declined to reconsider dismissal of legal issue referencing incorrect GMA subsection.] There were several opportunities for Petitioners to revise and hone their legal issue statements. More importantly, preparation of the Prehearing Brief necessarily entails reviewing and arguing the statutory basis for each legal issue. Petitioners had this additional opportunity to discover and correct the error [but the statutory analysis was limited to a single sentence.] *Order on Motions for Reconsideration (May 17, 2011), pg. 3.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008:** A motion for reconsideration is not intended to give a petitioner an opportunity to reargue a case or correct its own errors. … The Motion provides no authority that would alter the Board's application of RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c) [scope of review of SMP]; therefore reconsideration of other elements of the decision would not change the outcome of the case. *Order Denying Reconsideration (April 4, 2013), at 2.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County*, Case No. 15-3-0003:** Here the Farm Bureau had two opportunities to brief its case for jurisdiction and provided no case law for its tacit amendment argument. … A motion for reconsideration is not intended to give a petitioner an opportunity to reargue a case or fill in omissions. *Order Denying Reconsideration, (*August 17, 2015), p. 2.

Regional Planning

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** PSRC's multi-county planning process is the means by which local elected officials in the four-county metropolitan [Central Puget Sound] region articulate the "regional differences" which the GMA seeks to recognize…. Coordination and consistency among the metropolitan counties sharing common borders and related regional issues [see RCW 36.70A.100] is provided in the GMA through the provision for multi-county planning policies. Multicounty planning policies, like countywide planning policies, provide a "framework [that] shall ensure that city and county comprehensive plans are consistent as required in RCW 36.70A.100." *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 10-11, 117.*

  MPPs and CPPs cannot be ignored, particularly when their provisions are directive. …[Neither the cited MPPs] nor the cited CPPs can be read as an absolute prohibition of de-designation of ARL lands, in view of the designation amendment provisions in the Commerce minimum guidelines, County Policies, and case law. However, when weighing the ARL designation factors, the MPPs require a Central Puget Sound county – and the CPPs require Pierce County – to put a heavy thumb on the balance scale in favor of continued designation for prime farmland. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 60*.

  While the FDO did not apply the [Multi-County Planning Policies] as a stand-alone basis for any finding of non-compliance, the decision clearly recognized the County has incorporated a requirement for consistency with VISION 2040 into its comprehensive plan amendment process. It was not error of law for the FDO to apply the County's own adopted criteria. *Order on Intervention and Reconsideration, (August 20, 2012),* at 7.

  [T]he Board finds a fundamental regional issue is raised: whether multi-county planning policies may be applied as framework principles in determining compliance with the GMA [in the Central Puget Sound Region]. *Certificate of Appealability (September 28, 2012), at 6*.

Respondent

- ***William Palmer, et al v. Kitsap County and KRCC*, Case No. 12-3-0003:** Kitsap Regional Coordinating Council is a forum for county/city collaboration in developing countywide planning policies and coordinating land use matters. KRCC is not an entity subject to challenge before the Board. *Order of Dismissal (February 27, 2012) at 4-5.*

Rural Character

- ***William J. Rehberg, et al. v. Pierce County*, Case No. 13-3-0010:** Rural character in the GMA has a visual element. Rural character is defined as patterns of land use where natural landscapes

and vegetation predominate over the built environment and where traditional visual landscapes are provided. RCW 36.70A.030(15)(a) and (c). The rural element of a county plan must contain measures governing development that "assure visual compatibility" with surrounding rural areas. RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(ii). *Final Decision and Order (April 28, 2014), p. 8*.

Rural Element

- ***North Clover Creek, et al v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** Pierce County, in adopting the Graham Plan, has defined rural character for the Graham area. The GMA acknowledges the importance of local circumstances, and thus allowing each rural community to develop its unique vision of rural lifestyle, as Pierce County does through its community plans, is an appropriate way to implement the requirement for a rural element in the County Comprehensive Plan. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 55.*

  The Board has had few opportunities to assess the Rural Element requirements for preserving "visual landscapes" and assuring "visual compatibility." In the present case [the Community Plan] gives definition to the visual elements of the rural character it seeks to preserve. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 57.*

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** The Board finds the County has assumed responsibility for ensuring school facility locations are consistent with the County's growth plans. The Multi-county Planning Policies, the 2009 Countywide Planning Policies, and the [applicable sub-area plans], require the County to engage with school districts in planning for school locations; it is not enough to say the County will impose conditions on a school district's subsequent permit application. [Rezone to accommodate multi-school campus in the rural area remanded to County.] *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 122.*

Sequencing/Tiering

- ***Janet Wold, et al. v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** The City has undertaken a significant initiative for redevelopment in the heart of the City and has adopted or is planning other measures for first-tier infill. For development farther out in the annexed areas, while the City's plan relies largely on private developers for sewer system extensions, …the City has competent plans to provide urban infrastructure throughout the annexed areas in the 20-year planning horizon. In short, staged growth as advocated by Petitioners may well be a more prudent strategy, but it is not a GMA requirement so long as infrastructure concurrency is achieved. *FDO (August 9. 2010), pg. 61.*

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** It is well settled that the phased location of urban growth in RCW 36.70A.110(3) is advisory, not mandatory, as indicated by the word "should" rather than "shall." This statutory provision "*recommends* where urban growth should be located and who should provide governmental services to those areas." [Citing *Spokane County v. City of Spokane* and Board cases.]The Board has indicated growth phasing is an option

which is available to address the need for infrastructure concurrency, but is not a mandate. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pgs. 38-39.

Service

- ***North Clover Creek, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** The Board has long recognized that the GMA petition system differs from other kinds of land use lawsuits. The Board is charged with determining only whether governments have complied with the GMA. In reviewing a petition challenging a comprehensive plan amendment, the Board does not assume any direct authority over landowners or individual parcels. For this reason, there is no requirement that the petition be served on anyone other than the responsible city, county, or state agency. However, intervention is liberally granted to affected property owners and neighbors. *Order on Motions (April 27, 2010), pg. 4.*

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie,* Case No. 11-3-0012*:*** Petitioners' failure of strict compliance [with WAC 242-03-230(2)] was occasioned by the unscheduled closure of City Hall. By diligent and prompt efforts to complete service, Petitioners substantially complied. *Order on Motions (March 8, 2012), pg. 6.*

Shoreline Master Programs

- ***Elizabeth Mooney and Janet Hays v. City of Kenmore and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0004:** RCW 90.58.100 sets a high standard for scientific analysis of local shoreline conditions [shoreline inventory] on which shoreline master programs are to be based. However, the statutory provisions and the implementing guidelines expressly recognize limits to the feasibility of data collection…. Both the local jurisdiction and Ecology must have the flexibility to reconsider changes to the SMP if warranted by changed circumstances or newly discovered facts [during the time between initial filing of the SMP and Ecology's Final Approval]. However, the Board does not find in the guidelines any duty to revise the inventory to incorporate data that was not "existing," "available," or "the most current" at the time the completeness of the submittal was verified by Ecology. *FDO, (Feb. 27, 2013), at 21, 23.*

  While the Inventory does not include the 2011 Harbour Village Marina dredge report, the City's SMP policies and regulations call for obtaining and using ["any available monitoring data" and "the most recent data"] prior to issuing permits for new shoreline development. Thus data gaps are addressed on a permit-by permit basis so that the SMP does not become stale in the seven-year interval before the next update. *FDO, (Feb. 27, 2013), at 24.*

  [Notwithstanding the lack of immediate required actions to address Downtown Waterfront contamination, Kenmore's SMP restoration plan complies with WAC 173.26.201(2)(f) in identifying degraded areas and impaired ecological functions and setting requirements for restoration.] *FDO (Feb. 27, 2013) at 33-35.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008:** [When an appeal of an SMP concerns *shorelines*, the only GMA

claims the Board may review are "the internal consistency requirements of RCW 36.70A.070 and 36.70A.040(4)." Claims of non-compliance with other GMA provisions are dismissed.] *Order on Motions, (Dec. 17, 2012), at 2-3.*

[SMP] consistency with County development regulation presents a more difficult question. RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) limits the Board's scope of review [for regulatory consistency concerning "shorelines"] to "the consistency provisions of … RCW 36.70A.040(4), 35.63.125, and 35A.63.105." [Noting none of these statutory provisions is applicable to Snohomish County, the Board questions its jurisdiction to review regulatory consistency in this case.] *FDO (March 14, 2013), at 21-23.*

The record before the Board [County and Ecology distribution and mailing lists] demonstrates the outreach and consultation requirements of RCW 90.58.100(1)(b) and RCW 90.58.130(2) have been amply satisfied. RCW 90.58.100(1)(b) requires consultation "to the extent feasible" with agencies having special expertise in environmental impacts…. Shoreline Master Program development does not mandate outreach to every possible entity, but rather, reasonable efforts "to the extent feasible." RCW 90.58.130(2) requires invitations to all federal, state, and local agencies "having interests or responsibilities relating to the shorelines of the state." It was not an error to omit the federal and state agricultural departments from that list. *Order on Motions (Dec. 17, 2012), at 8.*

The Board's review [of an SMP] includes a determination of compliance with the applicable guidelines. RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) and (c). Pursuant to RCW 90.58.200 Ecology has adopted guidelines to assist jurisdictions in the development of their SMPs. Ecology's SMP regulations are found at WAC 173-26 (hereafter, SMP guidelines). Deference to Ecology's interpretation of the SMP guidelines is appropriate because WAC 173-26 is Ecology's own regulation. *FDO (March 14, 2013), at 5-6*.

[The petitioner] has raised an issue which we believe should be addressed by the departments of Commerce and Ecology and possibly by the Legislature: … whether a local jurisdiction may allow RCW 36.70A.170 designated agricultural land to be inundated pursuant to the SMA (Chapter 90.58 RCW), resulting in loss of agricultural productivity, without first dedesignating such land. … The Board recognizes the GMA and SMA are intended to be compatible. Petitioner's reasoning may well suggest a more coherent approach to concurrent realization of SMA and GMA goals, but it is simply not based on any existing law applicable to SMP adoption, and the Board does not have the authority to find such integrative direction where none exists. Legislative or judicial clarification of the appropriate balance is needed. *Concurring Opinion of William Roehl and Cheryl Pflug, FDO, (March 14, 2013), at 30, 36.*

- ***Lake Burien Neighborhood, et al. v. City of Burien*, Case No. 13-3-0012:** BAS may be a key factor as applied to the protection of critical areas under RCW 36.70A.172, but the standard set out in RCW 90.58.100 for the development of SMPs is the applicable standard here. Burien's 2003 Critical Areas Ordinance as incorporated in its SMP is subject to review in this case, but the scope of review is limited to compliance with the SMA and Ecology's Guidelines so that

Petitioners may not now argue the City's 2003 CAO was not supported by BAS or challenge various characterizations of Lake Burien's wetlands over the history of Burien's CAO. *Final Decision and Order (June 16, 2014), p. 11.*

Ecology explains that the object of "no net loss" requirements is that over time the existing condition of shoreline ecological functions throughout a jurisdiction should remain the same as when the SMP is first implemented. .. Thus, SMP development essentially takes the shoreline as it stands at the beginning of the SMP process and aims to preserve ecological function on a jurisdiction-wide basis over the long term… [T]he burden of proof falls to Petitioners … to show "that the SMP will lead to a net loss" in ecological function. *Final Decision and Order (June 16, 2014), pp. 14-15.*

- ***Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology,* Case No. 14-3-0012:** Having assembled current scientific data and assessed its uncertainties, the City appropriately chose to rely on its consultants and resident advisory committee in devising a shoreline master program that would comply with Ecology guidelines…. The SMA and Ecology's guidelines do not require local governments to referee disputes in the scientific community. Here the City gave reasoned consideration to Dr. Flora's critique by documenting the gaps and uncertainties in applicable science, which is the Flora theme, while building its SMP provisions around the consensus science incorporated in the requirements of the guidelines. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 43.*

  [The city's Residential Conservancy shoreline designation was based on] studies [which] provided Bainbridge with reach-by-reach documentation of the geomorphic conditions of its shores and detailed identification of aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna in nearshore, intertidal, and supratidal zones around the island. … The City exercised judgment in determining where the "severe biophysical limitations" or "important ecological functions and processes" exist. PRSM argues perimeter shorelines do not meet the City's designation criteria because they are not "sensitive lands" but rather are already developed….This generalized objection is not sufficient to offset the detailed scientific assessment of the coastline on which the SMP relies. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 56-57.*

  RCW 90.58.620(1), adopted in 2011, permits a city to consider certain nonconforming residential structures to be conforming…. [While the SMP does not declare such structures to be conforming,] the SMP is clear that its provisions are not retroactive but apply only to new development. [Petitioners failed to demonstrate disregard of the priority accorded single family homes in the SMA.] *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 16.*

  [Limitations on location of docks and floats appurtenant to single family homes did not violate SMA policy where fine-scale shoreline assessments] gave the City specific documentation and mapping of shoreline geomorphic conditions – drift cells, feeder bluffs, shoreline slopes, landslide hazards – and biological resources – eelgrass meadows, forage fish spawning areas, shellfish beds, and other critical habitats. This properly informed the SMP regulation of docks

and other over-water structures. Areas where new docks are prohibited are those areas with critical physical limitations. *Final Decision and Order(April 6, 2015), p. 83.*

The PRSM and Realtors briefs generally ignore the importance of navigation in the SMA. The policy of RCW 90.58.020 calls for … "protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto." Reasonable limits on location and spacing of docks, piers, floats and buoys protect the public interest in navigability. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 85.*

Bainbridge Island's SMP adopts criteria allowing the marine buffers to be tailored to the "physical and geomorphic characteristics of the property."… In choosing the site-specific approach, the City necessarily created a more detailed system than a blanket buffer size. The criteria appear to the Board to be clearly drawn. While more complex to administer, the buffer system adopted in the SMP is bounded by reasonable and established criteria that citizens and the Shoreline Administrator should be able to apply. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 103.*

PRSM has not met its burden to establish the SMP fails to attain the level of clarity required or results in an excessive delegation of discretion to regulators, in violation of RCW 90.58.900 or WAC 173-26-191(2)(a)(ii)(A). *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 118.*

[T]he scope of review set forth in RCW 90.58.190(2)(b) does not provide for Board review of consistency between SMP plan or regulatory provisions and GMA development regulations for GMA initially-planning cities. … PRSM has simply not alleged a statute within the Board's jurisdiction which would encompass violations resulting from inconsistencies between SMP policies or regulations and GMA development regulations. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 109-110.*

Shoreline Master Program- Process

- **Preserve Responsible Shoreline Development et al (PRSM) v. City of Bainbridge Island and Washington Department of Ecology, Case No. 14-3-0012:** The [SMP] guidelines specify: "for local governments planning under the Growth Management Act, the [public participation] provisions of RCW 36.70A.140 also apply." The Board therefore looks to its substantial record of decisions under that statute. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 14*.

  [L]imiting the length of oral testimony and limiting the subject of oral testimony allowed at public hearings is fair and reasonable, so long as written testimony is accepted throughout the process. *Final Decision and Order (April 6, 2015), p. 16.*

Shorelines of Statewide Significance

- ***Elizabeth Mooney and Janet Hays v. City of Kenmore and Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0004:** [Under the standard of review for SMP provisions concerning shorelines of statewide significance, the Board must uphold the action of Ecology unless there is "clear and convincing

evidence" of noncompliance. RCW 90.58.190(2)(c).] Petitioners worry that the regulatory language is platitudinous, that there are no express prohibitions against remobilization of contaminants in soils or sediments, and that enforcement may not be rigorous. Petitioners' concerns, however, do not constitute the clear and convincing evidence required to find error in Ecology's approval of the SMP. *FDO (Feb. 27, 2013) at 31.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County and Washington State Department of Ecology,* Case No. 12-3-0008:** As to shorelines of statewide significance, the Board's review of Shoreline Master Programs is limited to whether "the decision of the department is inconsistent with the policy of RCW 90.58.020 and the applicable [SMP] guidelines." RCW 90.58.190(2)(c). The Board is not permitted to assess compliance with GMA resource land designation and conservation provisions. *FDO (March 14, 2013), at 17.*

Standing

APA Standing

- ***Sleeping Tiger, LLC v. City of Tukwila,* Case No. 11-3-0005:** [While petitioner had not participated in the public process related to the City's enactment of the moratorium, the petitioner sufficiently demonstrated APA standing where its application for an unclassified use permit was denied due to the moratorium.] *Order on Motions, (May 6, 2011), pg. 7.*

- ***Lowen Family Limited Partnership v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0007:** To establish prejudice [as a requirement for APA standing pursuant to RCW 34.05.530], Petitioner must allege an "injury in fact." Here Petitioner [claims] that it does not challenge the enacted Ordinance which rezoned its property, merely the amendment which decreased the amount of upzone that might otherwise have been in the final legislation. … Proposed legislation may be amended repeatedly during the legislative process, but it is only the City's official action in adopting the Ordinance itself that is subject to Board review. *Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013), p. 3.*

  Petitioner Lowen's ability to use its property here is not diminished as a result of the City's action. Instead, Petitioner's grievance is that it did not receive as great a benefit from the enacted legislation as Petitioner had hoped for. [Petitioner has not shown actual injury and fails to establish APA standing.] *Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013), p. 5.*

Participation Standing

- ***Janet Wold, et al. v. City of Poulsbo,* Case No. 10-3-0005c:** Testimony in a public process does not need to spell out all of the Petitioners' legal theories, only apprize the City Council of the subject matter of the concern. The City was aware that Petitioners objected to the density standards on which the City was basing its plan. Petitioners are entitled to spell out additional legal bases for why they think the densities are noncompliant. *Order on Dispositive Motions (May 11, 2010), pg. 19.*

- ***William Palmer, et al. v Kitsap County and KRCC,* Case No. 12-3-0003:** The GMA does not provide for public challenge to CPPs. Only cities or the governor may appeal a CPP to the

[GMHB]; citizens may not appeal…. Because RCW 36.70A.210(6) is specific to CPPs, Petitioners cannot resort to other provisions of the GMA in an effort to obtain standing. *Order of Dismissal (February 27, 2012), pg. 5-6.*

- ***Snohomish County Farm Bureau v. Snohomish County (SCFB II),* Case No. 12-3-0010*:*** The Farm Bureau's participation in this case has involved much more than one letter. Yet in all the recorded testimony and comment, the Bureau did not raise the issue of conflict with plans of any adjacent county. Nor have the Bureau's briefs on these cross-motions provided any nexus between the RCW 36.70A.100 requirement and the subject matter of the Bureau's testimony and comments… The Board concludes the Farm Bureau lacks standing to challenge compliance with RCW 36.70A.100. *Order on Motions (January 31, 2013) at 12.*

- ***Brandi Blair, et al. v. City of Monroe*, Case No. 14-3-0006c:** [Where City legislative process for 2013 ordinance was consistently referred to in the city's own notices and documents as "continued from 2012," using 2011 and 2012 reference numbers, petitioners who participated in the earlier public process would not be denied participation standing under the GMA.] *Order on Motions (May 23, 2014), p. 3.*

SEPA Standing

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** One of SEPA's purposes is to ensure complete disclosure of the environmental consequences of a proposed action before a decision is taken. Participation and objection to the environmental analysis is therefore a prerequisite to review of agency SEPA compliance. … Pursuant to WAC 197-11-545(2) such lack of comment "shall be construed as lack of objection to the environmental analysis." [Board dismisses SEPA challenge of one of the Petitioners.] *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pgs. 6-7.

  [Prior] Board decisions stating "Failure to allege SEPA standing in the PFR is grounds for the Board to discuss a SEPA claim" [must be read in context]. In each case, the Board looked beyond the statement of standing in the petition for review and assessed whether the petitioner met the standing requirement adopted by the Board for SEPA cases. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pg. 7.

  The Central Board's long-held position on SEPA standing is based on the statutory provisions in the State Environmental Policy act which define the basis for appeal of a SEPA determination. RCW 43.21C.075(4), the controlling provision in SEPA regarding standing to challenge environmental review [ ] provides "… a person aggrieved by an agency action has the right to judicial appeal …" The Washington appellate courts have clarified the reach of the language. A "person aggrieved" who seeks judicial review of a SEPA determination must meet a two-part test to establish standing – the *Trepanier* test. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pgs. 8-9.

The rezone to Urban Center includes separate and distinct development standards adopted for Point Wells alone, in essence vesting densities which will directly impact Shoreline as the adjacent provider of urban services. … The City of Shoreline claims [ ] a direct impact on its planning and funding of transportation infrastructure, parks and other public services. Under the GMA, a county's amendment of its comprehensive plan and development regulations may create immediate obligations for an adjoining city to plan consistently, preparing the necessary infrastructure and service capacity. The Board finds the harms alleged by the City constitute injury-in-fact. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pgs. 10-12.

[In a Concurring Opinion, Board Member Roehl would apply a different analysis to standing to pursue SEPA claims.] It is only when a petitioner relies on APA standing [RCW 36.70A.280(2)(d)] that the Board would appropriately apply the requirements of RCW 34.05.530, statutory conditions originating in federal case law incorporating the "zone of interest" and "injury in fact" requirements. *Order on Dispositive Motions (Jan. 18, 2011)*, pg. 26.

[County argued the City of Shoreline was foreclosed from objecting to lack of SEPA alternatives by not raising the issue during the EIS scoping process.] As additional authority, the County cites *Department of Transportation v Public Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). [Reviewing *Public Citizen* on the County's motion for reconsideration, the Board concluded the Petitioner's challenge was not foreclosed.] *Order on Motions for Reconsideration (May 17, 2011), pg. 7.*

- ***Douglas Tooley v. Governor Gregoire, City of Seattle, et al.,* Case No. 11-3-0008:** By failing to submit timely comment on SEPA documents, Petitioner lacks participation standing for his SEPA challenge [citing WAC 197-11-545(2)]. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011), at 21.*

  By failing to allege injury in fact that falls within the SEPA zone of interests, Petitioner lacks standing to challenge a SEPA determination. The Board concludes it lacks statutory jurisdiction because Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the FEIS. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011), at 22.*

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie,* Case No. 11-3-0012*:*** The Board reads the SEPA comment provisions of WAC 197-11-545(2) as a component of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where public comment is a citizen's primary access to the administrative process, appropriate issues must first be raised before the agency [but citizens do not have to raise technical legal issues.] *FDO (May 8, 2012), pg. 16.*

- ***Lowen Family Limited Partnership v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0007:** [Petitioner is precluded from raising SEPA issues due to lack of participation and comment in the SEPA review process – WAC 197-11-545(2).] *Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013), p. 7.*

  As with the economic interests alleged by Petitioner, the SEPA interests alleged here are not actual losses of present value, but potential losses from what might have been but never was. Such injury is the definition of hypothetical. *Order of Dismissal (September 30, 2013), p. 9.*

- ***Brandi Blair, et al. v. City of Monroe*, Case No. 14-3-0006c:** [City did not carry its burden to show petitioners failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy where petitioners had "demonstrated an effort to avail themselves of administrative remedies by requesting to be added as appellants" in a co-petitioner's SEPA appeal.] *Order on Motions (May 23, 2014), at 7.*

- ***Ann Aagaard, Judy Fisher, Bob Fisher, Glen Conley, and Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell,* Case No. 15-3-0001:** The Growth Board has consistently … requir[ed] the party objecting to the local government's SEPA threshold determination to first use the review process in local regulations as a precondition for challenging the threshold determination before the Board…. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of hearing examiner review and thus did not exhaust their available administrative remedies. *Final Decision and Order, (July 21, 2015), p. 29.*

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** Shoreline Preservation had no administrative remedy for its objections to SEPA analysis of Alternative 4 during the DEIS comment period, as the alternative had not yet been created. The FEIS reviewed a preferred alternative admittedly beyond the scope of the alternatives reviewed in the DEIS, and the City itself extended the SEPA comment period for post-FEIS public comment. On these unique facts, the Board finds Shoreline Preservation properly availed itself of administrative remedies by providing post-FEIS written comments and testifying at the January 15, 2015 public hearing. [Motion to dismiss SEPA claims for failure to exhaust remedies is denied.] *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), p. 17.*

State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** Analysis of alternatives is central in nonproject SEPA review [citing WAC 197-11-442(2) (4)]. [While SEPA provides more flexible review for nonproject actions,] the "bookend" analysis of no-action and proposed-action in the present case fails to provide any information to allow decisions that might "approximate the proposal's objectives at a lower environmental cost" [WAC 197-11-786]. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011)*, pgs. 56-58.

- ***Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Coordinated Case Nos. 10-3-0012 and 09-3-0007c:** Having reviewed the alternatives analyzed in the 2010 FSEIS, the Board finds the City has satisfied the SEPA requirement to review reasonable alternatives, including off-site alternatives. [T]he parties have not cited, and the Board has not found, any authority requiring an alternative that is smaller or intermediate in size, only that alternatives have lower environmental cost. In the proper case, this requirement may be met by off-site alternatives that spread the proposed development across a larger footprint. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pg. 9.

  [The City's EIS alternatives were all based on the square footage of the mega-project which petitioners opposed. However, the FSEIS broke out the impacts related to development on the project site only, thus providing alternatives with lesser or differing environmental impacts.] In

short, the City decision-makers had the information they needed to select a less intense alternative on the Parkplace site or even to choose to forego additional development off-site and to plan for development on the Parkplace site alone at one of the lesser intensities….The 2010 SEPA review, with its expanded number of alternatives and subset analysis for the Parkplace site only, provided City Council members with ample information for a reasoned decision among alternatives having different and lesser environmental impacts. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pg. 17.

[Petitioners contended changes in design of the project required additional SEPA analysis. Prior to the Board's hearing, the Design Review Board issued its decision.]The Design Review Board Decision demonstrates: the adopted design guidelines for Parkplace were not changed, no "major modification" to the guidelines was proposed, and the four "minor modifications" allowed were each ruled to be "consistent with the intent of the guideline and result[ing] in superior design" and "not result[ing] in any substantial detrimental effect on nearby properties or the neighborhood." On this record the Board cannot find there was a substantial change to the project that should have been noted and analyzed in the environmental review. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pg. 19.

- ***Fleishmann's Industrial Park, LLC v. City of Sumner,* Case No. 11-3-0001:** Industrial uses have potentially very different impacts from high-density mixed-use residential/commercial developments; but differing impacts are not identified or assessed in the DEIS. [Case was remanded for SEPA review.] *FDO, July 6, 2011, pg. 16.*

  The Board understands adoption or denial of map amendments studied in an EIS may require changes to comprehensive plan text to ensure consistency. Where alternatives have been robustly analyzed and mitigation measures assessed, resulting text amendments may need no further scrutiny. Unfortunately, in this case, [DEIS] analysis of the proposal was far too sketchy to support an un-analyzed text amendment. *FDO, July 6, 2011, pg. 20.*

- ***Douglas Tooley v. Governor Gregoire, City of Seattle, et al.,* Case No. 11-3-0008:** The Board lacks jurisdiction to determine SEPA compliance except as it is tied directly to "adoption" or "amendment of a GMA or SMA plan or regulation [citing RCW 36.70A.280(3), .300(1), (3) (a) and (b)]. All SEPA appeals must appeal "a specific governmental action" together with the SEPA document or lack thereof [citing RCW 43.21C.075(1), (2), and (6)]. In the present case, Petitioner has not identified any final action by the City or State that constitutes adoption or amendment of a GMA plan or development regulation. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011), at 8-9.*

  Petitioner contends it is widely known the City and State finalized their intentions for the Viaduct replacement prior to issuance of the FEIS. However, the intentions of elected officials and other governmental personnel do not trigger the basis for an appeal; rather, some formal action must be taken that is binding on the local government or state agency. *Order on Dispositive Motions (November 8, 2011), at 15.*

- ***Your Snoqualmie Valley, et al. v. City of Snoqualmie,* Case No. 11-3-0012*:*** [Noting that annexations are specifically exempted from SEPA review, the Board found] the SEPA official appropriately limited her review of the impacts of the Pre-annexation Zoning ordinance to a comparison of the impacts of allowed uses under the King County zoning as conditioned by its P-suffix with the impacts of allowed uses under the City zones as conditioned by City regulations and plan requirements. *FDO (May 8, 2012), pg. 23.*

  The task of the threshold determination under SEPA is to compare existing conditions with a proposal. Here the baseline is the unmitigated DirtFish operation and the proposal adopts agreed restrictions. "The agency's task is to analyze the proposal's impacts against existing uses." *FDO (May 8, 2012), pg. 32.*

- ***Total Outdoor Corp. v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 13-3-0008:** [Where petition on its face or with attachments does not evidence final governmental action on the City's sign code amendments, the SEPA claim is not ripe and must be dismissed. RCW 43.21C.075(1), (2)(a).] *Order of Dismissal (September 23, 2013), p. 4.*

- ***Brandi Blair, et al. v. City of Monroe*, Case No. 14-3-0006c:** The FEIS for the property failed to consider meaningful alternatives to redesignation of the property from LOS to GC because it failed to properly formulate the "no-action" alternative and assessed the impacts of the chosen alternatives to each other rather than in relation to existing conditions…. The City did not follow Ecology's recommendation to more accurately portray environmental impacts by adding a true no-action alternative as the baseline using existing undeveloped site conditions. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2014), pp. 24-25.*

  The Ordinance rezoned 43 acres of land but the FEIS only analyzed environmental impacts of development on 11 acres of land. … The Ordinance did not condition the rezone to limit commercial development to only a portion of the property, and the FEIS must properly assess the maximum development possible under the GC designation. *Final Decision and Order (August 26, 2014), p. 25.*

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** Petitioners assert the FEIS piecemeals the analysis by "deferring the review and cost of infrastructure deficiencies" and failing to analyze funding sources to cure them…. They object to the City's reliance on subsequent hydraulic modelling by the service providers to determine all project needs and on utility system plan updates to spell out costs and funding sources. However, "[a] FEIS does not require inclusion of specific remedies of each environmental impact." Indeed, an EIS is not necessarily deficient if its mitigation measures call for parameters to be developed after specific future studies….[T]he need for future studies to detail mitigation projects and schedules does not render the subarea plan FEIS inadequate. [Citations omitted]. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 36-37.*

  In asserting an inadequate FEIS, Petitioners' constant refrain is the lack of fiscal analysis. Petitioners are wrong on the law on this point. SEPA contemplates that many essential policy

considerations – including financial considerations - will be taken into account in making final decisions, but many of these considerations are outside the scope of SEPA. WAC 197-11-448(1) states clearly: the *EIS is not required to evaluate all* the *impacts* of a decision, only the *environmental* impacts. The EIS "provides information on *environmental* costs and impacts." *Id.* Information that is *not* required to be discussed in an EIS expressly includes "methods of financing proposals" and fiscal policies. WAC 197-11-448(3). *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 43.*

[Construing WAC 197-11-448], Richard Settle states that "no reported Washington SEPA decision has ever so held" [that SEPA requires inclusion of economic impacts]. Settle comments: "While the language of WAC 197-11-448 of the SEPA Rules is not absolutely clear on this issue, its purpose is to require only analysis of impacts to elements of the environment listed in WAC 197-11-444 and to exclude from mandatory EIS coverage purely economic, social and other nonenvironmental impacts." *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 44-45, fn. 117.*

[T]he Courts have construed the WAC 197-11-440(6)(c)(iv) provision that an EIS "*may discuss*" the economic practicability of mitigation measures, as permissive, not mandatory. … Nevertheless, Petitioners insist that a special level of scrutiny is necessary in this case, because the planned action ordinance will preclude subsequent SEPA review of the effectiveness of the mitigation measures for the 185th Street subarea. … [However,] mitigation measures are not required to be analyzed in detail unless the measures meet *both* criteria: new adverse impacts or information *and* no subsequent SEPA analysis. … The fact that there may be no subsequent SEPA review does not, standing alone, trigger a requirement for detailed analysis of mitigation measures, much less fiscal analysis. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 46-47.*

- ***Seattle Displacement Coalition v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 15-3-0015** : [RCW 43.21C.420] created a "voluntary tool" and did not preclude the City from reviewing the U District subarea plan amendments under general SEPA provisions…. The City had the option to use the procedures provided by Section 420 and to preclude subsequent project-level review and appeal but chose not to take that route. *Final Decision and Order (May 31, 2016).*

SEPA—Planned Action Ordinance

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** "Planned action" is a SEPA mechanism provided by RCW 43.21C.440 and its implementing regulations, WAC 197-11-164, -168. … A planned action is "a type of project action" within an urban growth area that has had "significant environmental impacts adequately addressed" in an EIS prepared in conjunction with amendment of a comprehensive plan or development regulations, for example, for a subarea plan. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), p. 4.*

  [The Board lacks jurisdiction to review a planned action ordinance that does not adopt or amend a subarea plan or amend development regulations.] *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), pp. 4-5, 13.*

The Board's SEPA review authority is narrow. RCW 36.70A.280 grants review authority only for a petition alleging non-compliance with RCW 43.21C "as it relates to plans, development regulations, or amendments." [The Planned Action Ordinance] is not a comprehensive plan or a development regulation; therefore, the Board concludes, the Board's SEPA review authority does not apply to the question of whether adoption of Ordinance 707 met SEPA procedural requirements. *Order on Motions, (September 10, 2015), pp. 4-5, 13.*

SEPA—Standard of Review

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** The FEIS is reviewed under the "rule of reason" standard, which requires "a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences" of an agency's action. … "That is, the EIS need include only information sufficiently beneficial to the decision making process to justify the cost of its inclusion." *Klickitat County Citizens*, 122 Wn.2d at 641. In evaluating the adequacy of the FEIS,… the City's determination of adequacy "shall be accorded substantial weight." RCW 43.21C.090. Thus, the Board does not rule on the wisdom of the Subarea Plan, but only whether the FEIS gave the City Council sufficient information to make a reasoned decision. *Final Decision and Order, (December 16, 2015), p. 32-33.*

  [Where City after close of DEIS comment period reviewed a new preferred alternative but then allowed abundant post-FEIS comment,] the City's failure to issue a supplemental DEIS was harmless error. Applying the rule of reason, under these facts, the City's procedural error was not consequential and Petitioners' objection must be dismissed. *Final Decision and Order, (December 16, 2015), p. 39.*

Stay

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c*:*** [Pursuant to WAC 242-03-860, the Board stays the compliance schedule of a case on appeal to the Court where] the parties have agreed to halt implementation of the non-compliant amendments and undertake no irreversible actions regarding the subject matter of the case during the pendency of the stay. *Order Granting Stay (August 21, 2012), at 5.*

Sub-Area Plans [Neighborhood Plans]

- ***Talis Abolins and Marla Steinhoff v. City of Seattle,* Case No. 14-3-0009:** Much planning may be delegated to the neighborhood itself, but eventually the City Council must adopt into its Comprehensive Plan those portions of the neighborhood plans that purport to guide land use planning. It is these adopted policies that are given effect by development regulations and must be consistent with other Plan provisions, including the Capital Facilities Element…. [T]he GMA imposes no requirement that a comprehensive plan be consistent with those portions of neighborhood plans that have not been adopted into the comprehensive plan… *Final Decision and Order, (April 1, 2015), p. 9, 24.*

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Where subarea plan implements and supplements the comp plan, the capital facilities and transportation provisions of the subarea plan will be read together with the comp plan capital facilities and transportation elements.] When the comprehensive plan and subarea plan are read together, the planning requirements for all the public facilities challenged by petitioners are fully satisfied. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 19.*

Timeliness

- ***Andrew Cainion v. City of Bainbridge Island*, Case No. 10-3-0013:** Cainion disagrees with the original designation [of his land] but did not challenge that designation when originally enacted and cannot now challenge that designation collaterally by challenging the City's denial of Cainion's proposed amendment. The GMA's statutory appeal period expressly prohibits such an appeal. *Order on Motion to Dismiss (January 7, 2011)*, pg. 4.

Transformation of Governance

- ***City of Shoreline, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach, Inc. v. Snohomish County,* Coordinated Case Nos. 09-3-0013c and 10-3-0011c:** RCW 36.70A.110(4) does not impose a mandate. It provides: "*In general*, cities are the units of government *most appropriate* to provide urban services." Petitioners have cited no authority for asserting the County is required to designate a city to provide urban services as a condition for a comprehensive plan amendment in the urban area. *Corrected FDO (May 17, 2011).*

Transportation Element

- ***Davidson Serles v. City of Kirkland,* Coordinated Case Nos. 10-3-0012 and 09-3-0007c:** [The City] amended the Capital Facilities Plan and the Transportation Element of the City's Comprehensive Plan to include and identify funding sources for all the improvements called for in the Planned Action Ordinance for the Touchstone project for a ten-year period, thereby curing the deficiencies identified in the FDO. [The City's compliance ordinance] meets the consistency requirements of RCW 36.70A.070 (preamble), .070(3), and .070(6) because it includes all necessary capital improvements and provides a "multi-year financing plan based on the [10-year transportation] needs identified in the comprehensive plan." *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pg. 13.

  Petitioners argue that [RCW 36.70A.070(6)(a)(iv)] requirement (A) - analysis of funding capability to judge needs against probable funding resources –entails more than simple identification of funding sources and projected dollar amounts for each source […but…] must address "the range of revenue reasonably expected, the assumptions and variables for the projected sums and the level of certainty for the projections." According to the Guideline [WAC 365-196-430(2)(k)(iv)], "analysis of funding capability" means determination of revenues "reasonably expected" based on existing sources and "a realistic estimate" of any new funding source. Many jurisdictions, including Kirkland, undoubtedly undertake a much more sophisticated financial forecast and risk assessment in their annual CFP reviews, but the Board does not find that the GMA requires the Comprehensive Plan transportation element to contain

ranges, assumptions and variables, and levels of certainty for transportation funding sources. *Finding of Compliance Case No. 09-3-0007c and FDO Case No. 10-3-0012 (Feb. 2, 2011)*, pgs. 21-23.

- ***Shoreline Preservation Society, et al. v. City of Shoreline,* Case No. 15-3-0002:** [Requirements of capital facilities element RCW 36.70A.070(3) and transportation element RCW 36.70A.070(6) of comprehensive plan are summarized and charted.] *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), pp. 18-19.*

  The subarea plan, together with the City's existing comprehensive plan, provides an inventory of existing conditions, a forecast of needed improvements, projected costs, and a range of funding sources. The TIP, the six-year financing component, is not required to, and does not, describe project financing outside of the six-year time frame. *Final Decision and Order, (December 17, 2015), p. 21.*

Urban Density

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al. v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** [The 2006 Plan Update] acknowledges a historic local development pattern that failed to direct urban growth to urban areas, failed to distinguish urban from rural lands, and failed to provide for efficient urban services. In this context … the "current local circumstance" which determines the "appropriate urban density" in Kitsap County's unincorporated UGAs must begin with recognition of recent on-the-ground progress achieved by the County in implementing the UGA goals for compact urban development and reduction of sprawl. …[T]his trend of actual and increasing residential densities above 5 du/ac is the local circumstance which, in the absence of reliance on an urban bright line, indicates the appropriate urban density for Kitsap's unincorporated UGAs. As the remand states [156 Wn.App. at 780], the Board is to focus on local circumstances at this time, recognizing changes to land usage or population. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pgs. 16-17.*

  [W]hile Petitioners' academic studies and articles about the costs of sprawl and the efficiency of compact urban development do not prove that Kitsap must adopt a particular level of urban density, the County's capital facilities process in the case before us demonstrates the "on-the-ground" cost of planning to serve, and serving, a significant extension of lower-density urban development [with urban sewer systems]. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 42.*

Urban Growth Areas (UGAs)

UGA Location

- ***North Clover Creek, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** [Pierce County's Comprehensive Plan Policy – UGA Expansion Criteria – was not required to contain a policy prohibiting inclusion of agricultural lands in the UGA: agricultural lands are protected by other GMA imperatives.] *FDO (August 2, 2010), pgs. 39-40.*

[The subarea plan] calls for a clear distinction between urban and rural areas. Logical boundaries are an important determinant of such distinctions. [Deviation from arterial as UGA boundary was inconsistent with plan]. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 15.*

UGA Size

- ***Suquamish Tribe, et al v. Kitsap County,* Case No. 07-3-0019c [2011 Remand]:** [T]he County's reduction of minimum densities in the bulk of its residential UGAs forced the County to designate larger UGAs than would have been needed with its existing density range…. The result was a plan that allowed "inappropriate conversion" of rural land into low-density residential development. The County's reduction of [urban] densities and resultant UGA expansion was inconsistent with the compact urban growth and anti-sprawl provisions of GMA Goals 1 and 2. *FDO on Remand (Aug. 31, 2011), pg. 38.*

- ***North Clover Creek, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 10-3-0003c:** In recognition of excess UGA capacity, the County has adopted Comprehensive Plan policies to forestall further urban sprawl [allowing companion applications to remove and add land to the UGA.] The [subarea] plan also has policies allowing UGA boundary adjustments while preventing sprawl [allowing a 'land swap' so long as there is no net loss of rural separator land.] The Amendment with companion applications makes a size-neutral and capacity-neutral boundary adjustment. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 15.*

  Board decisions have wrestled with the question of whether land that has better characteristics for a desired economic purpose can be added to a UGA that is already oversized. In each of these cases, the antisprawl/UGA sizing requirements of the GMA trump the economic development goals of the local jurisdiction. If the Town or County find that they have not planned adequately for all the non-residential needs of the UGA, the remedy is re-designation of excess residential land for industrial or other uses, not incremental expansion of the UGA. *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 46.*

  There is simply no evidence in the record indicating need for more urban land in this area. With the UGA already substantially oversized, even marginal expansions violate the GMA requirement of RCW 36.70A.110(2) to size UGAs to accommodate forecasted growth and the GMA goal to reduce sprawl. [Citing *Thurston County* holding that "a UGA designation cannot exceed the amount of land necessary to accommodate the urban growth projected by OFM, plus a reasonable market factor."] *FDO (August 2, 2010), pg. 23.*

- ***Friends of Pierce County, et al. v. Pierce County,* Case No. 12-3-0002c:** In Pierce County there is already a well-documented county-wide "oversupply" of employment capacity. So the supply already exceeds the demand, even beyond the 25% market factor. County action further increasing the capacity (land supply) in one city on an ad hoc basis without a corresponding action decreasing capacity (land supply) somewhere else has the net effect of increasing the county-wide supply of employment capacity when there has been no increase in demand – OFM allocation. *FDO (July 9, 2012), pg. 71.*

- ***City of Snoqualmie v. King County,* Case No. 13-3-0002:** Snoqualmie contends [the 2009 legislative amendment to RCW 36.70A.110(2)] gives each city the prerogative to identify uses it wants to support its population growth and the additional urban land capacity it needs…. Rather, the Board finds the County's CPP revision reasonably incorporates the SHB 1825 provision for consideration of a broad range of non-residential uses, while reserving to the County the SHB 1825 authority to assess the need for these uses "as appropriate" and the un-amended requirement to conduct a county-wide analysis. *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 39.*

  Taken together, the GMA's UGA provisions require each city to project its land capacity for population and employment growth taking into consideration the need for commercial, institutional and other facilities. The County and cities must attempt to accommodate the projected growth, including non-residential uses, in the existing urban area through density revisions or other "reasonable measures." The County then adopts a UGA which may not be over-sized as a whole. *FDO (August 12, 2013), at 40.*

  In sum, the Board finds the [County's] newly-adopted amendments on D-3 and D-13 both (a) expand the category of uses to be accommodated within the UGA and (b) provide flexibility for UGA expansion if appropriate uses cannot be accommodated. These revisions bring the County's 2012 CP update into compliance with the SHB legislative amendments to RCW 36.70A.110(2) and .115. *Order Finding Compliance (January 30, 2014), p. 10.*

Updates

***John Postema v. Snohomish County,* Case No. 15-3-0011.** A specific restriction to the Board's scope of review arises when a party challenges a comprehensive plan or development regulation that has been "updated" in response to GMA planning cycles. The Supreme Court has ruled that the periodic updates required in the statute do not create an open season for challenges to previously-adopted provisions that are carried over into the new plan or code. [Citations omitted].Thus a party may challenge only new or amended plan and regulatory provisions in an update. Challenge to unchanged provisions is time-barred except where required by a recent GMA legislative amendment, new population forecast, or changed science concerning protection of critical area functions and values. *Final Decision and Order (April 8, 2016), pp 5-6.*

Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms

ADU	Accessory Dwelling Units
AMIRD	Areas of More Intense Rural Development
APA	Administrative Procedures Act
ARA	Aquifer Recharge Areas
BAS	Best Available Science
BMP	Best Management Practice
BOCC	Board of County Commissioners
CA	Critical Area
CAO	Critical Areas Ordinance
CARA	Critical Aquifer Recharge Area
CFE	Capital Facilities Element
CO	Compliance Order
CP	Comprehensive Plan
CPP	Countywide Planning Policy
CTED	Community, Trade & Economic Development, Department of
DOE	Department of Ecology
DNS	Determination of Nonsignificance
DR	Development Regulation
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EPF	Essential Public Facility
FCC	Fully Contained Community
FDO	Final Decision and Order
FEIS	Final Environmental Impact Statement
FFA	Frequently Flooded Area
FWH	Fish and Wildlife Habitat Conservation Areas (FWHCA)
GHA	Geologically Hazardous Area
GMA, Act	Growth Management Act
GMHB	Growth Management Hearings Board
HMP	Habitat Management Plan
ILA	Interlocal Agreement
ILB	Industrial Land Bank
IUGA	Interim Urban Growth Area
LAMIRD	Limited Areas of More Intensive Rural Development
LCA	Land Capacity Analysis
LOS	Level of Service
LUPP	Lands Useful for Public Purposes
MCPP	Multi-County Planning Policies
MPR	Master Planned Resort
MO	Motion Order
NRL, RL	Natural Resource Land, Resource Land
OFM	Office of Financial Management
PFR	Petition for Review

PHS	WA Dept. of Fisheries and Wildlife Priority Species and Habitat Manual
PUD	Planned Unit Development
RAID	Rural Areas of Intense Development
RO	Reconsideration Order
SCS	Soil Conservation Service
SEPA	State Environmental Policy Act
SMA	Shoreline Management Act
SMP	Shoreline Master Program
TDR	Transfer of Development Rights
TMZ	Trafic Management Zone
UGA	Urban Growth Area